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Abstract 
The contemporary problem of personal identity can be traced to Locke's initial 
formulation of the problem, and to the difficulties inherent in his solution. 
Following Locke, the favoured view in contemporary literature is that the 
primary locus of personal identity is in a person's psychological states or mind, 
to the exclusion of other factors, such as a person's body, or a person's 
environment. This thesis critically challenges the view that psychological 
continuity alone grounds personal identity. 
In addressing the psychological continuity criterion, I argue that the most fully 
developed version of this criterion contains untenable presuppositions about 
the nature of psychological states. In particular, I argue that the thought 
experiments advanced in support of the psychological continuity criterion are 
not adequate to establish that psychological continuity alone grounds 
personal identity. I also challenge the internalist conception of mental states 
implicit in the psychological continuity criterion, and the commitment to an 
atomistic, owner-independent characterisation of mental states. I argue 
instead for a characterisation that is holistic and owner-dependent. I also 
defend the view that the body plays a positive role in personal identity, and 
that self-unity is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. 
Throughout the thesis there is a strong commitment to the view that conceptual 
analysis alone is insufficient to solve the crucial issues involved in personal 
identity. There is, therefore, a significant utilisation of current empirical 
research and studies to support this commitment. Throughout the thesis also, 
attention is paid to the ethical implications of the psychological continuity 
criterion's conception of personhood, and to the practical consequences 
which are likely to be involved in this conception, were it to be adopted. 
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Prologue 
When I first began investigating personal identity, I knew nothing of the topic, 
nor did I know how to best deal with the huge array of material which 
confronted me. But as I worked my way through this material, I became aware 
of the psychological continuity criterial conception of personal identity. My first 
reaction was that this conception could not possibly be right, as it seemed to 
me to leave so much out about what persons fundamentally are. But as I 
became more aware of the implications of this predominantly psychological 
conception of persons and personal identity, I found myself becoming 
increasingly disturbed by the likely consequences and ramifications of this 
approach. Among these, three struck me the most. They concern the 
apparent disregard for the body, the alienation of moral responsibility, and the 
effective discarding of the self. 
My concern with the neglect of the body relates to the lack of prominence 
given to the body by an excessively mental approach to personal identity, as 
this implies that bodies are of no consequence to who and what persons are. 
This gives the impression that what happens to the body is of little importance 
to persons' well-being, and unwittingly gives tacit approval to ways in which 
persons can be harmed through the body, such as by starvation, torture, wars, 
homelessness, prejudice, in fact, any form of deprivation or oppression which 
can be directed at persons, first and foremostly, through the body. While the 
psychological continuity criterion in no way directly countenances any of these 
things, its neglect of the body leaves a gap into which these things could 
inadvertently fall. If an account of personal identity is to be personally or 
socially useful, in my opinion, there should be no such gap. 
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My concern with the moral implications of the psychological continuity criterion 
relates to its extremely capricious and unworkable attitude towards moral 
responsibility. Because moral responsibility, on this view, is tied to a certain 
quantity of memory retention, rather than to a single-bodied person, who 
maintains a constant spatio-temporal path through the world, the importance 
of moral responsibility is effectively devalued. In my view, if persons are to be 
absolved from responsibility for their actions (and there are indeed legitimate 
circumstances where this is appropriate), there must be some good reason 
other than simply, 'Well, a certain amount of memory has been lost' - how 
could this ever be accurately known, and how could such a policy be 
effectively administered? I believe that this attitude makes a mockery of 
fairness and justice, and would ultimately lead to manipulation and 
widespread injustice, and furthermore, counts against the likelihood of long-
term personal or societal reform. 
Finally, my concern with the effective discarding of the self relates to two 
distinct questions regarding the self, which, on the materialist approach of the 
psychological continuity criterion, are conflated into a single question. These 
questions concern whether selves exist at the empirical, experiential level, 
and whether souls or 'unknown entities' exist at a transcendent level. In my 
view, the conflation of these two questions into a single question results in 
neither of these issues being addressed satisfactorily. According to the 
psychological continuity criterion, selves are no more than bundles of 
experiences, with no efficaciousness or potential. They are little more than 
grammatical constructs, tools necessary to refer to individuals, but with no 
existence outside this role. This approach to the self is problematic in at least 
two ways. First, it seems to me that there are no grounds in the personal 
identity debate to make pronouncements concerning the status of the self 
outside its empirical role, as personal identity concerns the empirical status of 
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the self, and does not concern the nature of souls or similar such entities. 
There is thus no evidence in this debate on which to make the claim that souls 
or transcendent entities do not exist. Such a claim is unsoundly based, and 
is, therefore, erroneous and misleading. Second, the reduction of the self to a 
mere bundle of experiences trivialises the self at the empirical level, and thus 
provides no explanation for the operation of agency, or for the emergence of 
creativity which self-unity makes possible. It is in virtue of these and similar 
concerns that my investigation into personal identity has been pursued, and 
that, as a result, the following thesis about personal identity been produced. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Thesis Outline 
The problem of personal identity is the problem of specifying what makes a 
person at one time, the same person at a later time.' For example, what is it 
that makes me the same person that I was twenty years ago, or that I will be in 
twenty years time? According to one current view, personal identity over time 
is preserved in 'overlapping chains' of psychological connectedness. 2 These 
overlapping chains contain memories, beliefs, and other mental items. 
Personal identity accounts are accounts of psychological chains, and of the 
items within these chains. These accounts require reference neither to the 
items' ownership, nor to other items in the same chain. Known as the 
'psychological approach', this view also holds that mental items do not 
depend crucially for their identity on other features, such as particular bodies 
or brains, or on underlying entities such as souls or substantial selves. While 
the accumulation of mental items depends on experiencing subjects, the 
subjective apprehension of experience requires no special or substantial 
underpinnings. Theories embracing the psychological approach are criterial, 
as they specify the relevant criteria under which personal identity is preserved, 
and are known as versions of the psychological continuity criterion. Thought 
experiments, in which mind parts become disconnected from bodies or brains, 
or in which persons are 'reduplicated,' are frequently used to support the 
psychological continuity criterion, as they claim to show that personal identity 
is preserved in the mind, to the exclusion of the body or other external factors. 
In this thesis, I challenge the psychological continuity criterial approach, on the 
grounds that its portrayal of personal identity is distorted and misleading. 
'The problem of personal identity is more fully developed throughout this chapter, especially in 
Section 1.2. 
2For example, see (Parfit 1984), p 206. 
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My challenge addresses five key problems in the psychological continuity 
criterion that are referred to in the above account, but which are set out more 
precisely below: 
• The excessive reliance on oversimplified thought experiments to analyse 
personal identity. 
• The view that mind contents are adequately described by just looking 
inside the mind. 
• The view that minds are atomistically structured, and that mind contents are 
not individuated by ownership. 
• The view that the body is incidental to personal identity. 
• The view that the selves of experiencing subjects are no more than mere 
collections of thoughts and experiences. 
In addressing these five problems, I present some ideas which I see as crucial 
to personal identity, and which should be incorporated in any account of 
personal identity if such an account is to be accurate and comprehensive. It is 
my view that contrary to the criterial approach, personal identity must 
recognise that persons are complex and dynamic entities, in which their many 
components operate in an integrated manner, thereby producing a holistic 
structure. Unlike the criterial view of persons, this view requires that a person 
is understood as a whole, and not merely as a sum of theoretically separable 
parts. A comprehensive account of personal identity, therefore, is one which 
recognises this holistic conception of persons, and accounts for them 
accordingly. To support the holistic conception of persons, the central claims 
of this thesis are as follows: 
• That due to its reductionist, criterial approach, the psychological continuity 
criterion is inadequate to account for personal identity. 
• That a sound approach to personal identity must respect the complex, 
dynamic, holistic, non-reductive nature of persons. 
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Supporting these two main claims are five pairs of supporting claims, which 
amplify the five problems outlined above: 
• Thought experiments are inadequate to comprehensively analyse 
personal identity. In addition to such philosophical analysis, empirical 
research concerning actual persons in actual situations is required. 
• An internalist view of mental content is inadequate to account for the mind. 
Minds are formed and operate only in virtue of features external to the 
mind, and consequently, the constitution of minds cannot be understood 
independently of the environments in which they are located. 
• An atomistic, 'impersonal' characterisation of mental content misrepresents 
the mind's structure and mode of operation. Minds are predominantly 
holistic in structure and functioning, and mental states are individuated by 
ownership. 
• The neglect of the body by the psychological continuity criterion produces 
misleading conclusions about personal identity. The body plays a decisive 
role in psychological continuity, and therefore, also in personal identity. 
• The reduction of the self to a mere sum of experiences leaves subjectivity 
and experience inadequately explained. The self is a dynamic unity, which 
is essential to subjectivity and experience, and consequently, also to 
personal identity. 
These five supporting claims will be argued for throughout the next five 
chapters. While my arguments apply to the psychological continuity criterion 
in general, most of the discussion will focus on the version associated with 
Derek Parfit. Parfit is prominent among theorists who argue in favour of 
psychological continuity. Bodily continuity is also argued for by some current 
theorists, such as Peter Unger and Eric Olson. 3 Due to the complex nature of 
their theories, their work cannot be addressed in detail here. Although 
psychological continuity theories are the main focus of this thesis, a main point 
which emerges is that, due the integrity of the mind/ body relation, the 
separation of the mind and the body is as illegitimate for bodily continuity 
3See (Olson, 1997) and (Unger, 1990). 
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theorists as it is for psychological continuity theorists. Indeed, as I will show, 
any theory which assumes that the mind and the body operate autonomously, 
without regard for their integrity, or for their locatedness within a specific place 
or environment, does not take seriously the issues which personal identity 
actually involves. 
Parfit's work is chosen as the main focus of this thesis as it has received much 
criticism,4 and because it is more fully developed than most other versions, 
although many of its key ideas would most likely apply to these other versions 
were they to be equally developed. A feature of Parfit's version is his detailing 
of the ethical ramifications which would follow were the psychological 
continuity criterion to be adopted. I find these ethical stances questionable. 
Although Parfit claims that more concern for others and more personal 
liberation would follow, my view is that the opposite would occur. I suspect 
that with the neglect of crucial features involved in personal identity, such as 
the environment and the body, and with the reduced conception of the self, 
concern for others would decrease, responsibility would decline, and personal 
autonomy and self-esteem would diminish. 
The remainder of this chapter will proceed by first explicating more clearly the 
'problem' of personal identity. Some responses to this problem, including 
major aspects of Parfit's theory, will then be considered. Several difficulties 
which arise from Parfit's theory will then be discussed. I will then consider the 
issue of 'personhood', and outline the holistic approach to personal identity for 
which I shall argue throughout this thesis. Finally, the issues which occupy the 
remaining chapters will be summarised. 
4See, for example: (Brueckner 1993), (Cartwright 1993), (Curzer 1991), (Lewis 1976), and 
the many articles referenced throughout this thesis. 
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1.2 The Problem of Personal Identity 
Personal identity involves the set of conditions under which a person remains 
the same person over time, that is, the same person at a later time as at an 
earlier time. 5 Under normal conditions, being the same person over time 
involves being physically and psychologically continuous with an earlier 
person, that is, maintaining continuity of the same body and mind. But closer 
consideration reveals that bodies and minds are complex, and difficult to 
analyse. Bodies have parts, such as cells, limbs, organs, and brains. Minds 
involve 'components', such as thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and memories. Are 
all these parts essential to the preservation of personal identity, or are some 
essential while others are not? Some personal identity theorists hold that 
problem cases arise where body or mind parts are missing, or where bodies 
and minds could become separated. They claim that in such cases, we need 
to know what the conditions are under which personal identity is maintained. 
The problem of personal identity is just the difficulty of stipulating what those 
conditions are. Harold Noonan describes the problem as: 
the problem of giving an account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a person identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at 
another. Otherwise put, it is the problem of giving an account of what personal 
identity over time necessarily consists in, or as many philosophers phrase it, the 
problem of specifying the criterion of personal identity over time (Noonan 1989), p 
2. 
The problem of personal identity is a problem of persistence through change. 
It concerns the question of what permits persons to remain the same persons 
over time, when every physical cell and every mental state is constantly 
changing. 
5The material in this section is based on reading from a variety of sources, including: (Baillie 
1990); (Lyon 1988); (Maddell 1981); (Noonan 1989); (N000nan 1993); (Parfit 1984), and 
(Shoemaker 1984). 
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The notion of 'identity' itself is not simple, and requires a little explanation. 
'Identity' can refer to what is often understood as' type' identity or 'token' 
identity. Type identity refers to the identification of objects according to their 
possession of certain types or groups of characteristics. For example, one 
could say that what identifies Socrates is that he is a 'rational animal'. 
Similarly, one could say that what identifies Aristotle is also that he is a 
'rational animal'. In both cases, Socrates and Aristotle are the same type of 
thing, and thus have the same type identity. Socrates and Aristotle, however, 
do not have the same token identity. They are each different instances of type 
identity, and thus, each have a different token or individual identity. So, 
although they are identical to each other in some respects, they are also 
numerically distinct from each other. Personal identity concerns token or 
individual identity, as it is concerned with the identities of particular, individual 
persons. 
Token identity is, then, the identity of one thing over time and at a time, 
according to which the thing in question is distinct even from those other 
things which are qualitatively the same, and in which the thing concerned 
occupies a different spatio-temporal location from those other things. Thus we 
can distinguish numerical from qualitative identity, as it is numerical identity 
that is normally at issue in the discussion of personal identity. The identity of 
particular objects, however, is not always clear-cut, as there can be problem 
cases, in which identity is difficult to pin down, or in which identity appears to 
change. For example, the 'contents' of a river are always moving, yet we 
understand the river to always be the same river. A piece of clay appears to 
change its identity when it becomes a statue, yet the material of both objects is 
the same. Similarly, a signpost appears to change identity when its function 
changes and it becomes a see-saw, yet the object itself in both cases is 
exactly the same object. It can thus be seen that identity is not always simple 
and easy to determine. 
Living objects also change, as their interaction with the world generates 
change and decay in the particles out of which such objects are constituted. 
Where the change is normal, non-human living objects are taken to maintain 
identity over time. Persons are more complex, as they comprise both 
biological and psychological lives. Because both physical and mental lives 
are subject to constant change, the locus of personal identity is obscured and 
problematic. This problem is now explored in more detail. 
1.3 Personal Identity Theories 
Personal identity theories demonstrate a variety of responses to the problem 
outlined above. These theories are traditionally held to have originated in the 
work of John Locke, although the mind-body dichotomy on which they are 
typically based goes back to Plato. Locke holds that persons are primarily 
psychological entities, whose identity is preserved in rationality and 
consciousness: 
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes 
every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational 
being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
action or thoughts, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now 
it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, 
that that action was done (Locke 1959), 2.27.11. 
According to Locke's view, personal identity over time is realised in virtue of 
continuing successive conscious states, which are usually understood as 
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memories, beliefs and other similar mental items. Locke's theory is 
foundational to many contemporary personal identity theories. These can be 
divided into non-reductionist and reductionist theories. 
Non-reductionist theories hold that personal identity cannot be fully accounted 
for. Typically (though not necessarily),6 non-reductionist theories are dualistic 
in nature, and are explicitly based on Cartesian ontology, where mind and 
body are regarded as fundamentally separate entities. A person is regarded 
as a unique entity which is supplementary to the body and brain. 7 The identity 
of a person is not reducible to a specifiable set of facts, but is based on either 
a Cartesian soul, or on a further, unanalysable or undiscoverable fact.8 Thus, 
a complete description of a person cannot be given. Personal identity is 
always determinate and specific, as opposed to the identity of other living 
objects, which is sometimes ivague'. 8 For example, the identity of a plant may 
6As will become apparent, I offer in this thesis a non-reductionist view of personal identity which 
is not based on Cartesian ontology. 
7Among current theorists who hold non-reductionist views are Geoffrey MadeII, Roderick 
Chisholm, and Richard Swinburne. See, for example: (Maddell 1981); (Chisholm 1969); and 
(Swinburne 1984). 
8This view is traditionally attributed to Butler - see (Maddell 1981), p 107; (Noonan 1989), p 64; 
(Parfet 1984), p 222; and (Shoemaker 1984), p 75. Butler claimed that analysis of personal 
identity reached an end-point beyond which it could not go: 'But, though we are thus certain 
that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our 
remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And this 
question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever, because it is a question 
concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether perception by 
memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction 
and reasoning, which also includes memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception, can. Here, 
then, we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, 
whose truth we can no otherwise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with 
them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our 
faculties, which can not otherwise be proved than by the use of means of those very suspected 
faculties themselves' (Butler 1867), p 198. 
8The origin of this view is attributed to Butler. He referred to the non-reductive view of personal 
identity as 'strict and philosophical', as opposed to views about the identity of other objects, 
which were 'loose and popular'. He found Locke's treatment of personal identity 'hasty', and 
was at pains to draw a distinction between the identity of persons, and that of other objects. To 
this end he contrasted the identity of plants to that of humans: 'And therefore, when we say the 
identity, or sameness, of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under 
the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not, the word 
same, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify what it 
signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense, then, the 
life, and the organization, and the plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the 
perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no 
being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be the same with that with which it hath indeed 
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to which psychological states are also implicated varies according to the 
particular theory. There are three main types of physical theories. The Bodily 
Criterion stipulates that a person is the same person at one time as she is at 
another time if and only if she has the same body. Minute cell change of living 
tissue is permitted, providing that the change is normal, and occurs gradually 
and naturally. The Brain Criterion holds that personal identity resides in the 
brain, rather than in the whole body. If a person's brain was transferred to a 
different body, identity goes with the brain, rather than with the body. 
Psychology is important, but only because it resides in the brain. The Physical 
Criterion holds that personal identity is retained in amounts of physical matter 
less than that of a complete human brain. The amount of matter ranges from 
slightly less than a whole brain, such as when a small amount of brain is 
removed, to minuscule amounts, such as a single cell. Brain-split operations, 
both real and imaginary are appealed to in support of this view, as these 
operations have convinced some theorists that incomplete brains could 
maintain the psychology of a whole person. 11 
Psychological continuity theories hold that it is the continuity of a person's 
psychological states which maintains personal identity over time. Person A at 
ti is the same person as person B at t2 if and only if the psychological states of 
person A are appropriately connected to the psychological states of person B. 
Appropriate connectedness can refer to 'any causal links between past factors 
and present psychological states' (Noonan 1989), p 13. While psychological 
states are instantiated in some body or other, the body itself contributes 
nothing essential, either to the states, or to personal identity. Psychological 
continuity theories specify criteria under which personal identity is preserved, 
and are known as versions of the psychological continuity criterion. The 
11 This issue is developed in Chapter 5. There are many descriptions of brain operations in 
personal identity literature. See, for example (Nagel 1979), and (Unger 1990), or for more 
seminal material, (Gazzaniga 1970), and (Gazzaniga 1978). 
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seem 'vague' due the constant change in the material out of which the plant is 
composed. The constant change of matter also occurs in humans, but on the 
non-reductionist view, the personal identity of humans is taken to be 
unaffected by such change, and to remain strict and unaltered. Personal 
identity is what matters to a person's survival, and to a person's ethical 
commitments. Two main reasons for holding a non-reductionist view are the 
commitment, frequently on religious grounds, to an immaterial (often immortal) 
soul or substance, and the disillusionment with the paradoxes generated in 
reductionist accounts, such as the problem of possible person-reduplication.w 
Reductionist theories hold that personal identity is reducible to a set of 
specifiable facts. Describing these facts is said to produce a full description of 
a person. These facts concern either bodies or brains, or the states of bodies 
or brains. Materialist conceptions of the mind traditionally lend themselves to 
reductionist accounts of personal identity, as these accounts do not attempt to 
ground personal identity in unknown souls or non-material entities. 
Reductionist theories provide criterial accounts which stipulate the necessary 
and sufficient conditions required for a person at one time to remain the 
numerically same person at another time. Criteria stipulated for personal 
identity over time (diachronic identity) are thus derivable from, and indeed, 
necessarily limited to those stipulated for personal identity at a time 
(synchronic identity). Criterial accounts are of two types, and refer to either 
physical or psychological continuity. 
Physical continuity theories hold that it is the continuity of all or part of the 
human body which accounts for the identity of persons over time. The degree 
nothing the same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when applied to persons. The 
identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance' (Butler 1867), pp 194- 
195. These views of Butler are seminal to some of the arguments raised in the personal identity 
debate. 
10This problem is addressed in Chapter 2. 
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psychological continuity criterial approach generates certain problems. In 
particular, this approach is vulnerable to producing duplicate accounts of 
personal identity. It is in principle possible that the same description could be 
given to more than one set of mental states, theoretically resulting in the 
apparent conflation of several persons into one person. This problem is 
exacerbated by the consideration of imaginary cases in which persons are • 
'duplicated', or in which brains are split and put into different bodies. The 
attempt to overcome these and similar problems has resulted in several 
versions of the theory being produced. Each version attempts to overcome the 
duplication problem in a different way. A major problem with these responses 
is that they are incapable of being subjected to empirical scrutiny. It is simply 
assumed that they can be accepted at face value. 12 Parfit's is one such 
version, and is now considered. 13 
1.4 Relation R 
To distinguish his version of the psychological continuity criterion from other 
reductionist theories, Parfit refers to it as 'Reductionist', with a capital .R..14 Hi s 
Reductionist view holds that personal identity is reducible to psychological 
continuity, and comprises no underlying entities such as souls, Cartesian 
Egos, or substantial selves. Much of Parfit's reasoning is based on thought 
experiments, which involve brain or part-brain transfers, or the supposed 
artificial duplication of persons. When these transfers or duplications occur, 
12See, for example: (Lewis 1976), in which Lewis argues for the 'Multiple Occupancy thesis'. 
This thesis holds that in the cases of supposed fission (person reduplication), that new persons 
are not really created, but have existed all along, and have only become spatio-temporally 
evident after the supposed fission procedures have occurred (Noonan 1993), p xvii, and also 
(Nozick 1981), especially pp 29-114, in which Nozick argues for the 'Closer Continuer Theory'. 
This theory holds that the person which survives is the person who is closest to, or most like, the 
original person. Persons other than the 'closest continuer' who are supposed to have been 
produced are said to not maintain identity with the original person. 
13Parfit's theory is outlined only, as the relevant areas are expanded in future chapters. 
14Thus, when referring to 'Reductionism' as opposed to 'reductionism', I will be specifically 
referring to Parfit's theory. 
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the body which is discarded is taken to have no significance to the 
maintenance of the personal identity concerned. 
Parfit's thought experiments underpin his conclusion that personal identity 
holds in virtue of non-branching psychological continuity, defined as 
'overlapping chains': 
Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological 
connections. 
Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness (Parfit 1984), p 206. 
Psychological continuity is defined in terms of 'overlapping chains' because 
on their own, 'direct psychological connections' are not transitive relations, 
and thus would be unable to maintain identity. Parfit claims that while he is 
strongly connected to himself yesterday, and he was then strongly connected 
to himself the day before, and so on, it does not follow that he is strongly 
connected to himself as he was twenty years ago. He claims that there could 
be very few connections for most people over long periods of time. 
'Overlapping chains', on the other hand, are transitive, and permit identity to 
persist over extended periods of time. But even so, overlapping chains 
require sufficient connections between earlier and later times for identity to 
persist. Parfit claims that 'strong connectedness' is the retention of at least half 
the number of direct connections which hold in a single day. Identity is 
strongest when a large number of connections are held, and is weaker as the 
number lessens. Where less than half are held, identity fails to be realised 
(Parfit 1984), p 206. 
For Parfit, causes must be present between the elements which comprise 
psychological continuity. This means that the components in a person's 
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psychological chains must have causal connections between them of some 
kind. Causes are important, as it is the causal connections between items 
which permit identity to be retained. Three types of cause are possible, 
Narrow, Wide, or Widest. 'Narrow' cause is normal cause, such as the 
retention of one's memories in the normal way, or the normal maintenance of 
a continuous spatio-temporal path through the world by one's body. 'Wide' 
cause is any reliable cause, such as a partial or complete brain-transfer. 
'Widest' cause is any cause whatsoever, such as the complete reduplication of 
a person. Parfit claims that the 'Widest' criterion is best, as, even if it is not 
'true continuity', it is just as good. We should accept the 'Widest' criterion 
because there could be instances where we would accept non-normal 
causation in relation to bodily functions, and we should, therefore, accept non-
normal causation in relation to mental functions. For example, if a normally-
blind person were fitted with an artificial device which enabled a form of vision 
to occur, we would accept that this was 'as good' as normal vision, even 
though it was not caused in the normal way: 15 
I shall argue that the two Wide Psychological Criteria are both better than the Narrow 
Criterion. A partial analogy may suggest why. Some people go blind because of 
damage to their eyes. Scientists are now developing artificial eyes. These involve a 
glass or plastic lens, and a micro-computer which sends through the optic nerve 
electrical patterns like those that are sent through this nerve by a natural eye. When 
such artificial eyes are more advanced, they might give to someone who has gone 
blind visual experiences just like those that he used to have. What he seems to see 
would correspond to what is in fact before him. And his visual experiences would 
be causally dependent, in this new but reliable way, on the light-waves coming from 
the objects that are before him. Would this person be seeing these objects? If we 
insist that seeing must involve the normal cause, we would answer No. But even if 
this person cannot see, what he has is just as good as seeing, both as a way of 
knowing what is within sight, and as a source of visual pleasure. If we accept the 
Psychological Criterion, we would make a similar claim. If psychological continuity 
15As Parfit defends his claims for causal continuity with any cause with this argument, his 
defence is presented in full. 
does not have its normal cause, some may claim that it is not true psychological 
continuity. We can claim that, even if this is so, this kind of continuity is just as good 
as ordinary continuity (Parfit 1984), pp 208-209. 
Part it argues that because we should accept that non-normal causation of 
psychological continuity is just as good as normal causation, we should also 
accept that even a fully duplicated 'person' would be as good as an original 
person. Providing that only a single 'person' resulted from the duplication (or 
brain-transfer) process, psychological continuity with the original person 
would be maintained. Parfit designates the relation involved in this type of 
psychological continuity as Relation R, and defines this relation as 'non-
branching psychological continuity with any cause' (Parfit 1984), pp 199-217. 
For Parfit , the commitment to Relation R holds certain metaphysical 
consequences for the status of persons. Because personal identity is 
characterised in terms of a certain amount of overlapping chains, the 
maintenance of personal identity is a matter of having sufficient of these 
chains. When the amount of chains a person owns drops below a certain 
level, that person ceases to exist, and consequently, the person that 
subsequently exists is a different person to the one who existed earlier. Thus, 
an aged person whose mental constituents have undergone substantial 
change since her youth will be a different person to the person she was many 
years earlier. On this view, the life of a single body could embrace the 
existence of more than one person at different times in its life-history. Parfit 
holds that the difference between these persons at different times could be as 
great as the difference between different-bodied persons at the same time. In 
some instances, it could not be known when a person changed from being 
one person to being a different person. Parfit holds that this means that 
personal identity is often indeterminate, and is, therefore, less important that 
we might normally think. It is largely insignificant whether an individual is one 
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person, or several different persons over time. Psychological continuity is 
more important than personal identity. 
Parfit also holds that these metaphysical consequences have certain ethical 
ramifications. Different persons who are connected to each other within the 
lifetime of a single body may not be accountable for each other's actions. 
These persons exist at different times, and are 'series persons' (Parfit 1984), p 
298. Series persons are not responsible for each other's actions, 
commitments, promises, sufferings, crimes, and so on. Moral responsibility 
between series persons diminishes in proportion to reduced psychological 
connectedness. Parfit gives some examples of ways in which persons' lives 
could be affected by this changed conception of moral responsibility. 
First, a wife could make a promise to her husband when he was a young man, 
who had a certain set of values. Later, the wife could revoke that promise, as 
she might consider that her husband's values had changed, and that he had 
therefore become a different person to the one to whom she made the 
promise. She could hold that the young man to whom she has loyalty no 
longer exists, and that her now middle-aged husband is, therefore, owed no 
such loyalty (Parfit 1984), pp 327-329. 
Second, it may not be possible to compensate suffering which occurs early in 
life by gains received later in life. A person who suffers at one time may no 
longer exist by the time the gains are received: 
I argued earlier that if we move from the Non-Reductionist view to the Reductionist 
view, it becomes more plausible to claim that there is less scope for compensation 
within the same life. Thus it is more plausible to claim that great burdens imposed 
upon a child cannot be compensated, or fully compensated, by somewhat greater 
benefits in this child's adult life (Parfit, 1984), p 346. 
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The life of these persons does not coincide with the life of a single body, and 
thus, the life-time of a single body cannot be conceptualised as a complete 
whole, as if it was the life-time of only one person. 
Third, a person who commits crimes at an earlier time may not be the same 
person who receives punishment for those crimes at a later time. Parfit argues 
that if a criminal is 'less connected' to himself than he was at the time of the 
crime, he deserves less punishment. When connections are very weak, 
maybe no punishment at all is warranted (Parfit 1984), pp 326-346. 
Fourth, because series persons could be as separate from each other as 
spatially discrete persons, distributive justice between persons should be 
altered. Parfit claims that principles of distributive justice should be accorded 
'more scope and less weight'. He claims that it makes sense to be more 
concerned with justice across a community, than with justice for individual 
persons. Issues of moral responsibility, compensation or commitment, should 
be viewed similarly between different bodied persons, as they are between 
successive persons in a single body. Because the boundaries between 
different bodied persons and different series persons are not distinct, it would 
be irrational for me to be especially concerned for my own future, rather than 
for someone else's future. Self-interest theories should be replaced by more 
impersonal theories, such as the 'Revised Self-Interest Theory', as Parfit terms 
it. According to this theory, it may not be irrational to do things against one's 
own interests. For example, it would not matter if a person suffered hardship 
as long as someone benefited. It does not matter if the person who suffered is 
not the person who gains. On the Reductionist view, identity is less deep than 
on non-reductionist views, so we should be more concerned with the quality of 
experiences, than with whose experiences they are. Part it claims that we 
ought to be Reductionists, and hold to the above moral beliefs. He claims that 
17 
these beliefs can generate more concern for others, and can be personally 
liberating (Parfit 1984), pp 346-347. 
1.5 Problematic Persons 
In providing Relation R, Parfit has responded to the psychological continuity 
criterion's inability to provide uniquely determining personhood 
characterisations or personal identity descriptions. But the consequence of 
Relation R is that the status of personhood is diminished to the extent that 
personhood itself is secondary to the characteristics of which it is composed. 
More specifically, because the psychological continuity criterion is incapable 
of capturing the precise elements of personal identity, the psychological states 
which are deemed to characterise personal identity have become more 
important than personal identity itself. As Parfit states, significant metaphysical 
and ethical ramifications follow from this stance. Both of these are seriously 
problematic. 
Parfit claims that the commitment to Relation R should lead to an improvement 
in moral consciousness. He argues that because the boundaries between 
different persons are blurred, the concern we have for ourselves would lessen, 
and the concern we would have for others would increase. But it is not clear 
that this would necessarily be the case. The concept of series persons means 
that responsibility between earlier persons and later persons is diminished, 
and in some instances, is lost altogether. This view of responsibility invites the 
devaluing of the very concept of responsibility. If persons thought of 
themselves as series persons, and knew that they may not in the future be 
held responsible for their actions as they would no longer exist, they may care 
less about what those actions are than they would do otherwise. This could 
encourage capricious or arbitrary promise-making and promise-breaking. It 
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could also generate a careless approach to one's actions and one's attitudes 
towards others. Often the way we behave and choose our actions is 
associated with what we perceive to be the interests of ourselves and of other 
persons who are affected by such actions. But the idea that we or our friends 
and families may no longer exist when such interests are realised is likely to 
make us care less about what those interests are. Why should I care if I am 
mean and unjust to others now, if later I can later tell myself it was not me who 
was once mean and unjust, but someone else? The notion that I would care 
for someone in the way that I care for myself is simply not feasible, as it is only 
in virtue of caring for myself that my ability to care for others is possible. 16 
Another problem with series persons concerns the elderly and sufferers of 
diseases such as Alzheimer's disease. Due to the loss of psychological 
connections, these persons would be considered to be no longer be the same 
persons they once were, and in some instances, they would be considered to 
no longer be persons at all. Thus, one's elderly relatives may not be the same 
persons they were when one was a child. At a time when your mother may 
most need your care and attention, she may not be the same person who was 
once your mother. Many people would find this notion of identity disturbing. 
Part it might say that it would not matter if the person was not your mother, as 
long as you cared for someone. But this view is not realistic, and takes no 
account of our intuitions about our family and other close relations. In most 
instances, we instinctively conceive of our family (or surrogate family) relations 
as being unique, and as being, in an important sense, unaffected by change. 
We do not regard our relatives as being different persons just because they 
lose their memories, or because they change their ideas over the years. Even 
16 Imagine that you never had any needs or concerns. How would you know what it was like to 
want or need something, or to care for someone if you had never experienced the meaning of 
'care'? How would you understand the needs of others? How could you care for them, or put 
them before yourself, if you had no conception of need, or of meeting your own needs? 
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if we do not get on well with our families, we take for granted that they are, in 
some sense, an aspect of our lives, which, in normal circumstances, could not 
be arbitrarily discarded or exchanged. Family relations are also unique in that 
they are the basis of our relations with others. Being the primary form of our 
relations, they are foundational to our relations with others, and thus cannot in 
some arbitrary way become secondary to that foundation. Families are also 
part of the structure of society, and an important basis of social relations. If 
family relations were subject to the sort of breakdown envisaged by the 
psychological continuity criterion, social relations, and with them societies, 
would be vulnerable to breakdown also. 
Furthermore, the diminishing or removal of responsibility and punishment for 
crimes, on the basis of a reduced psychology, could lead to widespread 
injustice. Because the duration of series persons depends solely on the 
amount of psychological change which occurs, it effectively means that 
whether or not someone at a later time is held responsible for a crime 
committed at an earlier time depends solely on the quantity of change 
involved in that person's psychology, rather than on the quality of change 
involved. This seems grossly unjust. It means that if persons (as traditionally 
understood) were at one time involved in horrific war crimes, they could, at a 
future time be excused the responsibility for those crimes if their psychology 
had sufficiently changed, regardless of whether the change which had 
occurred involved remorse, character improvement, or moral growth, or 
whether victims had been compensated. 17 Similarly, a person who commits 
corporate fraud at an earlier time, and lives off the fruits of his profits on a 
luxurious island at a later time, given the right amount of 'memory loss', could 
17 It is not enough to say: 'Well, if someone had changed that much, of course they would be 
reformed'. It is not at all certain that this would be the case. All that is required is the loss of a 
certain amount of memories, not a character change or compensatory actions. It is the principle 
itself - quantity v quality - which is at issue. 
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fail to be held accountable for his former actions, regardless of whether he felt 
remorse or had compensated his victims. 
The above attitudes towards moral responsibility go against our intuitions, and 
seem neither ethical nor just. They make neither for an ethical individual, nor 
for an ethical society. If the principles generated by series persons were 
universalised, society as a whole would suffer. Without realistic and feasible 
distinctions which permit persons to be held accountable for their actions, 
personal autonomy would diminish (if not lose) significance, and the impetus 
for social and moral reform would be inhibited. If it does not matter who 
commits particular actions, it can hardly matter who is affected by them, and so 
it cannot matter what actions are committed. 
These ethical stances are controversial, and have the potential to affect 
society considerably were they to be adopted as general principles. As I 
believe that these effects would be negative, the view of persons which leads 
to such stances should be questioned. In my view, these unsatisfactory ethical 
stances arise from the conception of personal identity associated with Relation 
R. The major fault of this conception is that it neglects to acknowledge many 
aspects of personal identity, which, although not explicitly specified by the 
psychological continuity criterion, are nevertheless implicated by it. In other 
words, conceiving of personal identity in terms of psychological states alone, 
without taking account of what is involved in those states, leaves many 
important aspects of personal identity unaccounted for. This neglect ultimately 
leads to the loss of personal identity, and to the incurring of certain ethical 
ramifications which, in my opinion, are totally unacceptable. It is the gap in 
analysis that concerns the present thesis, as, in my view, this gap is 
responsible for an account of personal identity which is inadequate and 
misleading. Of the areas of neglect involved, five important problems in 
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Part it's account of personal identity were referred to earlier, and are now 
outlined in more detail. 
First, Parfit places undue emphasis on thought experiments to elucidate 
personal identity. Like those of other personal identity theorists, Parfit's 
thought experiments contain fictitious scenarios, in which extraordinary things 
happen, and in which extra-ordinary persons are produced. Concerns about 
the identities of these extra-ordinary persons are then used to inform about the 
identities of normal persons. It is not clear, however, that the identities of 
extra-ordinary persons have much in common with the identities of normal 
persons, as the scenarios which produce extra-ordinary persons give little 
exploration or time to the concerns of real persons in real life. This lack of 
concern with real persons results in a distorted and inappropriate assessment 
of what personal identity involves. 
Second, Parfit fails to recognise the significance of causal factors. The 
psychological continuity criterion stipulates that the contents of mental chains 
are essential to personal identity, but does not care how these contents are 
caused. The Widest Criterion holds that 'any cause will do', which means that 
the actual cause may be entirely ignored. This means that factors outside the 
mental chains which contribute to the chains' contents are effectively excluded 
from the account of mental content. This is misleading, as what goes on 
'inside' the mind is crucially affected by what goes on 'outside' the mind. 18 
Parfit is little interested in external factors, and concentrates on the mental 
chains themselves and what happens to them, rather than on where they 
came from. 
18 1 place 'inside and 'outside' in inverted commas because I think, as will be shown, that this 
distinction is artificial and misleading. As I shall argue, especially in Chapter 3, what is 'inside' our 
minds is ultimately what is 'outside' them also. 
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Third, in giving an account of personal identity in terms of overlapping chains, 
Parfit characterises minds and mental items atomistically. Personal identity is 
maintained according to the number of connections between mental items. 
Neither the ownership of these items, nor the way these items are connected 
to each other is taken to be of importance. But this view of the mind's structure 
is inaccurate, as it misconstrues the nature of the mind and its mode of 
operation. This view misses the point that the ownership of mental items, and 
the relation between different mental items are essential features of the mental 
items themselves. To be accurate, an account of personal identity must 
recognise these essential features, and must include them when accounting 
for minds and the contents of minds. 
Fourth, when accounting for mental states, Parfit neglects the body's 
significance. Whether a person has one body, or another body, is not taken to 
be of interest to the mental life of that person. Different persons can occupy 
the same body at different times, without their identity being compromised. 
This means that any influence which the body has on mental life goes 
unrecognised. The kind of bodies persons have is taken to have no bearing 
on the kind of minds they have, nor on the kind of thoughts they think. This is 
not right, as the particular body a person has is crucially related to that 
person's mind. We cannot take for granted that minds would be the same, 
were they to be 'placed' in different bodies. 
Fifth, the Reductionist stance on the self amounts to an unacceptable 
trivialisation of the self. Reductionism conceives the self to be no more than a 
formal requirement of experience, but does not expand on what this formal 
requirement involves or implies. Parfit maintains that experience requires no 
underlying entities, such as unknown souls or Cartesian Egos, and that, 
therefore, we should accept Reductionism and reject such types of entities. 
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This view seems to conflate two issues: the question of the existence of an 
underlying entity beyond the reach of empirical research, and the question of 
the existence of a detectable empirical self, which, although substantially 
constituted by experience, nevertheless, is more than a mere sum of 
experiences. The confusion arises from viewing experience from a third-
person perspective only. When the first-person viewpoint is taken into 
account, it becomes evident that a subject's first-person knowledge of herself 
is a crucial condition of experience. The relevance of the first-person 
viewpoint to the preconditions of experience is not taken seriously in the 
above account, and this leads to a misleading conception of the self. 
The above deficiencies in Parfit's account demonstrate the psychological 
continuity criterion's failure to adequately account for personal identity. This 
failure is exemplified in the fact that by trying to account for personal identity in 
terms of psychological states alone, the psychological continuity criterion 
loses the persons it started with, and as a result, undermines the concept of 
moral responsibility between different persons, and possibly across society as 
a whole. As this view of personal identity and its consequences is 
controversial, the analysis which leads to such a view, namely criterial 
analysis, warrants investigation. 
Criterial analysis of personal identity operates by dissecting persons, looking 
at their parts, ascertaining what the parts are used for, and then determining 
which parts are essential to personal identity. Accounts of personal identity 
formed on this basis then stipulate the relevant parts which encapsulate 
personal identity, to the exclusion of other parts which are seen as 
unessential, and as theoretically expendable or replaceable. A major problem 
with this type of analysis, however, is that in focussing on the parts which are 
candidates for personal identity, little or no attention is paid to the effect which 
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these parts have on each other. This deficiency is problematic, as the relation 
between particular 'person parts' is crucial to both the identity of those parts, 
and to the particular way those parts operate. For example, a particular brain 
is crucially influenced by the body of which it is part, such that were that body 
to be different, the brain would be different also. A person with artery 
blockages, who lives a sedentary and painful life, for example, may develop a 
different brain structure to, and would have different experiences from a 
person who is fit and does lots of walking and exercise. While not all 
differences are as acute as this, they are nevertheless present in some degree 
or another. This means that the conceptualisation of 'person parts', without 
giving due consideration to the relation between these parts, gives the 
misleading impression that 'person parts' are independent and self-sufficient. 
Criterial analysis, however, pays no attention to these anomalies, and 
considers brains, bodies, and minds as if they were theoretically separable 
objects, whose role in personal identity can be determined independently of 
the role of the other objects to which these parts are connected. 
The problem with this approach to personal identity is that it does not accord 
with the nature of persons as we know them. Persons seem to me to be highly 
complex entities, who exist in a more-or-less integrated manner, such that it is 
difficult to conceive how their parts could be theoretically separated in the way 
suggested by Parfit and similar theorists. I wonder, for example, how could a 
person's mind be the same, if that person had a different brain? Or how could 
a person's thoughts be the same, if that person had a different body? Or how 
could a person's memory be the same, if that person lived in a different place? 
If we are to really understand personal identity, we must address these 
questions. We need to be clear about what persons are, about how their 
different parts relate to each other, the degree to which these relations are 
significant, what makes a person change at different times in her life, how the 
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notion of 'change' itself relates to being a person, and so on. As these issues 
are important, it seems that an appropriate first step to determining the nature 
of personal identity is to first determine more precisely what persons are. For it 
is only when we are clear about what being a 'person' means, that we can be 
clear about what being the same person over time means. In the following 
section, this question is addressed. 
1.6 Personhood 19 
Persons appear to be intrinsically complex objects. Pinning down precisely 
what defines and identifies persons as persons is inherently difficult, as the 
concept 'person' itself is not simple. This is evident from the attempts of many 
theorists to provide accurate and decisive descriptions of what persons are. 
This section will look at several accounts of personhood, with a view to 
locating common characteristics among these accounts which might help 
ascertain more precisely what persons are, and what it means to be a person. 
The concept 'person' proves to have a complex history. The meaning of 
'person' has changed as intellectual currents and societies have changed. 
One thing seems apparent throughout: being a person is being a human 
being, living in our world, and being recognised by others. 20 The Latin origin 
of 'person' refers to 'persona' as a 'mask' or covering (Trendelenburg 1910), 
pp 338-339.21 Over its history, the meaning of 'person' has expanded to 
include numerous aspects, including dramatic, legal, social, rational, and 
moral. 
19By 'personhood' here I mean no more than the state of being a person. This meaning is 
intended throughout. 
20While the issue of whether aliens, computers, and animals are persons comes up at times, 
this issue cannot be taken up here, as it would make the present argument too complex to deal 
with in the space available. Personal identity is thus dealt with in relation to normal human 
persons. Once what this involves is established, the question of who or what else might be 
persons also can then be addressed. 
21 For an account of the very early history of the word 'person', see (Trendelenburg 1910). 
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For Locke, the legal and moral aspects of personhood are the most important. 
The issues of rewards and punishments in this life and the next motivate his 
concerns. Locke concludes that a person's essential characteristics are 
intelligence, rationality, and self-consciousness, but does not refer specifically 
to embodiment. 22 More recently, Peter Strawson claims that being a person 
implies that one is necessarily an embodied being. He claims that in order to 
understand ourselves as persons, we must understand others as persons 
also. For Strawson, this means that we must be able to ascribe psychological 
predicates as well as bodily predicates to other persons. 23 In order to do this, 
we must interact with other persons, which means we must be able to 
distinguish them as being spatio-temporally distinct from ourselves. We do 
this by means of our separate bodies. So, to be a person is to admit to 
consciousness, and, at the same time, to admit to embodiment (Strawson 
1959), pp 87-116. 
Harry Frankfurt conceives personhood to be a special type of agency. He 
argues that being a person requires the ability to distinguish between first-
order desires, second-order desires, and second-order volitions. Second-
order desires arise from reflection on first-order desires, but are not 
necessarily intended to motivate action. For example, a physician who, to 
help his patient (first-order desire), wants to understand what it is like to crave 
a certain drug (second-order desire), does not want to act on this desire by 
taking the drug. A second-order volition is a second-order desire which is 
22Locke claimed: 'we must consider what person stands for:- which I think, is a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places: which it does only by that consciousness, which is 
inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it' (Locke 1959), 2.27.11. This 
claim is taken as foundational to the personal identity debate. 
23Strawson describes psychological predicates as 'P predicates, and as attributable only to 
persons, examples being 'is smiling' or 'is in pain'. He describes physical or material predicates 
as 'M' predicates, and as applicable to material bodies, whether conscious or not, for example, 
'weighs 10 stone' (Strawson 1959), p 104. 
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intended to motivate action, such as by wanting to concentrate more on one's 
work. According to Frankfurt, an entity which can reflect on second-order 
desires, and distinguish them from second-order volitions, is a person. 
Entities capable of second-order desires, but not second-order volitions, are 
wantons. Wantons include children, animals, and some adults. 24 Frankfurt 
emphasises that it is the inability for second-order reflection, rather than 
irrationality which distinguishes wantons from persons. He claims wantons 
could be completely rational (Frankfurt 1971), pp 9-14. 
Daniel Dennett holds that persons have rationality, consciousness, self-
consciousness, verbal ability, communicative ability, and must be treated as, 
and be able to reciprocate treatment, as persons. These conditions of 
personhood are related in various ways. The first three form a set of mutually 
interdependent conditions. To be rational, one must be conscious, and must 
be recognised as an object of a 'certain stance' by others. The fourth 
condition is conditional on the first three, but remains independent of the last 
two. One might expect that the ability for reciprocity requires both language 
and self-consciousness. But Dennett waves this requirement by considering 
persons as intentional systems. 25 While the capacity for entities to be 
intentional systems is a necessary condition of personhood, it is not sufficient. 
An intentional system does no more than invite simple behaviourist-type 
responses, such as treating an entity as if it had beliefs, desires, and so on. 
This position accommodates the third condition of personhood, but not the 
fourth. Reciprocity consists of reaction to stimulus, indicating response to that 
stimulus. While reciprocity, as here understood, seems to presuppose 
24Although Frankfurt does not specify which adults, I presume he means cases of mental 
disorder, such as mental illness, dysfunction, retardation, senility, and so on. 
25This concept is brought out in (Dennett 1978), in which Dennett compares three stances 
which can be taken towards entities, namely the design stance, the physical stance, and the 
intentional stance. The latter of these assumes rationality, and is thus the best stance to adopt 
where prediction of behaviour is required. It applies equally to non-human and human entities. 
See Dennett's article for full details, and for explanations of his reasoning. 
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language and self-consciousness (Dennett's fifth and sixth conditions), this is 
not necessarily so. It is this hiatus in the account which underpins the discord 
between metaphysical and moral personhood (Dennett 1976), pp 178-181. 
The discord is revealed by considering higher order intentional systems, and 
Rawls' theory of justice. 26 An example of a higher-order intentional system is 
a second-order intentional system, which has the capacity to reciprocate the 
behaviourist-type responses of first-order intentional systems. The reciprocity 
in mind here involves knowing (or at least, predicting) how the other system 
will respond to a given stimulus. This principle could be iterated to involve 
higher and higher orders of reciprocation. However, such reciprocation is not 
restricted to persons. Dennett gives examples, in which other entities, such as 
animals, demonstrate apparent reciprocity. In one instance, a dog anticipates 
its master's response by feigning the intention to leave the room, and then 
retrieving its favourite chair. In another, a bird feigns a broken wing to protect 
its nest from predators. If these cases are examples of reciprocity, then 
reciprocity appears not to be conditional on either language or self-
consciousness. In other words, condition four does not entail conditions five 
and six. This lack of entailment signals the discord between metaphysical and 
moral personhood, further elucidated by consideration of Rawls' original 
position (Dennett 1976), pp 181-185.27 
The aim of Rawls' position is to formulate principles of justice by initiating 
responses to given situations. Such responses might be expected to 
26As spelt out in full in: (Rawls 1971). 
27The original position is proposed by Rawls as the ideal from which to formulate principles of 
justice. The hypothetical position entails persons evaluating such principles from behind a 'veil 
of ignorance', that is, not knowing one's own position or status in society: 'Among the essential 
features of this situation is that no one know his place in society, his class position or social 
status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength, and the like' (Rawls 1971), p 12. Rawls' purpose is to locate principles of 
justice which interpret 'justice as fairness' by building on the social contract theory, as found in 
the work of Locke, Rousseau and Kant (Rawls 1971), p 11. 
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represent a certain moral awareness, but on Dennett's view, just because 
calculations and deductions take place, does not mean that these responses 
are not merely part of the 'intentional stance'. Just because reciprocity has 
occurred, we cannot know for certain that it is accompanied by beliefs 
constitutive of moral awareness: 
There is no objectively satisfiable sufficient condition for an entity's really having 
beliefs, and as we uncover apparent irrationality under an Intentional interpretation 
of an entity, our grounds for ascribing any beliefs at all wanes, especially when we 
have (what we always can have in principle) a non-Intentional, mechanistic account 
of the entity (Dennett 1976), pp 193-194. 
In other words, moral awareness is not necessarily coincident with reciprocity. 
The conditions from which moral awareness could be derived are, in fact, the 
fifth and sixth. Even then, language and self-consciousness are not of 
themselves sufficient condition for moral awareness, but are at least 
necessary conditions of it. Responsibility for an action requires one's 
awareness of it as one's own action, (derived from self-awareness), which in 
turn requires one to recognise the action under the relevant description 
(derived from language). However, while it may appear that this occurs, how 
can we really know? Although Rawls' original position may indicate that moral 
awareness is present, we can never really be sure if this is the case. The 
outcome of this view is that not only can moral personhood not be fully 
secured, but neither, according to Dennett, can metaphysical personhood. 
Dennett holds that although we stipulate the conditions of metaphysical 
personhood, in the end we cannot know whether these conditions are 
completely satisfied. 28 He claims that personhood is ultimately a normative 
28 Dennett claims that the concept of a person is 'inescapably normative', and that the 'moral 
notion of a person and the metaphysical notion of a person are not separate and distinct 
concepts, but just two different and unstable resting points on the same continuum' (Dennett 
1976), p 193. Michael Goodman agrees with Dennett that metaphysical personhood fails to 
secure moral personhood, but argues that moral personhood is sufficient, although not 
necessary, for metaphysical personhood. An example of a metaphysical, but non-moral person 
is a sociopath, who, while possessing the characteristics of the former, lacks those of the latter. 
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concept, and that due to the complexities outlined above, is subject to 
inevitable equivocation and uncertainty (Dennett 1976), pp 191-194. 29 
Mary Warren stipulates that persons must have consciousness of internal and 
external objects, reasoning and problem-solving ability, independent self-
motivated activity, and self-concepts. Warren's main concern is with the moral 
and legal status of foetuses, which, although genetically human, have not yet 
achieved the relevant criteria of personhood. Aliens and robots, on the other 
hand, could have personhood characteristics and, therefore, could be 
accepted into the moral community as persons. Foetuses and defective 
humans are outside the moral community, and therefore lack the 
corresponding moral rights and responsibilities. This means that the rights of 
mothers always outweigh the rights of foetuses in cases of potential abortion, 
regardless of the level of foetal development. Warren argues that because a 
foetus is always only a potential person, its right to life never outweighs the 
right to end its life by its mother. This holds equally, regardless of the reason 
for ending the pregnancy, such as whether the life of the mother is threatened, 
or whether the mother wishes to take a holiday. Warren holds that although 
killing a foetus (even a fully-developed one) is not morally wrong, killing a 
Goodman claims that the crucial condition missing is that of moral consciousness. 
Consciousness that one's actions are either good or bad requires that one is rational, 
conscious, communicative and so forth, but this moral consciousness is itself additional to those 
characteristics. See (Goodman 1992). 
29 In later works, Dennett more explicitly denies the existence of consciousness. For example, 
in (Dennett 1991), Dennett examines in detail analogies between the brain and computers. In 
taking the view that all phenomena require to be explained from a third-person view-point, he 
concludes there is no such thing as consciousness. Replying to an 'adversary' who considers 
how consciousness relates to animals and zombies, Dennett states: 'But why should it matter, 
you may want to ask, that a creature's desires are thwarted if they aren't conscious desires? I 
reply: Why would it matter more if they were conscious - especially if consciousness were a 
property, as some think, that forever eludes investigation? Why should a "zombie's" crushed 
hopes matter less than a conscious person's crushed hopes? There is a trick with mirrors that 
should be exposed and discarded. Consciousness, you say, is what matters, but then you cling 
to doctrines about consciousness that systematically prevent us from getting any purchase on 
why it matters. Postulating special inner qualities that are not only private and intrinsically 
valuable, but also unconfirmable and uninvestigable is just obscurantism' (Dennett 1991), p 
450; (Searle 1997), p 107. This view has been explored and criticised by many theorists. See, 
for example, (Searle 1997), in which Searle takes Dennett's view to task, arguing that the 
experienced qualia of consciousness is undeniable. For a lively exchange between Searle and 
Dennett on this matter, see especially pp 95-131. 
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newborn would be. This is because persons other than the parents may want 
the child, and because people in general prefer to preserve rather than 
destroy children (Warren 1994), pp 307-311. 
Mary Gore Forrester holds that personhood is a moral concept. All persons 
are entitled to full moral consideration, characterised by the principles of 
beneficence and fairness. Whether persons have immortal souls is not an 
issue for personhood, as persons warrant moral consideration whether they 
have immortal souls or not. 30 Two types of persons are possible. Natural 
persons are human beings with rationality, consciousness, linguistic 
competence, self-awareness, the ability to feel pleasure and pain, and the 
capacity for higher-order intentions. Extended persons are entities which 
deserve to be treated with beneficence and fairness, but which lack some of 
the above characteristics. For Forrester, extended persons include infants, the 
mentally incompetent, the senile, and hypothetical conscious, communicative, 
rational aliens. Problem cases include foetuses, 31 criminals, and animals. 
Criminals have violated the principles of justice and fairness, and although 
they should be appropriately punished, because they are likely to re-enter 
society, they should not lose personhood. Forrester also argues that because 
animals are sentient creatures, they have interests, and therefore warrant 
moral consideration, but not necessarily as persons (Forrester 1996), pp 7-13; 
78-79; 87-97; 104-113. 32 
30This is the view of the present thesis. Whether persons have immortal souls or not, they 
warrant moral consideration. In addition, as is evident in Chapter 6, whether persons have 
immortal souls is treated, in this thesis, as a different question as to whether they have empirical 
selves. 
31 The question of foetuses is complex, and cannot be given adequate treatment here. 
Forrester addresses foetuses in 'Should Fetuses be Extended Persons?' (Forrester 1996), pp 
164-187, in which she argues that foetuses are not natural persons, but that a hierarchy of 
considerations should be brought into play when deciding on their treatment, and under what 
conditions extended personhood should or should not be granted to them. 
32Forrester argues that the capacity of animals for reciprocity is limited, and that therefore, to 
weigh the consideration of animals equally with the consideration of humans would be unfair. 
Forrester claims that this is not 'specism', but survival. Unless human interests weigh heavier 
than those of other creatures, the inability to universalise rules would ultimately see humans 
overrun, and possibly displaced. Additional discussion of animals is presented in 'How Animals 
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1.6.1 	Summary of Personhood 
The above accounts bring out some of the complexities involved in being a 
person. For the most part, these accounts focus on mental rather than 
physical characteristics. Locke points out the importance of consciousness 
and rationality in being a person. Strawson draws attention to the link 
between embodiment, consciousness, and the ability to relate to other 
persons. Consciousness and rationality are fundamental to most of the above 
theorists, although Frankfurt considers the ability for second-order reflection as 
more primary, and not necessarily tied to rationality. Consciousness itself is 
problematic, as persons are sometimes unconscious, and are certainly not 
always self-conscious. Dennett draws attention to the need for reciprocity 
between persons. His view suggests that unless we accept each other as 
persons, the whole idea of personhood loses meaning. Personhood is thus a 
communal affair, and hence requires communicative skills. It is difficult to 
conceive of a person existing completely by herself, and of never having had 
interactions with other persons. Interaction between persons seems to be part 
of what persons are. But, as Dennett also points out, ascertaining whether the 
characteristics we ascribe to personhood are really present may be more 
difficult that it first seems. For Warren, personhood gives one certain rights 
over supposed 'non-persons', such as foetuses. Forrester draws attention to 
persons unable to engage in reciprocity. She claims that by underpinning 
personhood with beneficence and fairness, such 'extended' persons could be 
included in the moral community. These various approaches to personhood 
demonstrate the difficulty in precisely locating the characteristics of 
Ought to be Treated' (Forrester 1996), pp 115-128, and 'Animal Rights' (Forrester 1996), pp 
129-136. Forrester claims that animals should never be treated cruelly, and should be given the 
degree of consideration commensurate with the resources available in a society. For example, 
she claims it is never permissible to cause pain to animals in the interest of producing luxury 
items such as cosmetics, however it may be permissible to eat animals if other food sources are 
inadequate, and as a result humans would suffer unduly or die out unless animals were eaten. 
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personhood, and, in some instances, in determining whether or not these 
characteristics are actually present. 
The inability to fully pin down personhood characteristics, plus the perceived 
need by some theorists to make exceptions in problem cases, creates 
difficulties in specifying criteria for personal identity. It seems that any criterion 
is open to challenge. If it is too narrow, it excludes the most vulnerable 
members of our species. If it is too broad, it trivialises personhood. 
Personhood is thus inevitably a contested concept. There seems to be two 
important strands of interpretation involved. The first concerns a person's 
'natural' endowments, such as embodiment, consciousness, the capacity for 
rationality, and so on. These characteristics appear to be features which most 
normal humans living in society and interacting with other humans naturally 
have. The second strand of interpretation concerns the rules of the community 
in which persons live, as it is these rules that specify which of the 'naturally 
endowed' characteristics are the most essential. For example, a community 
that regards rationality as fundamental to personhood might consider that non-
rational entities such as foetuses, the mentally handicapped, the senile, and 
so on, are non-persons. A community that did not hold rationality to be 
fundamental to personhood would respond to these non-rational entities 
differently, although that community might deny personhood to these entities 
for different reasons. For example, foetuses may not be denied personhood 
due to the absence of rationality, but because they have not reached a certain 
stage of independence which the community has stipulated. In a community 
whose resources are extremely depleted, personhood might be denied to the 
senile in the interests of saving that society from extinction. While rational 
argument could be produced to justify both these and similar stances, this 
approach is not without its problems. If the ability to decide who are and who 
are not persons was totally arbitrary, prejudicial decisions could be made by 
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the strongest members of a community against its weakest members, resulting 
in the weakest being designated as non-persons. 
This discussion demonstrates that specifying of criteria for personhood is 
inherently problematic. Even the providing minimal core criteria is fraught with 
difficulties. Knowing what to include and what to exclude is no simple task, as 
whatever is specified is ultimately contestable. Importantly also, features 
which are specified as essential could be intimately related to other features 
which are assumed not to be essential. This means that features that are 
integral to personhood, but which are 'hidden', are excluded when accounting 
for personhood, and thus leave the account deficient and misleading. As 
Strawson points out, for example, being conscious (at least in this world), 
requires having a body, as bodies allow us to distinguish ourselves from other 
persons and to interact with other persons. Also, Frankfurt and Dennett refer 
to the connection between reasoning abilities and the capacity for action. Just 
being accepted as a person by other persons requires certain communicative 
abilities but, as Dennett points out, ascertaining just what these abilities 
involve is difficult to discover. What does seem apparent, however, is that 
many typical personhood characteristics are related to other similar 
characteristics, and few, if any, appear to be isolated or independent. This is 
one of the reasons that theorists have difficulty in selecting what seems most 
essential. Thus, when we stipulate 'consciousness', we may give the 
impression that consciousness does not carry anything else with it, but, as 
indicated above, this is not the case. Moreover, even if we do specify certain 
criteria for consciousness, we cannot assume that we have specified it all. To 
specify all that is required for an entity to be conscious would require a great 
deal of knowledge about biology, psychology, evolutionary theory, and more. 
To fully specify what it is to be rational would be equally problematic. Thus, 
even if some flexibility in criteria is permitted, we can never fully circumscribe 
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what we include. This means that an account of personhood, if it is to be 
authenticate, should be non-reductive. To fully account for all aspects of 
personhood would take more than our resources permit. We could never say 
all that there is to be said. 
If personhood is basically irreducible, it follows that personal identity is 
irreducible also. This means that what maintains personal identity over time 
cannot be fully specified. We can never know for sure that we have included 
all that is relevant, and more importantly, whether something crucial, whose 
influence is present, but also concealed, may have been left out. As the 
psychological continuity criterion relies on the specification of criteria, it is easy 
to see why it falls into difficulties. If, for example, we claim that maintaining 
personal identity over time involves traits, such as rationality or memory 
retention, we imply many other things as well. When we explicate one 
characteristic, we inevitably implicate others. We therefore need to rethink the 
effectiveness of the criterial approach to personal identity. Clearly it tells us 
some things. But it also misleads us into thinking it can tell us everything that 
matters. It does not, because it cannot. A different approach to personal 
identity is, therefore, needed. 
1.7 Holistic Persons 
Rather than defining persons in terms of discrete characteristics, it is more 
beneficial to consider persons as holistic structures. This way of thinking 
about persons permits the recognition, not only of the characteristics involved 
in personhood, but also of the relations between these characteristics. When 
personhood is 'dissected' into discrete characteristics, the relevance of these 
relations becomes masked. In most cases, the development and 
manifestation of particular characteristics is tied to, and interdependent with 
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the development and manifestation of others. To account for one such 
characteristic is thus to implicate many other characteristics at the same time. 
Let me outline this new understanding of persons. 
Persons are not simple structures, nor are they an assemblage of theoretically 
separable parts. Persons are complex structures, composed of parts, each of 
which is indissolubly linked to other parts. Unless the other parts are referred 
to when making definitions, definition is incomplete. Because the parts are so 
intimately interrelated, it makes no sense to 'take out' one part, and to assume 
that the rest are unaffected. The unity of the structure depends on the relation 
between all of its parts. Indeed, the components are identified and defined 
only in terms of their participation in the unity. The structure looks 'inward' and 
'outward'. It looks 'inward' to its own parts, and to the relations between them. 
It looks 'outward' as a single structure to its relations with other objects. 
We cannot take one part, such as a brain, a limb, a thought, an emotion, or 
even an environment, away from a person, and assume that neither the 
removed part, nor the remaining parts are unaltered. Part of what makes that 
part what it is, is its connection with other parts. Thus, in naming one part of a 
person, such as a brain, we inevitably name other parts also. It follows that 
only by considering a person as a whole, can we get some idea of what 
personal identity involves. If it is to be authentic, a theory of personal identity 
needs to recognise this. The remaining chapters take up this challenge, and 
articulate and defend a theory of personal identity, which conceives of persons 
as complex and holistic. I will now summarise the present chapter, and then 
outline the contents of the remaining chapters. 
37 
1 .8 	Complex Persons 
The foregoing sections have considered certain metaphysical and ethical 
implications of the criterial, Reductionist approach of the psychological 
continuity criterion of personal identity. These implications include the 
fragmentation over time of personal identity, the blurring of personal identity, 
and certain ethical ramifications. I claim that these implications are 
unacceptable, and result from a faulty, atomistic analysis of personal identity. 
Consideration of the concept 'person' indicates that personal identity is not 
conducive to reductionist, criterial-type analysis. An alternative, more holistic 
type of analysis of personal identity is therefore proposed in the following 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines some of the thought experiments used by personal 
identity theorists to argue for the psychological continuity criterion. Thought 
experiments have been influential throughout the personal identity debate, 
and have contributed to the atomistic approach taken in contemporary 
thinking. The scenarios involved consider ways in which the elements that 
compose personal identity become separated, and draw conclusions about 
which elements retain personal identity. For psychological continuity criterion 
theorists, these elements are persons' psychological states or minds. By 
examining thought experiments from several theorists, I argue that such 
thought experiments are inadequate to comprehensively analyse personal 
identity. Briefly, they treat the mind-body relation as merely contingent, but 
produce no evidence for this; their scenarios are often unclear and 
incomplete; some arguments are unsound, and some arguments misconstrue 
the mind's structure. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of arguments used by many psychological continuity criterion 
theorists. By drawing attention to these inadequacies, I open the way for 
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further analysis, at the same time indicating the direction that this analysis 
should take. 
Chapter 3 examines the psychological continuity criterion's internalist view of 
the mind This view characterises mental content as internal to the mind. By 
describing mental content in terms of self-sufficient linear chains, theoretically 
transferable from one person to another, the psychological continuity criterion 
fails to acknowledge the mind's external features. No explanation of how 
mental content is achieved is furnished. As a result, the link between mental 
content and the events and items in the world from which mental content is 
formed, is missing from the account of personal identity. This leaves the 
account inadequate and misleading. In response; I defend an externalist view 
of the mind. To show how mental content is achieved, I investigate how it is 
linked to items in the world. My focus is on perception, in particular, on 
environmental perception and visual perception. Like other biological 
creatures, humans respond to the environment in relation to their survival 
needs. Included in this response is the need to secure habitats, and to select 
those features in the environment which best serve our primary needs. 
Because response to these features governs and constrains our mental 
content, acknowledgment of these features is essential to an account of the 
mind. Visual perception is especially important, as it is a major mode of 
perceptual response. Consideration of environmental perception in general, 
and visual perception in particular, elucidates the connection between thought 
and the objects of thought. By recognising the link between perception and 
the external world, the link between thought and world is acknowledged, and 
in consequence, the link also between the world and personal identity. 
Chapter 4 considers the psychological continuity criterion's characterisation of 
mental states as atomistic and impersonal. I consider Parf it's view that causal 
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connectedness between mental states could be 'any cause'. While the 
commitment to Relation R is examined, it is acknowledged that most versions 
of the psychological continuity criterion characterise mental items 
atomistically, and permit non-normal causal connectedness. To investigate 
psychological atomism and impersonal description, the psychological 
continuity criterion's recourse to quasi-memory is investigated. 'Impersonal' 
memory, or 'quasi-memory', is used by the psychological continuity criterion to 
overcome the criterion's inherent circularity. This strategy results in a 
defective account of memory, as is shown in an investigation of genuine 
memory. The investigation brings out the inherently holistic nature of memory, 
and the role of personal ownership. For memories to have meaning requires 
that they belong to coherently structured sematic networks, which by definition, 
are necessarily owned by individual persons, with individual histories. The 
account of memory thus supports the view that an atomistic, impersonal 
account of memory is inadequate to account for the role of memory in personal 
identity. 
Chapter 5 draws attention to the body's role in personal identity. It considers 
the psychological continuity criterion's neglect of embodiment when 
accounting for personal identity. Personal identity over time is taken to be a 
matter of psychology only. A person's body features only incidentally in the 
realisation of psychological continuity. Thus, while bodies are needed as a 
kind of 'vehicle' for psychological continuity, it is irrelevant which persons have 
which bodies. This denial of bodily relevance takes no account of the body 
and its functioning, particularly in relation to the brain. The brain and the body, 
and parts of the brain and the body are treated as if they functioned 
independently of each other, and as if they played no significant part in mental 
life. In defending a holistic view of brain and body functioning, I argue that this 
view is incorrect. The holistic view of the body is supported by considering the 
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ways in which the body affects mental life, such that were a person to have a 
different body, that person's mental life and identity would be different also. 
Chapter 6 investigates the nature of the self. The psychological continuity 
holds that no substantial entities underpinning experiences can be found, and 
therefore, that it is irrational to presume that such entities exist. Persons are 
held to be no more than bundles of perceptions, and it is therefore irrational 
prefer self-concern over other concern. I argue that this stance on the self is 
misconceived, and results from both an over reaction to Cartesian errors, and 
the failure to recognise that having a self is essential to having experience. 
While the psychological continuity criterion recognises that experience 
requires a subject, it does not adequately appreciate what subjectivity 
involves. I show that subjectivity is more than a peripheral grammatical 
function, and involves a self which is concealed in superficial analysis. I argue 
that this self is a dynamic unity, which is both necessary to experience and 
mental life, and which is part of what it means to have experience and mental 
life. I also argue that selves are more than just minds, and include bodily 
capacities for action, and the first-person knowledge we have of ourselves and 
our capacities. In addition, I argue that selves are primarily bodily 
experienced, and only secondarily mentally experienced, and finally, I discuss 
some aspects of the cognitive self's emergence, and some of the ways in 
which autobiography and narrative contribute to the development and 
expansion of the self. 
Chapter 7 draws together the main arguments from the previous chapters in 
support of this thesis' two main claims, namely that: 
• Due to its reductionist, criterial approach, the psychological continuity 
criterion is inadequate to account for personal identity. 
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• A sound approach to personal identity must respect the complex, dynamic, 
holistic, non-reductive nature of persons. 
This final chapter looks at the implications which the holistic approach to 
persons and personal identity holds to the ethical problems outlined earlier. It 
also briefly considers possible future directions that the personal identity 
debate could take. 
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that in arguing for this thesis' 
claims, great weight is placed on empirical research from a variety of sources. 
Much of this research is taken from actual persons in actual situations, and is, 
therefore, more likely to represent personhood and personal identity, than an 
analysis which relies largely on speculation. Finally, while the claims of this 
thesis are not intended to furnish a complete account of personal identity, they 
are intended to indicate some of the important features which such an account 
should include. The next chapter begins the case for complex persons, by 
investigating thought experiments used by proponents of the psychological 
continuity criterion to argue for the reductionist conception of personal identity. 
Chapter 2 Uncommon Persons 
2.1 	Introduction 
A frequent method of supporting the psychological continuity criterion is the 
use of thought experiments. 33 These thought experiments concern scenarios, 
which, although unlikely, appear to be logically possible (Wilkes 1988), p 2. 
Possible worlds are imagined in which extra-ordinary events occur. Personal 
identity theorists frequently use thought experiments to inquire into cases 
where personal identity seems to be problematic. Psychological continuity 
theorists typically construct scenarios in which mental continuity, rather than 
the bodily continuity, is shown to ground personal identity over time. The 
scenarios concerned usually involve brains or brain parts being transferred 
into different bodies, or whole persons or parts of persons being duplicated. In 
these cases, personal identity is presumed to go with the mind, rather than 
with the body. Persons resulting from these processes have not become 
persons in the normal way, and I thus refer to them as uncommon persons. 34 
A problem with uncommon persons is that due to their extra-ordinary 
generation and heritage, we cannot be sure that their personal identity 
features correlate with the personal identity features of normal persons. Due 
to this anomaly, I argue in this chapter that the thought experiment strategy 
which produces uncommon persons is inappropriate to establish definitive 
conclusions about the personal identity of normal persons. 
33 For a good discussion of thought experiments, see (Wilkes 1988). Some ideas in this 
chapter are drawn from this work. According to Wilkes, there are different types of thought 
experiments, those concerning philosophy normally being of scientific, metaphysical, moral, or 
epistemological interest. Wilkes cites two basic kinds of thought experiments: 1) those which 
are about scientifically possible situations, such as carrying out a particular manoeuvre to prove a 
scientific law, as in the case of Gallileo contemplating the outcome of objects of different weights 
falling to the ground. In this case, the procedure was not carried out, but it could have been - it 
was imagined instead; 2) those which amount to playing around with ideas and words in the 
mind, an example being imagining the grammatical merit of a phrase such as 'colourless green 
ideas sleep furiously' (Wilkes 1988), pp 2-3. 




Philosophy often uses thought experiments to explore obscure or problematic 
issues. These thought experiments present scenarios in which unlikely events 
are supposed to take place. Such scenarios present opportunities to 
speculate outside our normal frameworks. But we need to be careful not to 
take the 'results' of these experiments too far. We should remember that in 
most instances, thought experiments describe events which do not usually 
happen, and which may never happen. This should be kept in mind when 
drawing conclusions from thought experiments, or we could be misled into 
thinking we have examined something real when we have only examined 
something imaginary. The thought experiment strategy used by psychological 
continuity criterion theorists is particularly problematic in this regard. It is 
inclined to draw conclusions on the basis of mere speculation. But, because 
these thought experiments are mere speculation, their conclusions should be 
taken as indicating where more investigation is required, rather than being 
taken as having yielded any definitive conclusions in themselves. 
Certain typical thought experiments are frequently used by psychological 
continuity theorists. They usually concern scenarios in which minds are 
supposedly transferred to different bodies, without personal identity or 
continuity being compromised. But, as these scenarios are far removed from 
the norm, we cannot be sure that the events they portray would work out in the 
same way in real life. In real life, bodily continuity and psychological continuity 
normally occur together. Between birth and death, persons exist in the world 
where mind and body operate as a unity. Minds and bodies do not normally 
become swapped or separated. 35 We cannot be sure, therefore, that minds 
would not be affected in some significant way if they became 'attached' to 
35 1 am speaking here of normal experiences, excluding situations such as alleged astral 
travelling, near death experiences, or similar. 
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different bodies. If the thought experiment strategy of the psychological 
continuity criterion is to be effective, it must establish that if bodily continuity 
were to be violated, psychological continuity would remain unaltered. In the 
relevant thought experiments, however, this issue is not addressed. It is often 
simply claimed that following the particular disruptive processes involved, 
persons' psychological states would just continue as before, as if this 
supposed outcome was uncontroversial and uncontestable. 
Another problem with thought experiment strategy is that its scenarios must 
always be incomplete and opaque. This means that details which could be 
crucial are omitted, leaving important issues obscure and uncertain. In 
addition, many of the situations portrayed rest on complex and untested 
assumptions, and may not represent genuine possibilities. Key features of the 
scenarios often deviate widely from the norm, and it is often unclear whether 
these deviations are relevant to the issues under scrutiny. Due to their 
incompleteness and obscurity, these thought experiments, at least by 
themselves, are a dubious method of inquiring into the issues which most 
concern personal identity. In view of these problems, I argue that certain key 
thought experiments, used by defenders of the psychological continuity 
criterion, are inadequate to establish definitive conclusions about personal 
identity. I argue that these thought experiments fail to demonstrate that the 
mind and body operate discretely. I also argue that they fail to establish that 
personal identity is grounded in psychological continuity, to the exclusion of 
other forms of continuity. Finally, I argue that they present an inaccurate view 
of the mind's structure and operation. To argue my case, several key thought 
experiments are examined. Various responses to these thought experiments 
are then considered, followed by an assessment of the reasoning used, and of 
the relevance of this reasoning to the personal identity debate. 
2.2 Thought Experiments Considered 
Locke was one of the earliest theorists to use thought experiments when 
considering personal identity. A key tenet of Locke's philosophy is that 
substance, both material and immaterial, is unknowable. By contrast, 
consciousness is knowable, and is the means by which personal identity is 
preserved. A problem for Locke is that he considers it possible that 
consciousness and substance could become separated: 
But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that, if the same 
consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same 
numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance 
to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one 
person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or 
different substances, the personal identity is preserved (Locke 1959), 2.27.13. 
But for Locke, where consciousness and soul are conjoined, and the body 
becomes disconnected, it is consciousness that maintains personal identity. 
To show this, we are asked to imagine that the soul and memories of a prince 
leave the body of the prince, and become manifest in the body of a cobbler. 
The question of which body then contains the prince permits the more general 
question about personal identity: 
For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's 
past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own 
soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable 
only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the same man? (Locke 
1959), p 457. 
According to Locke, we would reject the person with the prince's body as 
being the prince, in favour of the person with the prince's mind. Even though 
confronted with a different body, with a different history, the mind and 
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memories would have priority as the locus of identity. These claims constitute 
part of Locke's intended vindication of the psychological continuity criterion. 
Inspired by modern neurosurgery, many thought experiments, such as Sydney 
Shoemaker's, concern surgical procedures in which brain parts are 
transferred from one person to another. To consider personal identity, 
Shoemaker asks that we imagine that the brain of one person, Robinson, is 
removed, and the brain of another person, Brown, is replaced into Robinson's 
empty skull. If this new 'person' exhibits the characteristics and the supposed 
memory-knowledge of the former person Brown, we would be entitled to think 
that the person Brown now inhabits the body of the former person Robinson, to 
be now referred to as 'Brownson' (Shoemaker 1984), p 78; (Shoemaker 
1984), p 43. 
According to this view, Brown has not allegedly become Brownson due to the 
physical matter of the brain, but rather due to inheriting the required 
psychological states, and to experiencing them in the first-person mode. 
Shoemaker sees similarities between his brain-transfer experiment and 
Locke's prince and the cobbler (Shoemaker 1984), p 78. While the physical 
matter of the brain is relevant as the vehicle of transfer, it is only a contingent 
fact that the relevant psychological states are instantiated in that bit of matter, 
rather than in any other bit of matter. What is crucial in this case is the 
inheritance of the right psychological states, as it is these which determine the 
continuation of identity. It is because it is psychological states that matter, 
rather than the brain or brain parts, which distinguishes this view as that of the 
psychological continuity criterion, rather than that of the brain criterion. Recall 
that the brain criterion focuses on brains and brain parts, rather than on 
psychological states. 
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Par-fit also uses thought experiments to argue for the psychological continuity 
criterion. An example of Parfit's thought experiments is one in which a human 
being is hypothetically teletransported to Mars. Due to imagined advances in 
technology, it is supposed that it is possible for human persons to become 
located on Mars without having to travel there in the normal way. At the press 
of a green button, a brain-scanner is supposedly able to copy and record the 
complete state of a person's body and brain cells, at the same time at which 
the body is destroyed. This information is transmitted to Mars, arriving three 
minutes later. It is then used to create an exact duplicate of the person, using 
new matter. The person can 'return' to earth in the same way, and in fact, 
'travel' back and forth between Mars and earth any number of times. On each 
occasion, this person 'wakes up' as the self which entered the process three 
minutes earlier. Parfit imagines that he, himself 'travels' in this way to Mars: 
My replica thinks that he is me, and he seems to remember living my life up to the 
moment when I pressed the green button. In every other, way, both physically and 
psychologically, my Replica is just like me. If he returned to Earth, everyone would 
think that he was me (Parfit 1984), p 200. 
Parfit acknowledges that the replica is merely qualitatively similar, rather than 
numerically identical. But, Par-fit argues, according to the 'Widest criterion', the 
replica is the original person: 
Reconsider the start of my imagined story, where my brain and body are destroyed. 
The Scanner and the Replicator produce a person who has a new but exactly similar 
brain and body, and who is psychologically continuous with me as I was when I 
pressed the green button. The cause of this continuity is, though unusual, reliable. 
On the Physical Criterion and the Narrow Psychological Criterion, my Replica would 
not be me. On the two Wide Criteria, he would be me (Parfit 1984), p 209. 
By allowing the causal continuity of mental states to be of any kind, rather than 
the standard form of memory retention, psychological continuity with the 
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original person is understood to have been maintained. Thus, the person who 
continues life on Mars is taken to be the same person as the person who 
formerly lived on earth. 
2.3 Thought Experiments Assessed 
The above scenarios refer to imaginary cases in which bodily continuity and 
psychological continuity become disordered or disconnected. In each case, 
the reader is supposed to conclude that it is psychological continuity, as 
opposed bodily continuity, which retains personal identity. There are, 
however, some problems with this approach. For example, the scenarios 
themselves present their case in such a way that the personal identity 
concerned is already assumed to be present in the transferred states, even 
though there are no substantial arguments presented to back this up. We may 
be inclined to accept this claim at face value, as we may feel that persons' 
identities are more likely to be contained in persons' psychologies, rather than 
in persons' bodies. But in the above scenarios, little exploration is given to 
what persons' psychologies actually involve. Emphasis is put on the 
psychology as it was just before the crucial change, but pays little attention to 
what happens after such change. It is thus assumed that the locus of identity 
continues as before, and that it is affected neither by the operations, transfers, 
or changed locations which are supposed to have taken place. Of course, 
proponents of thought experiments are perfectly entitled to stipulate their own 
conditions and events, but the problem here is that in doing so, they beg the 
question at issue. The problem with the above thoughts experiments is that 
they inquire into personal identity by stipulating the conditions under which 
personal identity is maintained. This is surely a very odd way to conduct an 
inquiry. 
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In taking this approach, the above thought experiments take for granted that 
psychological continuity, rather than bodily continuity would be favoured as 
the locus of personal identity. It is not entirely clear, however, just how this 
conclusion is supposed to be reached, or even could be reached. Would we, 
for example, necessarily assume that the prince was the person in the 
cobbler's body, just because he acted as if he was the prince, or remembered 
important events in the prince's life? Would this be sufficient evidence that he 
had the prince's mind? Alternatively, if the prince was an accomplished 
pianist and the cobbler was not, instead of asking questions about the prince's 
life, we might ask 'the prince' to prove his identity by playing an item from his 
repertoire. With his new body, however, the 'prince' might be unable to 
comply, as he would now lack his former manual dexterity, muscle control, and 
flexibility. We may then be less inclined to believe that he is really the prince. 
Personal identity may also difficult to pin down if the supposed prince had the 
gruff, heavily accented voice of the cobbler, rather than the soft, refined voice 
formerly associated with the prince. We would be even more confused if the 
cobbler was a pregnant woman, or if there were large age differences 
between the prince and the cobbler. These possible difficulties indicate that 
personal identity may be more complex than the psychological continuity 
criterion is prepared to admit. 
The other examples could also be problematic if they were expanded a little. 
We might, for example, question the identity of Brownson if, in addition to 
mental characteristics, we also consider physical ones. We may not 
necessarily agree that Brownson was the former Brown if Brown was 
ethnically different to Robinson - say Brown was Chinese, short and small-
framed, and Robinson was Jamaican, tall and muscular. We might then be 
inclined to say that neither psychology alone, nor brain identity are sufficient to 
capture personal identity. While this is an extreme example, it draws attention 
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to the fact that identity-determining features are not captured simply by a 
single brain or a single set of psychological states, and are not, therefore, as 
clear-cut as the psychological continuity criterion makes out. Parfit's case 
could also be confusing. For example, what if the duplicating machine ran 
amuck, and produced hundreds of Parfits, and scattered them all over the 
universe, would they all be Parfit, or only one of them? If none of them were 
Parfit, but then all but one of them died the following week, would the one 
which remained then be Parfit? 
These kinds of problems and questions suggest that thought experiments 
provide a fairly superficial analysis of personal identity. Those above fail to 
grapple with many pertinent issues which could be involved. The work of a 
number of other theorists also supports the idea that thought experiments of 
this sort are indeed highly problematic. 
For example, Bernard Williams mounts an objection to Locke's case by 
presenting a similar thought-experiment. 36 He asks us to imagine that Charles 
wakes up one day with memories which appear to be those of Guy Fawkes. 
Charles remembers having done certain things which earlier he could not 
remember doing, and cannot remember doing certain other things which 
earlier he could remember doing. Even though these new memories appear 
to be first-person memories, the strangeness of the situation might prompt a 
listener to Charles' tale to try to verify that it was Charles who performed the 
deeds in question. For Charles' testimony to be valid, the listener might seek 
a witness to verify that Charles was bodily present at the events concerned. 
Williams argues that if there was no such witness available, the situation could 
be addressed from a different angle. Rather than first individuating Charles as 
36 For this objection, see (Williams 1973), pp 1-18. The fact that certain thought experiments 
throw doubt on other thought experiments does not undermine the claim that thought 
experiment strategy is inadequate on its own to account for personal identity. 
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an agent, and then ascribing a specific action to him, a particular action could 
first be individuated, and then uniquely ascribed to an agent, for example, 'the 
person who murdered the Duchess, whoever it was'. Under this latter 
approach, should Charles' actions prove to be those generally understood to 
have been undertaken by Guy Fawkes, we may be inclined to believe that 
somehow Charles has become Guy Fawkes (Williams 1973), pp 4-8. 
Williams claims that even if we could overcome obvious objections to this 
account, such as our incredulity at the idea of re-incarnation, or the apparent 
difference of personal and bodily characteristics between Charles and Guy 
Fawkes, there is one particular reason why this account should not be 
accepted. What if Charles' brother Robert also makes the same claim, that is, 
he also claims to have witnessed and carried out the relevant actions? In this 
case, they might both be, not only Guy Fawkes, but also each other. Williams 
claims this outcome is 'absurd.' Yet, if Charles and Robert were equally good 
candidates for the identity in question, there would be no principle to 
determine which of them was Guy Fawkes. Williams claims that the analysis 
undertaken here fails, due the failure to include the body: 
We are trying to prise apart 'bodily' and 'mental' criteria; but we find that the normal 
operation of one 'mental' criterion involves the 'bodily' one (Williams 1973), p 5. 
By 'separating' the mind from the body, we have ignored the point that part of 
what it means to remember oneself performing a particular action, is to have 
the body which performed that action. This point creates serious problems for 
Locke's approach, and for those derived from it. Unless we recognise that 
particular bodies ground particular sets of psychological states, there seems 
nothing to prevent the indefinite proliferation of single set of psychological 
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states. The relation between the body and personal identity needs to be taken 
more seriously. 37 
Person reduplication is not only problematic for psychological states, but also 
for the brain and the brain parts in which they are instantiated. An early 
version of this problem is raised by David Wiggins. 38 Based on Shoemaker's 
account of Brown and Robinson, Wiggins considers the possibility of duplicate 
persons.38 Wiggins extends the scenario to Brown's brain being split into two 
equal halves prior to the transplant. Each brain-half is put into a different 
body, resulting in two persons with the former Brown's memories. Based on 
the psychological continuity criterion, both new persons have equal claims to 
now being Brown. This outcome entails the unacceptable consequence that 
they will each initially appear to be the same person as each other, but as they 
each take up threads of different lives, they will chart separate histories, and 
then 'become' two different persons: 
if we say each is the same person as Brown, we shall have to say Brown 1 is the 
same person as Brown 2. That is an inescapable part of what was meant by saying 
that each was the same person as Brown. But Brown 1 will have all sorts of 
experiences which Brown 2 will not. They will be in different places and have 
separate experience from now on. And they will communicate interpersonally 
(Wiggins 1967), p 53. 
This outcome is rife with paradox and confusion. Is Brown one person in two 
bodies, two different persons with two different lives, or does he cease to exist 
altogether? The consequences of brain-body discontinuity overturns our 
37Williams' solution was later criticised, on the grounds that bodies also can be duplicated. This 
has, of course, meant that further thinking is required to overcome the problem of person 
reduplication (fission), but Williams' work has nevertheless opened up the issue to discussion. 
38 Another seminal article in this debate. See (Wiggins 1967), pp 50-58. 
38 Wiggins takes his discussion of this example from Shoemaker's presentation of the case in 
(Shoemaker 1963), pp 23-24, see (Wiggins 1967), p 50 & p 78. I use the example in 
Shoemaker's abbreviated version of the same scenario in (Shoemaker 1984), in which 
Shoemaker (on p 40) refers to Wiggins' variation. 
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common-sense notions of personal identity. These notions are further 
disturbed when additional brain dissections and transfers are considered, as 
there then seems to be several persons where previously there was only one. 
Parfit's case of imaginary teletransportation is also subject to problematic 
interpretation. This scenario is supposed to justify the 'Widest' criterion - 
psychological continuity with any cause. Based on this criterion, causal 
connections of any kind could exist between the psychological states of an 
individual at one time, and the identically similar states of another individual at 
a later time. This argument requires that the relation which counts is the 
survival of those states, rather than the survival of their owner. Two objections 
to this argument are considered. Both objections attack Parfit's causal 
requirements. Andrew Brennan claims that Parfit's causal requirements imply 
that the survival of psychological states is equally as indeterminate as is 
personal identity (Brennan 1987). Robert Elliot claims that causal 
requirements do not entail the survival relation, are virtually meaningless, and 
could therefore be dispensed with (Elliot 1991). 
Part it's claim is that the 'Widest' criterion shows that what matters is the 
survival of particular mental states, regardless of their particular physical 
embodiment, or of the cause of their survival. Brennan's claim is that the 
'Widest' criterion shows that both survival and personal identity are equally 
indeterminate (Brennan 1987), pp 225-230. The problem seems to be in the 
apparent relation between survival and personal identity. Two aspects of 
Part it's theory are at issue: the need for a causal connection (of whatever 
kind) for the survival of mental states, and the irrelevancy of whether the 
person who causes the states survives or not. Brennan gives the example of 
the mental states of one individual 'surviving' in a different individual. If I 
strongly influence my friend, my mental states (as they were at the time of my 
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influence) may survive in my friend, whereas, due to my changing ideas, such 
states may not survive in me. There is thus less difference between my past 
mental states, and the present mental states of my friend, than there is 
between my past mental states, and the present states mental of myself. In 
this case, I have 'caused' the survival of certain of my past mental states in my 
friend, but this fact is of no interest to me. I am more concerned with the 
survival of those mental states which concern me now. Thus, whether mental 
states are causally connected is not the issue which determines their level of 
importance to the individuals who have them. Yet, on Parfit's account, causal 
connectedness is all that is important. Causal connections are more 
important that persons. 
According to the 'Widest' criterion, a relation exists between the survival of 
mental states, and the individual who causes them. Yet, on this criterion, the 
survival of particular individual persons is unimportant. This implies that their 
survival is in some way distinct from, or independent of the mental states they 
cause. But if their survival is independent of those states, they cannot be the 
cause of them. Alternatively, if particular persons are relevant to the cause of 
mental states, and their survival is unimportant, then those states are similarly 
unimportant. Put another way, if having a cause matters, then so must the 
person who causes - that person is the cause. If the person had not survived, 
the states in question would not have been caused at all. But if the identity of 
the person is merely trivial, then so also must be the causal role attributable to 
that person: 
If causal differences of the sort mentioned are trivial, then either personal survival is 
independent of causal role in the way just suggested, or, if it does depend on 
causal role, it depends on merely trivial circumstances and is thus - given Parfit's 
view - no better off than personal identity (Brennan 1987), p 226. 
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Brennan claims, however, that if the causal role were abandoned, there would 
be an unacceptable proliferation of mental states. Without causal connections 
to anchor them to a legitimate origin, any selection of mental states deemed to 
be sufficiently like the originals could count as cases of survival. And without 
the refinements attributable to particular individuals, there would be 'too many 
cases to count as cases of survival'. Brennan concludes that unless the role of 
persons as causes is clarified; arguments about survival are subject to 
'crippling ambiguity' (Brennan 1987), pp 226-230. 
Elliot argues that Part it's notion of cause lacks the elements required for the 
survival of mental states. He notes that Parfit's account of psychological 
continuity requires a causal connectedness condition if the psychological 
states concerned are to be successive states within the same chain. But he 
also argues that Part it's causal continuity requirements (CCR) are ineffectual, 
and do not contribute anything worthwhile to Parfit's theory. If CCR was 
dropped from Parfit's theory, however, the theory would not work, as there 
would be no stipulated requirement for causal connectedness among 
psychological states, and thus no explanation of how psychological continuity 
was maintained. On the other hand, even if CCR was retained in Parfit's 
theory, if it is ineffectual, its retention would be virtually meaningless: 
My concern is rather to show that psychological continuity theories which include 
CCR are unstable; either CCR must be dropped or the psychological continuity 
approach must be abandoned (Elliot 1991), p 58. 
Elliot uses two sets of thought experiments to argue his case. The first in each 
set are cases where the presence of CCR seemingly warrants the conclusion 
that identity is retained. The second in each set are cases where the absence 
of CCR seemingly implies that identity is not retained. Elliott argues that the 
difference in the cases is not sufficient to warrant different conclusions in each 
set of cases. He argues that if identity is maintained in the first examples, it 
should also be retained in the second. 
In case Aa, a super-being creates Y following the death of X. The super-being 
creates Y to be psychologically similar to X because it wants X to live on in Y. 
Both X and Y know this, and expect it to happen. No bodily or brain continuity 
is involved, but there is a causal connection in virtue of the super-being's 
specific intentions and actions. Based on CCR, we should accept that X lives 
on as Y. Case Ab is similar to Aa, in that Y appears following the death of X, 
complete with similar psychological states to X, and these events were 
expected by them both. However, there is no causal connection between the 
death of X and the appearance of Y. The fact that no such connection exists 
does not affect the fact that the psychological states in Y happen to be similar 
to those of X. Elliot claims that if we accept that X survives as V in case Aa, we 
should also accept it in case Ab. The reason is that although a causal relation 
is present is Aa, that causal relation is not one of survival. It is no more the 
case that X caused the states of Y in Aa than it is in Ab. Thus, if we are 
prepared to accept X as being Y in Aa, we have no legitimate grounds for 
denying it in Ab. 
The second set of thought experiments is similar to Part it's teletransportation 
case. In Ba, X becomes located at a distant place as Y, by having her body 
biochemically recorded, reconstituted as Y, and then destroyed. CCR is met 
due to the causal connection between the various stages of the process. In 
this case, we would, in accordance with CCR, accept that Y was the former X. 
Case Bb is similar, except that the blueprint containing X's records is lost. 
During the malfunction, a person Y appears. She has been constituted from a 
stockpile of elements, but is coincidently just like X. Further, Y believes that 
she is X. Things for both X and Y seem to have occurred just as they had 
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expected. Thus, even if Y discovers the malfunction, she still believes she is 
X. But although X mirrors Y, no causal connection between them exists. Elliot 
claims that in spite of this, if we accept that Y is X in Ba, we should also accept 
this in Bb. This is because, although CCR was present in Ba and not in Bb, 
the causal connection was not one in which the states of the original person 
actually survived. In essence, the person Y in Ba is no different to the person 
Y in Bb. This means that if the psychological continuity of Ba is sufficient to 
satisfy CCR, then so also is the psychological similarity of Bb. The 
conclusions drawn from both sets of thought experiments is that Parfit's 
version of causal continuity does not capture the elements involved in the 
survival of mental states. Consequently, psychological continuity is rendered 
virtually meaningless, as there is no discernible difference between instances 
when it pertains, and instances when it does not. 
2.3.1 	Summary of Assessment 
In reconsidering the above thought experiments, a number of deficiencies 
have been brought out. It appears that determining personal identity on the 
basis of psychology alone is not clear-cut, and that other features, such as 
physical or bodily characteristics could also be involved. In Locke's example, it 
was claimed that in virtue of having the prince's memories, we would take the 
former cobbler to be the prince. Similarly, for Shoemaker, due to the brain 
transfer, we would assume that Brownson was the former Brown. Finally, the 
precisely controlled copying and duplication process encouraged us to take 
Parfit's Martian duplicate as being Parfit. But it was pointed out that if we took 
into additional factors, such as appearance, physical characteristics, or 
possible technical malfunctions, these supposed conclusions could be 
undermined. 
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Williams and Wiggins show how some thought experiments can be altered to 
produce peculiar results. By extending the cases of inherited memories, or by 
increasing the amount of dissection carried out on a single brain, multiple 
persons could supposedly be produced from a single person, raising the 
bizarre spectre of possible uncontrolled person proliferation. Brennan and 
Elliot reveal flaws in the causal continuity requirements of the 'Widest' 
criterion. They show that the refusal to stipulate conditions which distinguish 
genuine causes from merely superficial ones means that 'causal continuity 
with any cause' ultimately amounts to no cause at all. Thus, although certain 
conclusions about personal identity are supposed to flow from thought 
experiments, it is apparent that these conclusions are in no way definitive, as 
they are extremely speculative, and are always subject to modifications which 
could produce different or even opposing results. We can thus never be sure 
which thought experiments to take notice of, or indeed, whether to take notice 
of any of them at all. 
2.4 Locating the Difficulties 
Although thought experiments have long been used as a tool of philosophical 
inquiry, we need to be aware of their limitations. They are, after all, merely a 
tool, to be used in conjunction with other available tools. If we take them too 
much at face value, we are in danger of accepting the purely fantastical as 
being more important than the actual. This appears to have happened in the 
case of the those considered above. They treat the issues involved in 
personal identity in a very simplistic way, such that a particular answer as to 
'wherein lies the identity of the original person?' is supposed to be obvious 
and uncontroversial. We are wooed by the simple elements of the stories to 
presume all too easily what the answer might be. To accurately assess the 
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value of these stories, we need to consider them in terms of the actual world, 
rather than just in terms of imaginary worlds. 
Wilkes notes that many thought experiments lack specific background 
conditions. These would be essential in scientific experiments, as they affect 
the legitimacy of the experiments' results. The thought experiments under 
discussion are not commensurate with scientific experiments, so they cannot 
carry an equivalent weight. Wilkes also points out an important difference 
between the use of thought experiments in philosophy, and in the use of 
fantasy in literature. In the case of fantasy, an environment is supplied in 
which fantastical events can occur, permitting our suspension of belief. The 
world of Carroll's Alice is one in which it is legitimate to abrogate the laws of 
nature; we know her world is not intended to be one commensurate with our 
own: 
A world in which one can walk through mirrors is, as explicitly indicated, a world of a 
dream; in such a world mushrooms can make one grow or shrink, a shop can turn 
into a boat, Queens can believe six impossible things before breakfast. For such 
fantasy, we have another world sketched for us, against the background of which 
the events are intelligible (Wilkes 1988), p 10. 
In the thought experiments under discussion, however, such background 
conditions are not sketched. It is not clear whether we are operating under our 
own laws of nature, completely different laws, or even laws contrary to our 
own. If the world of the foregoing scenarios was one in which persons did 
inherit the mental states of others, or in which it was possible to transfer brains, 
or in which persons could be reduplicated, would there be other changes 
entailed by these occurrences which would affect our judgments about 
personal identity? The situations presented may not only be scientifically or 
metaphysically dubious, they may also be logically inconsistent. As Wilkes 
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points out, a world in which gold has a different atomic number, or where 
water is no longer H20, is arguably as impossible as one in which a fish could 
be a whale (Wilkes 1988), p 18. In other words, if we reinterpret one concept, 
we need to recognise the impact this could have on the concepts to which it is 
related. Thus, if in our world the body and brain are required for our mental 
states, we need to consider whether it is intelligible to assume we can 
radically change the body and brain, without our mental states also being 
radically affected. 
These points are relevant if we are to draw strong conclusions based on 
theoretical brain transfers or person reduplication. It matters whether or not 
the difference between these imagined cases, and the cases of real life are 
significant differences. For example, even if we lack the skill to successfully 
separate brains from bodies (at present anyway), does the theoretical 
separation make any sense? Brains are not inherently discrete objects, but 
are part of the nervous system, a complex network which exists throughout the 
whole body. Would the laws of nature be different in a world where 
transferring such a large and fragile system was possible? Similarly, even on 
a purely materialist interpretation, does the idea of person replication make 
sense? Persons are not static objects, but from the level of cellular activity to 
the life-preserving functions of the body's major systems, are subject to 
constant dynamic change. At the sub-atomic level, not all the features of 
particles can be determinately specified. There are genuine doubts that 
'copying' a person makes any sense. As mentioned earlier, we need to 
remember that on the one hand, while thought experiments are perfectly 
entitled to stipulate what conditions and events they like, on the other, we 
need to be aware whether in doing so they simply beg the question at issue. 
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These considerations raise two crucial issues. First, do the thought 
experiments in question address the key issues involved in personal identity? 
Second, do they yield the conclusions claimed? In other words, are the issues 
raised in these scenarios the right ones, and do the conclusions claimed 
follow from the premises? Let us grant for the moment that the various forms 
of mental content inheritance, memory transplant, and reduplication are 
possible. In what way do these scenarios actually show that personal identity 
is a matter of psychological continuity, to the exclusion of other forms of 
continuity? Consider the following scenario: 
The earth has been devastated by nuclear winter, resulting from a massive 
nuclear war. As a result, individuals have a much shorter life-span, only 
twenty years as adults. Technology is such that old bodies can be recycled, 
and re-constituted into new bodies. Individuals expecting to die can thus 
order a new body just like their own ahead of time. When death is impending, 
brain states can be copied, such that the resulting individual continues life 
much the same as before. In order to keep life as normal as possible, 
individuals voluntarily agree to undergo no more than three such transplants 
in their "life-time", so that "death" finally occurs at about age eighty years. 40 
According to the psychological continuity criterion, because they have a 
continuing psychology with the right kind of cause, the persons above remain 
the same persons over time in virtue of the continuation of their psychological 
states, rather than because of the continuation of their bodies. The elements 
in the story are sufficiently similar to those of the earlier stories to recognise 
the points at issue. Let us now pursue the two questions outlined above. 
40This thought experiment is my own, although I may have read one like it somewhere, but 
cannot be sure. 
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First, have the issues involved in personal identity been addressed? We 
could answer in the affirmative, on the basis that we have referred to the 
continuation of individuals' psychology and individuals' bodies. Old bodies 
die, while psychology lives on in new bodies. Based on this, personal identity 
is claimed to be preserved because psychology is preserved. But this answer 
does not show that the full range of issues involved in personal identity has 
been addressed. It just shows that we have raised the issues we intend to 
address. That is, we have explored personal identity by addressing 
psychological continuity and bodily continuity. We have begged the question 
whether the issues involved in personal identity are confined to psychological 
continuity and bodily continuity. In other words, for the above thought 
experiment to work, we must already have decided what is involved in the 
question of personal identity. The thought experiment itself did not reveal 
anything we did not already 'know'. It did not explore other issues which might 
be involved, such as the environment, relations, whether a self is involved, 
and so on. 
The above approach to personal identity is the same as that taken by the 
previous thought experiments. In those discussed, we are given a set of 
factors pertaining to personal identity, and asked to choose amongst them, for 
example the prince's memories, the prince's body, the cobbler's body, 
Brown's memories, Robinson's body, Parfit's duplicate, and so on. Because 
we are presented with a set of factors, amongst which a choice of alternatives 
is possible, it is tacitly assumed that the total set of factors has been presented. 
But it is not at all clear that this is the case. If factors other than those 
presented were involved in personal identity, we would not learn this from the 
thought experiments themselves. This means that by confining our analysis to 
what is involved in the thought experiments, we are giving tacit approval to the 
range of possibilities that they provide. We are thus lured into thinking we 
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have given personal identity a comprehensive analysis, when in fact we have 
not. 
Second, we need to consider whether the above thought experiments yield 
the conclusions claimed. In the example just given, we are to assume that 
individuals remain the same persons over time in virtue of retaining 
appropriate psychological continuity, in spite of periodical body replacement. 
But in what way does the scenario show that personal identity is a matter of 
psychological continuity rather than bodily continuity, or indeed, any other 
form of continuity? How has the story proved that it is the fact of psychological 
continuity alone which preserves identity, rather than say, social custom, 
community acceptance, stability of relationships, the existence of a self, and so 
forth. There is no specific argument to show that it is psychological continuity 
over and above these other things which encapsulates personal identity. To 
accept the case, I must already be committed to that view. In other words, 
unless I already believe that personal identity is a matter of psychological 
continuity, I will not be convinced by a story which merely reiterates that view, 
without arguing for it. To conclude from these thought experiments that 
persons retain their identity in virtue of psychological continuity, in spite of 
various bodily changes, whether due to swapping of minds and bodies, brains 
and bodies, or complete reduplication of bodies, and so on, one must already 
be sympathetic to the primacy of psychological continuity. The thought 
experiments themselves do not argue for this, they merely demonstrate 'cases' 
of it. This point could be put in the following way: 
Personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. We can see this 
because in cases where bodily continuity and psychological continuity 
become disconnected, personal identity is maintained in virtue of 
psychological continuity. That is, we can see that personal identity is 
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maintained because we can see that psychological continuity is maintained. 
Therefore, personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. 
This argument does not justify the primacy of psychological continuity. It 
demonstrates neither that psychological states operate independently of 
physical states, nor that personal identity does not involve issues other than 
mental continuity. If other issues were involved, they would not be revealed in 
these types of arguments. 
A final problem is a serious flaw in the general strategy of the above thought 
experiments. The flaw concerns the type of analysis which is given to mental 
states. In the various scenarios, mental states are presented as insular, as 
self-sufficient and self-contained. That is, they are considered in terms of their 
intrinsic content. This view, sometimes known as interhalism, stipulates that 
what makes a mental state the particular state it is, is describable in terms of 
the mental state itself, as opposed to something external to the state, such as 
some item in the person's environment. For example, in the case of Locke, 
what makes the former cobbler the prince is that he has the former prince's 
mind contents. It is not altogether clear just what this means. Perhaps it 
involves having mental pictures of the palace where the prince lives, or of his 
courtiers, jewels, and fine clothes. If the cobbler lives in a crude village 
setting, it is not clear how he would recognise these mental pictures. Similar 
questions could be asked of any thought experiments which discuss mind 
contents as if they are items contained wholly inside a mind or a brain. Such 
lnternalism is controversial and highly questionable, and will thus be 
addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the efficacy of key thought experiments in the 
personal identity debate. Investigation of specific examples has revealed 
several inadequacies. First, in discussing the various forms of mind-body 
separation, mind and body are presumed to operate discretely, without 
adequate grounds being produced that this is the case. When describing 
various scenarios, in which minds and bodies, or brains and bodies become 
separated, the relevance of connections between these features is not 
examined. Whether embodiment affects mind content is not even questioned. 
Second, the thought experiments are sketchy and incomplete. Without the 
specification of background conditions, it is unclear whether the omitted 
details are relevant to the case being argued. While the laws of nature under 
which the scenarios are sketched are not specified, the scenarios themselves 
do not appear to cohere with the laws with which we are familiar. Third, the 
lack of specified conditions and the incomplete arguments render claims 
inconclusive, and open to counter-examples and counter-arguments. 
Through lack of detail, potential logical inconsistencies and impractical or 
contradictory states of affairs are not revealed. Fourth, the thought 
experiments do not offer cogent arguments in support of the psychological 
continuity criterion, but operate as if the case for it had already been proven. 
Finally, the thought experiments adopt an internalist view of mental states, 
such that no explanation of the meaning of those states is furriished, other 
than that of internal reference to the state itself. It will be argued that this 
conception of mental states is ultimately unsound, and cannot be sustained. 
In summary, these key thought experiments fail to vindicate the psychological 
continuity criterion, and ultimately leave the issue of personal identity 
unresolved. What the thought experiments do reveal, however, is that the 
analysis of personal identity requires a broader investigation than pure 
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speculation alone can provide. Some areas in particular need further inquiry. 
These include at least, the structure of mental content, the mind-body relation, 
and also a more developed and realistic inquiry into the nature of the self. As 
a first step in this inquiry, the psychological continuity criterion's internalist 
conception of the mind is taken up in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 Externalised Minds 
3.1 	Introduction 
The main tenet of the psychological continuity criterion is that personal identity 
is dependent on a person's psychological states or mind. Diachronic identity 
is taken to be maintained due to the continuance of mental content with the 
right kind of cause, which for Parfit, could be any cause. The significance of 
mental content lies in its causal connectedness, rather than in the content 
itself. As long as causal connectedness is maintained in some form or 
another, personal identity is also maintained. In cases where brains and 
minds are supposedly transferred to different bodies, the identity of the 
resulting person can be determined by checking to see if causal 
connectedness is present between the earlier person and the later person. 
Thus, checking whether Charles is Guy Fawkes, Brown is Brownson, or the 
Martian duplicate is Parfit, is thus just a matter of ascertaining whether causal 
connectedness is present between the minds of Charles and Guy Fawkes, the 
minds of Brown and Brownson, and the minds of Parfit and his duplicate. The 
actual contents of these 'persons" minds is of less significance than the 
causal connectedness - of any kind - which is present between the items 
which make up those contents. The problem here is that in permitting causal 
connectedness of any kind, this view takes no account of the factors external 
to the mind from which those contents first arise. This means that there is no 
correlation between what goes on inside the mind, and what goes on outside 
the mind. In this chapter, I argue that this internalist approach to the mind and 
its contents is mistaken, as it represents neither how minds function, nor how 
they relate to personal identity. 
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The internalist conception of mind holds that minds are autonomous and self-
contained. 41 Mental content is not held to depend in any essential way on 
anything existing external to the mind. Minds are entirely internally 
constituted, and identifiable solely in terms of their intrinsic content. This 
means that the actual world in which thinking subjects are situated is not taken 
into account when giving an account of the mind. The opposing view is that 
minds are interdependent with the external world, and that reference to the 
external world is required to identify and individuate mental contents. 42 The 
distinction between these two views is broadly referred to as that between 
intemalism and externalism. 
The internalist conception of the mind is necessary to the viability of the 
psychological continuity criterion. For, if external factors were acknowledged 
to be significant in determining mental content, then the psychological 
continuity criterion would not adequately capture what is essential in personal 
identity. More strongly, if external factors were shown to be essentially 
involved in the formation and maintenance of mental content, the 
psychological continuity criterion would be seriously undermined. The 
internalist view of the mind, however, is problematic. Investigation of mental 
content shows that what happens 'outside' the mind is crucially involved in 
what happens 'inside' the mind. In what follows, I will argue that the internalist 
view of the mind is inadequate to address to the actual causes of mental 
content, and thus, cannot adequately account for psychological continuity, or 
for personal identity. Although causal connectedness is stipulated by the 
psychological continuity criterion, the causal continuity requirements 
41 Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume are examples of thinkers who hold an internalist view 
of the mind and its contents. See, for example: (Descartes 1968); (Leibniz 1973); (Berkeley 
1965); and (Hume 1888). 
42Later Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Davidson are examples of thinkers who hold an externalist 
view of the mind. See, for example: (Wittgenstein 1958); (Putnam 1981); and (Davidson 
1995). 
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effectively preclude the actual causes of mental content from being 
recognised. Only a view which acknowledges the mind's external factors can 
recognise these causes. Therefore, I also argue that only an externalist view 
of the mind can adequately account for psychological continuity, or for 
personal identity. These claims will be defended, first, by explicating the 
relevance of the internalist-externalist distinction to the psychological 
continuity criterion, and second, by showing how empirical research supports 
the externalist case. This research focuses on perception, in relation to both 
perception of the environment in general, and visual perception in particular. 
3.2 The Problem with Internelism 
The internalist view of the mind focuses on factors 'inside' the mind, to the 
exclusion of factors 'outside' the mind. When accounting for mental content, 
the internalist view does not make explicit reference to the objects43 which first 
caused that content. When mental content is considered more closely, 
however, it becomes apparent that content inside the mind arises, first and 
foremost, on the basis of objects outside the mind. Investigation shows that 
mental content is dependent on external objects existing. The types of minds 
we have, as well as the contents of our minds, is related to objects which exist 
outside the mind. This claim does not just refer to the types of minds and 
mental content we have, but to the fact that we have minds at all. If external 
objects are crucial to minds, a comprehensive account of the mind must 
include reference to these objects, and to our mode of involvement with them. 
The psychological continuity criterion, however, is remiss in this regard. When 
giving an account of the mind, the psychological continuity criterion does not 
make explicit reference to the objects which furnish the material for mental 
43 'Objecti, in this chapter, signifies event, fact, object, or place, in fact anything that humans 
perceive, engage with, or think about. 
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content. This is because 'any cause' of mental content is allowable, meaning 
the actual cause is often overlooked. 
The deficiency in the psychological continuity's approach to the mind can be 
understood by considering more closely the factors on the basis of which 
mental content emerges. Mental content emerges from our interactions with 
objects in the world. Without these objects and interactions, mental content 
would not be possible. This means that when accounting for the mind, these 
fundamental causes of mental content should be specified. If they are not 
specified, the existence of objects fails to be acknowledged as a necessary 
condition of thoughts about objects. This implies that thoughts about objects 
are prior to the objects themselves, and that the very intelligibility of thought 
does not depend on objects actually existing. 
When considered closely, the internalist view of the mind is paradoxical. If the 
objects which cause thought are left out of the account of thought, a theoretical 
division is thereby established between the thoughts of objects, and the 
objects of thought. More specifically, if the psychological continuity criterion 
does not acknowledge the existence of the objects as a precondition of 
thoughts about objects, there is an explanatory gap in its account of mental 
states, as it has not provided an explanation for the content of thought. 44 But if 
the psychological continuity criterion does provide this explanation, its ability 
to comprehensively characterise mental states independently of non-mental 
factors is undermined. 
44 It is true that fictions and fantasies are possible about any object. But they could not get off 
the ground unless there was some connection, either direct or indirect, with something which 
already exists. This same point applies when mistakes in thinking are made. Even in cases of 
misremembering or misidentifying objects of thought, connection to something which exists is 
essential. Even in mistakes, the content of thought could not arise totally ex nihilo. If no objects 
existed at all, we would have no starting point for our thoughts. 
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The weakness of internalism can be seen by considering different kinds of 
thoughts. These thoughts could be about general items, particular items, and 
this particular item here and now, such as the pen in my hand. First, I can 
think about cats in general, without having to think about one particular cat. 
But unless I know about cats, or have engaged with cats, I could not have any 
thoughts about cats. Indeed, unless there were cats in existence, no-one 
could have thoughts about cats. 45 Second, I can think about a particular item 
which I have never seen, or engaged with directly, such as Mount Everest.46 I 
can do this, although I have never visited Mount Everest. Even had I never 
climbed a mountain or a steep hill, I can still have thoughts about Mount 
Everest. I can do so because I have learned about Mount Everest from people 
who have visited it, or who have had either direct or indirect engagement with 
it. Persons who have engaged with Mount Everest could not do so unless it 
existed. Genuine thoughts about Mount Everest are thus contingent on Mount 
Everest actually existing. Finally, I can think about this particular pen here, 
now, even when I am not looking at it, or using it. But I can only do so because 
I have looked at it, and have used it. My engagement with the pen, and my 
knowledge of the pen is first-person knowledge, and is contingent on the pen 
being present to me as a physical object. As a physical object, it has 
interacted with my limbs, and my sense organs, such that my thoughts about it 
are directly related to this interaction. In all the above cases, the thoughts 
about objects are contingent on, and arise out of, the objects actually existing. 
45 If cats did not exist, the thoughts we have about cats would not be about the cats that do exist 
- they would be about imaginary creatures. While it is possible to have thoughts about objects 
thought not to exist, such as unicorns and mermaids, this does not undermine the point being 
made. Imaginary objects can only be thought about due to their connection with objects which 
do exist. This point is essentially the same as that made above. If we never interacted with 
objects, we could not have thoughts about real objects or imaginary objects. 
46Again, if Mount Everest did not exist, my thoughts would not be about Mount Everest, they 
would be about some other imaginary mountain. You may think: 'Well, how do you know it really 
exists, couldn't all the stories you read be mistaken, or a trick'. Of course, this is possible in 
some instances, but it could not be possible about all objects. For such fictions to be possible, 
some objects must exist in the first place. 
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The above examples indicate that there is a necessary connection between 
the objects of thought, and the world of objects, or put another way, between 
what we can think about and what exists. The crucial point is that for thought 
to occur at all requires that objects exist. Our whole understanding of 'what a 
thought is' is tied to the notion of objects existing in a world. If no objects 
existed, no thought would be possible. You only have to imagine yourself 
living in a world (a world? what could this mean here?) with no other objects of 
any kind beside yourself. What could you think about? Indeed, how could you 
even know what you were? In such a case, even a priori thoughts would not 
be possible. A priori thoughts are only possible for beings who have minds. 
And beings who have minds are beings who exist in, and interact with, a world 
of objects. If the very notion of thought itself is contingent on the world 
existing, a comprehensive and accurate account of thought should include 
reference to that world. The psychological continuity criterion fails in this 
regard. When accounting for mental states, it does not require that the objects 
from which the thoughts, memories, and other mental items first arise, are 
explicitly specified in such an account. 
In holding this position, the psychological continuity criterion takes the 
connection between thought and the objects of thought for granted. It 
assumes that because thought and the objects of thought can be 
disconnected in the imagination, the existence of objects is not required as a 
precondition of thought. This is misleading. Although the psychological 
continuity criterion does not directly dispute the connection between thought 
and objects, it does not emphasise this connection. As a result, it draws 
inaccurate conclusions about mental states, and consequently, about 
personal identity. More specifically, because the psychological continuity 
criterion fails to recognise the necessary connection between thought and the 
objects of thought, it is able to execute the theoretical separation between 
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thought and world, and consequently, to categorise psychological states 
independently from the items which initially caused those states. As a result, 
the account of personal identity, produced by the psychological continuity 
criterion, fails to include many significant items, such as bodies, places, 
relationships, activities, events, and in fact, many of the items which 
characterise and personalise individuals' lives. In failing to include these 
items, the account of personal identity is incomplete. 
3.3 The Case for Externalism 
In contrast to internalism, externalism is the general view that mental content is 
constituted, at least in part, by factors external to the mind (Honderich Ted 
1995), p 265. This view recognises the interdependence between the 
contents of minds and the world of objects. Work by Donald Davidson and Jeff 
Malpas helps to elucidate this view. 47 Davidson's work, in particular, is 
especially important, if only because he is one of the most influential figures in 
the formulation of a version of the externalist position. 
Davidson recognises the intricate relation between mental content and the 
mind's external factors. These factors include at least the social and historical 
contexts in which persons live. Shared beliefs, languages, social practices, 
concerns, goals, and activities, all contribute to the kinds of minds persons 
have. For Davidson, the concept of 'pure objects of thought', disconnected 
from these factors, makes no sense. Although minds have public and private 
aspects, neither aspect is primary to the other, as they are, in fact, mutually 
supportive. It is precisely on the basis of our engagements with other persons, 
and with the world of objects, that mental states are determined as the states 
they are. It is these engagements that provide the epistemological 
47See, for example: (Davidson 1987), and (Ma!pas 1999). 
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connections that give mental states meaning. According to Davidson, the very 
concept of raw experiential data is meaningless, as, to him, even the 
theoretical separation of data and conceptual scheme makes no sense 
(Davidson 1987), pp 159-172. 
Davidson challenges the view that thoughts about oneself are more 
fundamental than thoughts about others. For him, this gets things the wrong 
way round. Rather than progressing from self-knowledge to other-knowledge, 
we must first acknowledge ourselves as members of a community of others, in 
a world in which there are other objects, and other persons. Having thoughts 
involves having beliefs, making judgements, holding propositions, and 
knowing the meaning of objective truth. It is only by conceiving of ourselves 
as persons among other persons that these things are possible. The 
recognition of our own viewpoint as one among other viewpoints permits us to 
judge, compare, make mistakes, change our minds, and therefore, to 
understand what it means to be 'objectively true' (Davidson 1995), pp 203- 
205. To formulate a proposition requires that one holds other propositions, 
which means holding beliefs about things in the world, other than just those 
things to which the proposition directly refers. Davidson points out the 
impossibility of understanding the belief that 'the sun is shining' without having 
other beliefs also. Such another belief could be the belief that the sun is in the 
sky above us, or that the sun appears dull when obscured by clouds, or that 
the sun disappears at night, and so on. Davidson holds that having these and 
similar beliefs presupposes a world of shared objects, within a common 
spatial and temporal frame, accompanied by a set of interpersonal relations 
(Davidson 1995), pp 211-217. 
Davidson distinguishes between three different types of knowledge: self-
knowledge, world-knowledge, and other-knowledge. All these types of 
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knowledge concern the same reality, but from three different perspectives. 
Davidson uses the concept of 'triangulation' to explain these perspectives. 
We relate to others by means of a shared world of experience. In sharing this 
world, we share concepts, meanings, and language. These meanings 
correlate with objects and events in the world, thus forming a three way 
connection: 
Without this sharing of reactions to common stimuli, thought and speech would 
have no particular content - that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view to 
give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content. We may 
think of it as a form of triangulation: each of two people is reacting differentially to 
sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain direction (Davidson 1991), p 160. 
These 'triangulations', or common reference points, arise out of our common 
experiences. It is by being mutually experienced and understood that these 
reference points give our communications shared meanings. By sharing the 
world, we communicate with each other, and understand each other's 
thoughts (Davidson 1991), pp 153-160. In explicating the externalist position, 
David shows how interpersonal communication and shared meaning is 
possible. But internalism notoriously faces problems in addressing such 
issues. 
Work by Malpas on agency and spatiality also supports the externalist 
position. Central to agency is the implicit connection between the agent's 
mental content and the external world, or put another way, between the 
agent's intentional states and the world's objective causal ordering. The 
capacity for agency entails a grasp of this connection, and of the fact that it is 
possible only in a spatially ordered world. Together, the above factors form 
the holistic structure which makes agency possible (Ma!pas 1999),. pp 92-96. 
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The capacity for action requires an appreciation of the connection between 
agency and causation. Malpas notes that this understanding is not simply a 
matter of grasping what happens at the point of action; it also involves 
grasping the conditions under which agent-centred action is possible. These 
conditions distinguish agent-centred action from mere behaviour. 48 The 
conditions include the subjective state of the agent, and the objective state of 
the external world. The first of these concerns the agent's capacity for 
intentional thought, while the second concerns the causal ordering in the 
objective world. For action to occur requires that an agent grasps both these 
conditions (Ma!pas 1999), pp 99-108. 
Ma!pas argues that to act in any situation requires that agents appreciate 
'causal bodily power', that is, they are aware of the effect that a particular 
bodily action will have. This involves having beliefs about oneself and one's 
capacities, about the causal connections between oneself and objects in the 
world, and about the causal connections between the objects within the world. 
These different beliefs cohere to form a framework of beliefs. To make sense, 
these beliefs require to cohere and connect with each other. One's belief 
about a particular action must cohere with similar beliefs about similar actions. 
The framework of beliefs is, then, one within which particular beliefs and 
actions make sense (Malpas 1999), pp 99-113. 
Malpas notes that to have such a framework requires, not only a set of 
subjective states in an agent, but also a consistent causal ordering in an 
objective world. Unless there was some reliability of causal connectedness 
among objects, there could be no consistency of beliefs about objects. For 
example, to drink a glass of water involves my knowing how to lift my arm, and 
how to make appropriate grasping and lifting movements in certain directions. 
48For seminal work on the difference between actions and behaviour, see (Davidson 1980). 
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It also involves knowing about the possibility of resistance to my actions. If my 
arms were immobilised by being tied in a sling, I need to be aware that my 
ability to act will be impeded. When I become aware of my limitations in this 
way, I become aware that my bodily capacities are related to objective facts in 
an objective world, and not just to a set of subjective states in me (Malpas 
1999), pp 114-124. 
Ma!pas argues that an appreciation of spatiality is necessary to understanding 
the causal ordering in the world, and how this ordering relates to action. 
Believing that actions at one time are causally connected to actions at another 
time means grasping those actions as distinct and temporally separated 
actions. But grasping this means also grasping the actions as located within a 
single spatio-temporal framework, in a single, objective world. To accept that 
one's actions at one time, are part of the same causal ordering at another time, 
requires that one appreciates them as both occurring within a single, spatio-
temporal framework. Just being an agent requires that one understands 
oneself as standing in a certain kind of causal and spatial relation to objects. 
This means having the relevant beliefs about those objects, and about one's 
connection to those objects. If we did not have some kind of beliefs about 
objects, and about our relation to objects, we would have difficulty initiating 
actions in relation to such objects. Grasping spatiality allows an agent to 
differentiate between the objective elements of the world, and to understand 
how these elements are causally linked. An appreciation of spatiality also 
enables an agent to distinguish between her own intentional states, and the 
states of the objective world. It is thus ultimately only through spatiality that 
agency is possible, and hence also, that thought is possible. The externalist 
conception of mind recognises this integral relation between spatiality and 
thought, but the internalist conception has difficulty in doing so (Malpas 1999), 
pp 114-137. 
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The above work elucidates ways in which internalism and externalism differ in 
their approach to mental content. Specifically, it shows that the externalist 
view can more satisfactorily account for the source of mental content than the 
internalist view. Because it acknowledges the preconditions of thought, 
externalism can also more satisfactorily account for psychological continuity. 
In linking the content of thought to the objects which first cause thought, 
externalism provides a more sound account of the content mental chains than 
a view which does not explicitly recognise this link. 
3.4 Perception 
In addition to philosophical argument, the externalist case is also supported by 
empirical research. In particular, research in the areas of Ethology, 49 
Ecological Psychology, 50 and Biology, 51 elucidates some of the ways in 
which mind and world are linked through perception. Perception is the 
interaction between a creature's perceptual apparatus and the world of 
objects, and the meaning given to that interaction. Perception, therefore, is the 
way in which humans and other creatures receive information from the 
'outside' world. For humans, the information received through perception 
provides the material for mental content. Bodily interaction with objects, 
through the various sensory modes of hearing, smell, taste, touch, and vision 
provides the perceptual information from which thoughts are built. Without this 
sensory information, it would not be possible to think thoughts, not even a 
49 Ethology is a biological approach to the study of animal behaviour, which is concerned with 
the animal's natural environment (Tortora and Becker 1978), p 777. For seminal work in 
ethology, see (von Uexkull 1934). This work is addressed in Section 3.5. 
50 Ecological Psychology is a psychology which recognises that the physical and biological 
features of the environment affect and influence mental life (Reed 1996), p 7. For 
foundational work in ecological psychology, see (Gibson 1977). This work is addressed in 
Section 3.6. 
51 Biology is generally concerned with the origin, history, structure and other features of the 
lives of plants and animals (Krebs 1981), p 84. Biology will explored in Section 3.7 specifically in 
relation to visual perception. See (Furst 1979), and (Atkinson and Braddick 1989). 
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priori thoughts, as we would be unable to understand them. Perception, 
therefore, is fundamental to having a mind. 
For humans, perception yields information concerning external objects, such 
as events, facts, persons, and other items (Honderich Ted 1995), p 652. 
This information forms the basis of our thoughts. Because thought and 
perception are so intimately linked, understanding perception is crucial to 
understanding the mind. To help to understand the link between perception 
and thought, and to further support the case for externalism, perception is now 
examined from three different perspectives. These concern the perception of 
the immediate environment, the perception of objects in the environment, and 
the operation of visual perception. 
3.5 Perception of the Environment 
In its most general sense, perception is the means by which creatures receive 
information from the external world. It is perception, therefore, that guides and 
constrains a creature's interaction with its immediate environment. By 
perceiving their environment, creatures receive information concerning the 
factors that constrain their lives, such as the subjection to gravity, the tolerance 
of temperature, and the need for nutrition. Perception varies for each creature 
in accordance with its perceptual apparatus. For example, a starfish has no 
head or brain, but has rings of nerves around its mouth, and thousands of 
neurosensory cells in the epidermis which are sensitive to touch, 
photoreception, 52 and chemoreception. 53 It also has a nerve cord in each of 
its five arms, and its main sensory organ is an 'eyespot' at the end or each arm 
(Curtis 1983), p 551. The 'information' given to the starfish through these 
52Photoreception' is the detection of light (Curtis 1983), p 1103. 
531Chemoreception' is sensory response to specific chemical stimulus, including smell and 
taste (Curtis 1983), p 1090. 
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various receptors guides its movement across the sea bottom, its search for 
food, and so on. The different perceptual responses of creatures can thus vary 
from the apparently simple, 54 like those of a starfish, to the very complex, like 
those of a human. The relation between creature, environment, and survival 
can be understood in terms of an interrelated framework. This framework 
comprises a creature's survival needs, its perceptual apparatus, its immediate 
environment, and its capacity for action. These factors concern the biological 
needs of organisms in an environment, and apply equally to humans and non-
humans. 
From an evolutionary perspective, these factors are taken to have influenced 
the emergence of minds. The need to deal with the complexities of multiple 
perceptual responses to the environment, and the corresponding need to plan 
and execute action is thought to have influenced and guided the development 
of the higher cognitive faculties which characterise human minds. If minds first 
developed in this way, our understanding of the mind should include an 
understanding of the mind's biological underpinnings. Because it deals 
specifically with creatures' perceptual responses to the environment, ethology 
provides an effective way of taking some steps towards gaining this 
appreciation. 
While ethology has developed and become formalised in recent years, the 
foundational work in this area is understood to be that undertaken by von 
Uexku11. 55 Through simple studies and experiments, von Uexkull studied 
creatures in their natural habitats. His work produced some intriguing 
findings. He found that as a sensory being, a creature's perceptual response 
54Although the perceptual capacities of some creatures may seem relatively simple when 
compared to humans, in their own right, they can still be very complex. 
55 Von Uexkull's ideas were later developed and formalised by others, such as Lorenz and 
Tinbergen. 
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to its immediate environment is selective, and is part of a single system which 
composes the creature's world or Umwelt. The Umwelt comprises perceptual 
apparatus, motor capacities, survival needs, and perceptual response. This 
means that each creature or creature type responds to its environment 
according to its particular type of perceptual apparatus, and according to its 
particular survival needs. By studying different types of creatures, von Uexkull 
learnt that due to the differences in perceptual apparatus and survival needs, 
each creature type perceives the environment differently to other creature 
types. A mollusc, for example, would have a completely different type of 
perceptual response to, say, a bird. Crucial to the present argument is von 
Uexkull's discovery that the set of environmental features which most 
concerns an anima156 is that, and only that, to which it responds. This means 
that for humans, the kind of thoughts they can think is tied, by means of their 
perceptual responses, to the environments in which they are situated. Closer 
consideration of von Uexkull's work makes this link clearer. 
As explained, to von Uexkull, the Umwelt or immediate environment comprises 
the set of environmental features relevant to, and consequently perceived by, 
any given creature. The features perceived by a creature relate to its life-
activity, and vary according to the needs of species and individuals. These 
features relate to the creature's nurture, maintenance, and development, and 
guide its selection of habitat. The Umwelt of each creature comprises its total 
perceptual response, and hence, its total world. Because each creature type 
responds differently, each creature type's 'world' is completely different to the 
'world' of other creature types. What these worlds have in common, however, 
is that they are each constrained by the factors which permit them to exist. 
These factors include the distance between earth and sun, the basic elements 
found on earth, the climatic conditions, and so on. Together, these factors 
56Humans are included as animals in this and other instances in this section. 
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provide the totality of conditions under which the Urnwelten exist. The totality 
of these conditions is the Welt, or the wider potentia157 universe (von 
Uexkull 1934), pp 5-6; (IngoId 1995), pp 62-66; (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
1975), p 6. 
To explore the notion of the Umwelt, von Uexkull takes his reader on a stroll 
through 'unfamiliar worlds', which are known to animals, but not to humans. 
We are asked to imagine each creature's world captured inside a soap-
bubble, through which, looking outwards, we may see the world of the 
creature, our own world 'transformed': 
When we ourselves then step into one of these bubbles, the familiar meadow is 
transformed. Many of its colorful features disappear, others no longer belong 
together but appear in new relationships. A new world comes into being. Through 
the bubble we see the world of the burrowing worm, of the butterfly, or of the field 
mouse; the world as it appears to the animals themselves, not as it appears to us. 
This we may call the phenomenal world or the self-world of the animal (von Uexkull 
1934), p5. 
According to von Uexkull, the phenomenal world of the animal differentiates 
the animal from a mere mechanical object. Von Uexkull argues that unlike the 
physiologist, who regards a creature as no more than a machine, the biologist 
appreciates a creature as a perceiving subject, a centre of a world, a being 
capable, albeit primitively, of phenomenally experiencing its own world. 58 
Having different perceptual frameworks and limitations, different creatures, 
accordingly, have different experiential worlds (von Uexkull 1934), pp 5-9. 
57 1 say 'potential' here, because, it does not seem to me that it is possible for any creature to 
experience all the perceptual variations that are possible. In having one type of perceptual 
apparatus, one is effectively cutting-off the possibility of having another. Yet, because a certain 
set of physical conditions exist which permit all the creatures which do exist, to exist, we know 
that such a 'potential' universe, or Welt must exist. 
58Von Uexkull contrasts his view with that of some zoologists and physiologists who accord no 
more status than that of a machine to non-human creatures, and thus miss the awareness that 
many different worlds exist (von Uexkull 1934), pp 5-6. 
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To bring out the difference between an animal and a mere machine, von 
Uexkull compares the perceptual response of a living organism with the 
mechanical response of a bell. When affected by temperature, or agents, such 
as acids, alkalis, or electric currents, the bell responds in the same way as any 
object which is constructed of similar metal. Living organisms, by contrast, 
respond to objects in accordance with the different cell groupings of which the 
organisms are composed. These cell groups form the organism's perceptual 
apparatus, or perceptual tools, and its operational capacities, or effector tools. 
Under the direction of a control centre or 'brainl, 59 'orderly collaboration' 
between the cell groups takes place. The receptor cells in the 'brain' receive 
and respond to stimulus, while the effector cells generate and control 
movement. The different cell groups perform their own functions, but by 
working in concert, they combine to produce representations of objects, which, 
for visually perceiving creatures could be 'the blueness of the sky', or 'the 
greenness of the lawn'. Similar co-operation occurs in effector organs when 
motor impulses act on muscles to produce movement. In short, when a 
creature engages with objects in its environment, it responds perceptually, 
and generates its activity accordingly (von Uexkull 1934), pp 7-10. Von 
Uexkull sees a mutual relation between a creature's activity and its perceptual 
response, and the perceptual response and the creature's activity: 
But since all the traits of an object are structurally interconnected, the traits given 
operational meaning must affect those bearing perceptual meaning through the 
object, and so change the object itself. This is best expressed briefly as: The 
effector cue or meaning extinguishes the receptor cue or meaning (von Uexkull 
1934), p 10. 
59Quotes are inserted here around 'brain' as it is referred to in a very general sense, and not 
specifically as the brain of a human or higher mammal. 
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The resulting arrangement or 'functional cycle' is a 'systematic whole', an 
interrelated and mutually supportive set of factors, where an organism's 
perceptual response initiates its activity, and where its activity influences and 
defines its perceptual response (von Uexkull 1934), pp 10-11. 
A creature's Umwelt comprises several such functional cycles. Von Uexkull 
notes that these cycles provides the first principle of 'Umwelt theory', namely, 
that all animals, whether complex or simple, have a reciprocal relation with, 
and therefore conform precisely to their own individual worlds. That is, there is 
a mutual relation between creature, survival, perception, environment, and 
action - in short, an inherent interrelatedness between organism and 
environment, and environment and organism (von Uexkull 1934), pp 10-11. 
Von Uexkull gives the example of the three functional cycles which compose 
the life-cycle of the female tick. The first cycle begins when the tick reaches 
maturity. Waiting in a suitable bush or similar place, the tick responds to the 
skin odour (butyric acid) of a passing mammal (first perceptual cue). Her 
response to the odour is to launch herself onto the unsuspecting prey (first 
effector cue). When alighted on the creature's surface, she seeks a hairless 
spot through which to burrow. The alighting action stifles the emission of 
butyric acid (second perceptual cue), causing the tick to 'run about' (second 
effector cue). On finding a warm spot (third perceptual cue), the tick proceeds 
to burrow and engorge herself with blood (third effector cue). Satisfied, she 
leaves her prey and returns to the ground. Here, she lays her eggs, and then 
dies. These three functional cycles comprise the tick's total life-cycle, and 
hence her total Umwelt (von Uexkull 1934), pp 7-11. 
Von Uexkull claims that these cycles are not merely an exchange of forces, but 
are an exchange of relations between a living subject and its object. Although 
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there is a multitude of possible responses from the tick, it 'chooses' the only 
three which are right for its needs: 
The whole rich world around the tick shrinks and changes into a scanty framework 
consisting, in essence, of three receptor cues and three effector cues - her Umwelt. 
But the very poverty of this world guarantees the unfailing certainty of her actions, 
and security is more important than wealth (von Uexkull 1934), p 12. 
Von Uexkull caps his account by observing that a 'lucky coincidence' prevails 
between the scarcity of readily available tick food resources, and the tick's 
ability to survive for long periods without nutrition, up to eighteen years in fact 
(von Uexkull 1934), p 12. 60 
The simple life-cycle of the tick demonstrates the principles which apply to all 
creatures in their Umwelten. An interplay transpires between organism, 
needs, and environment, orchestrated by the creature's perceptual response 
and action. Von Uexkull relates how different types of visual responses result 
from different sets and types of visual apparatus. In each case, the apparatus 
supplies just what the organism needs for its survival. Together, needs, 
environment, response, and action, comprise the various creatures' 
Umwelten. In demonstrating the reciprocity between organism and 
environment, the functional cycles of von Uexkull's woodland creatures shed 
light on the biological underpinnings of human mind-formation and operation. 
Humans, like other creatures, also respond selectively to their environments. 
60Von Uexkull deduces from the tick's unusual survival ability that creatures experience of time 
is not uniform. At issue is the length of a creature's 'moment' - the amount of time in which the 
world 'stands still'. For humans this is 1/18 of a second. We can infer this by observing the 
amount of time required between frames to ensure that moving pictures appear as a continuous 
frame. Above this level (faster), the pictures would appear as a flickering confusion. Below this 
level, we could not detect movement (that is, with the naked eye). Creatures do not experience 
time 'absolutely', but in accordance with their relation to their Umwelten. This relation is the 
outcome of perceptual and effectual cues, which themselves are tied to the way creature and 
Umwelt relate (von Uexkull 1934), p 12. It can be seen that the process is mutually constructive 
and supportive, and hence is essentially holistic. Spatial response is also involved in this 
intricate relation, but its exploration goes beyond what I can reasonably undertake here. 
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The extremes of temperature we can tolerate are related to the survival 
capacities of our bodies and our vital organs. Similarly, the amount of food, 
water, and sleep that we crave is related to our needs as biological organisms. 
Because these are the things which concern us, they are the things from which 
our thoughts are formed. Von Uexkull notes that because our response to the 
world is selective, we can often have a 'search image' in mind when looking 
for objects. In some instances, this 'search image' is powerful enough to 
'block' us from seeing actual images. Von Uexkull gives the example of a clay 
pitcher which he frequently saw in a particular spot on a friend's dining table. 
One day, the pitcher was broken and replaced by a glass jug. Not expecting 
the unfamiliar image, von Uexkull was completely unable to see the replaced 
item until it was pointed out to him (von Uexkull 1934), p 62. This simple 
example demonstrates how our needs influence, and often determine, what 
we perceive, and therefore, what we think. 
Von Uexkull gives many examples of creatures' different phenomenal worlds. 
The phenomenal world of one creature differs from that of creatures differently 
configured. In each case, reciprocity between creature, perceptual response, 
and environment is demonstrated. A single scene, for example, is perceived 
differently by a man, a dog, and a fly. Of course, we cannot know for certain 
that the phenomenal content of another creature's perceptual experience is 
like the pictures offered by von Uexkull, but this is beside the point. What we 
can appreciate is that a creature's perceptual world is the outcome of an 
interrelated set of factors, and that correspondingly, so is our own (von 
Uexkull 1934), pp 20-72. 
The selectivity of Umwelt response is brought out by von Uexkull's example of 
a single oak tree. To the creatures who live there, it is home, protection, and 
sometimes, nourishment. Each creature who lives in the tree chooses a 
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different part, according to its needs. The ant chooses the crevices of the 
gnarled bark, the boring beetle the bark's underside, the fox the roots, and the 
owl the branches. In each case, the creature's response to the tree relates 
specifically to the creature's own needs and concerns, and furnishes each 
creature with its own unique world (See Figures 1-4). 
Figure 1 Ant Figure 2 Boring Beetle 
Figure 3 Fox 	 Figure 4 Owl 
Ant, Bark-boring Beetle, Fox, Owl and Oak Tree. Illustrations by G. Kriszat. 
Reproduced from (von Uexkull 1934), pp 76-79. 
While there is only one tree, each creature responds to different parts or 
aspects of the tree. Each creature selects its habitat from the part of the tree 
which best supplies its comfort, nutrition, protection, and suitable vantage 
point for watching predators. The creature's perceptual response delimits this 
complex arrangement in each case. Most likely, each creature is unaware of 
the perceptual responses of the other creatures, and may even be unaware 
that the other creatures exist (von Uexkull 1934), pp 74-76. 
Just as the tree appears differently to the various creatures who live there, the 
tree also appears differently to humans (See Figures 5-6). 
88 
Figure 5 Girl 	 Figure 6 Forester 
Girl, Forester and Oak Tree. Illustrations by G. Kriszat. Reproduced from (von 
Uexkull 1934), pp 74-75. 
To the little girl, the tree is a frightening demon. To the forester, it is just the 
next tree to be felled. He is oblivious to the frowning, forbidding face. These 
examples demonstrate how a single object can elicit a variety of different 
perceptual responses, and how these responses are related to the different 
perceptual apparatus, and the different concerns of the creatures involved. As 
a result of their different concerns, each creature perceives the one, single 
object, differently. We can never know what these different perceptions are 
actually like. Thomas Nagel was aware of this when he argued that we could 
never understand what life was like for a bat (Nagel 1979), pp 169. 61 We can 
61 See Nagel's seminal article: (Nagel 1979). Nagel argues that the different needs and modes 
of perception of other creatures, such as bats, ensure that their phenomenological experiences 
are different from ours: 'Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, 
nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory' apparatus so different from ours that the 
problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid . . . bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, 
is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose 
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speculate though, that the bat occupies, and responds to, a set of 
environmental features - an Umwelt - quite unlike our own. Similarly, the 
world of a bee, a snail, or other creature, cannot be a world for us. 
For von Uexkull, the oak tree and its diverse inhabitants provide a mirror to the 
rest of nature, in which multitudinous possibilities are present: 
What we have found on a small scale in the oak tree is enacted on the life tree of 
nature in vast dimensions (von Uexkull 1934), p 76. 
The 'dimensions' perceived by humans differ in accordance with their 
particular needs and concerns. Von Uexkull gives the example of different 
types of scientists, each of which sees the same world through different eyes. 
Because of their different concerns, they each 'see' the world differently to the 
others. For the astronomer, the world is one small object among millions of 
other objects in space; for the deep-sea researcher, the seas of the world 
contain nature's abundance; for the nuclear physicist, the world comprises. 
minute particles. The colours which these scientists see are seen differently 
by the physiologist under his microscope. And the sounds they all hear are 
heard differently by the tuned ear of the musician. Although each of these 
'worlds' are different, they are all underpinned by the same natural laws, and 
thus, at a fundamental level, are constrained by one nature (von Uexkull 
1934), pp 76-80. 
Von Uexkull's account of the selective responses of humans and other 
creatures to the one, single world, draws attention to the mind's biological 
underpinnings. In particular, his work treats organisms as always in 
systematic relation to their environments. This means that their individual 
that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine' (Nagel 1979), p 168. 
Although we cannot imagine precisely what it is like, we can be aware of it as a field of activity and 
experience which is necessarily different to our own. 
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responses have to be understood in relation to the environmental context that 
elicits them. Individual responses cannot be understood independently of 
environmental circumstances. If we were to extend this to mental states, it 
would suggest that they cannot be viewed independently, not only of their 
environments, but also of the bodily characteristics to which they are related, 
and by means of which creatures hold themselves in contact with their world. 
This means that the kinds of thoughts we think, indeed the kind of thoughts 
that we can think, are, at least in part, a direct product of the kind of world in 
which we live, and of the kind of interaction we have with that world. Another 
way of putting this is to say that the world is inside our minds, rather than our 
minds being inside the world. The psychological continuity criterion fails to 
recognise the connection between our minds and the world. Indeed, in 
confining its account of the mind to an account of 'overlapping chains', the 
psychological continuity criterion fails to acknowledge that the world not only 
constrains and influences our thoughts, but also, our capacity to think at all. 
The importance of environmental influences on our perceptual abilities is 
further taken up by J. J. Gibson. 
3.6 Perception and Affordance 
The relevance of environmental features to mind formation is also emphasised 
by ecological psychology. In particular, Gibson's work on affordances relates 
environmental features to creaturely activity, and to the objects involved in that 
activity. An affordance is any item in the environment which relates, either 
directly or indirectly, to activity. Affordances contribute to a creature's 
development and maintenance, and include natural and manufactured 
objects. They apply to all creatures including humans, and generate a 
reciprocal relation between creature and environment. Because they are 
intimately tied to perception, affordances are relevant to human experience, 
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and hence also to mind formation. To understand how affordances influence 
and constrain minds, we need to appreciate how they are involved in a 
reciprocal arrangement between any creature and that creature's basic 
biological needs. While humans are thinking creatures, they are also 
biological creatures, and are, therefore, involved in this arrangement also. 
According to Gibson, an affordance is: 
a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surface taken with 
reference to an animal . . . . a combination of physical properties of the 
environment that is uniquely suited to a given animal - to his nutritive system or his 
action system or his locomotor system (Gibson 1977), p 67; p 79. 
Aspects of the environment which are useful to a creature's maintenance 
constitute its affordances. Items valuable to a creature's nutritive system are 
determined by its being a herbivore or carnivore; those valuable to its action 
system concern whether it has claws or hands; and finally, those valuable to 
its locomotor system relate to its type of legs and feet (Gibson 1977), p 79. 
Affordances range from simple to complex, examples being 'features of the 
terrain, shelters, water, fire, objects, tools, other animals and human displays'. 
The conditions under which these items are perceived are also affordances, 
an example being the presence of sufficient light for vision to be possible 
(Gibson 1977), p 67. 
Gross environmental features are affordances, because they determine the 
type of creature able to live in a given environment. For example, a land 
surface, solid and flat, better supports large or heavy animals than one 
swampy and sunken. Mobility and upright posture is sustainable, legs can 
walk and stand, conditions are thus conducive to quadrupeds and bipeds. An 
affordance could also be a seat. It is the means of 'sitting down' because, 
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having the right solidity, shape, surface, and height, it can support the required 
part of the human (or other) frame. Affordances are also objects that can be 
climbed on, crawled under, moved around and so on, or otherwise 
encountered by creatures in the course of their pursuits. More generally, 
affordances.are the tools, shelter, food, and drink provided by the environment 
to creatures in accordance with creatures' manipulative skills, shelter needs, 
digestive systems, and so on. Together, these features compose a niche, that 
is, the set of affordances selected and utilised by a creature from its 
environment, according to its own particular set of needs. Gibson makes the 
point that although a niche implies reciprocity between creature and selected 
features of the environment, it also implies the presence of an 'unlimited 
environment', from which these features can be selected (Gibson 1977), p 68- 
69. An affordance is thus more than an arbitrary subjective response to one's 
immediate surroundings, but is also an objectively identifiable construction, in 
an objectively identifiable world. For humans, the set of environmental 
features which form their niches are those to which they respond, and thus, 
are those to which their minds become 'tuned'. Were humans to be differently 
constructed, their niches would be different, and consequently, their thoughts 
and identities would be different also. 
For niches to exist requires that amenable geographical, chemical, and 
climatic conditions also exist. Physical features such as caves, water-holes, 
swamps, rivers, river-banks, plains and so on must be available. Materials for 
habitat construction (human and other), must also be obtainable. 
Compatibility between creature and niche is necessary, as each 'fits' the other. 
Unless this occurs, creatures could not survive, as it is the elements 
comprising niches which allow them to do so. Human capacity to alter the 
environment is extensive, but not unlimited. While modification of the earth to 
better serve human needs has been widespread and cumulative, it is, like 
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aspects of all other life forms on the earth, ultimately constrained by the nature 
and composition of the earth itself (Gibson 1977), pp 69-70. Similarly, the 
earth (and, by extrapolation, the wider universe and the scientific laws within 
which the earth exists and operates) in constraining what is available for our 
niches to exist, also constrains what is available for us to think about. 
Elements on, and in, the earth contribute variously to the life forms sustained. 
Elements and combinations of elements are fluid or solid, and roles vary 
accordingly. For example, oxygen sustains breathing, transparent air sustains 
vision, and water sustains drinking. More solid substances can be eaten, or 
provide materials for tools or habitats. Materials are subject to manipulation to 
varying degrees, and provide life-support or life enhancement. Gravity 
anchors some creatures to the earth, while permitting others to fly from it 
without being catapulted into space. Earth provides the requisite conditions 
for lying, and for locomotion, such as walking or running. Due to 'cluttering', 
this latter feature is not ubiquitous, as some surfaces, such as swamps or cliffs, 
require different methods of negotiation. For many creatures, vision prevents 
collision, and thus aids locomotion. Because vision is limited to the 
perceiver's visual field, vision also implies concealment, meaning objects can 
be hidden as well as seen. This could not occur unless some surfaces were 
opaque. Gibson points out that the very possibility of concealment contributes 
to the idea of enclosure and privacy (Gibson 1977), pp 71-74. These features 
of the earth are significant to humans, as they relate to the structure of our 
bodies, to our capacities to negotiate ourselves through the world, and to our 
biological needs. Like any creature, we do not respond equally to all of these 
features, but only to those which concern us, and which relate to our bodily 
structure, survival needs, and perceptual apparatus. Thus, although these 
features of the earth are concealed in a superficial analysis of thought, they 
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provide crucial material for our thoughts, and are part of what makes our 
thoughts possible. 
Object manipulation occurs in accordance with the availability and usefulness 
of objects, combined with the manipulative capacities of creatures, whether 
human or others, such as chimpanzees. Objects of appropriate size, shape 
and solidity provide the means of performing tasks, such as levering, throwing, 
spearing, cutting, tracing, and so on. The affordances which most impact on 
any creature are other members of its own species, as it is these which 
provide the most direct influence on behaviour, through interaction of varying 
kinds, such as nurturing, or sexual activity. Affordances thus include all 
aspects of a creature's environment which, in one way or another, contribute 
significantly to the creature's survival (Gibson 1977), pp 74-76. 
In summary, the notion of affordances draws attention to the point that objects, 
both natural and manufactured, elicit differential responses from different 
creatures in the 'same' world. An object, or feature of the terrain, is perceived 
by a creature in accordance with the creature's needs and concerns. This 
indicates that perception is neither autonomous nor arbitrary. What a creature 
perceives is the outcome of its perceptual apparatus, its survival needs, and 
the particular selection of items in the environment to which it responds. This 
is equally true for humans and non-humans. Human sensory modalities 
operate in conjunction with human needs, concerns, and abilities. We do not 
readily (or even at all) pick up from the environment all that is there. We note 
and respond to what is most important or significant to our 'niche'. We are 
blind to the features which interest our cat or our goldfish. But we are 
concerned that the supermarket stocks our food, that the petrol-station is open, 
and that the road is not flooded. Because these items concern us, they 
'register' with us, we respond to them, and they become part our mental 
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repertoire. These items are the objects from which our thoughts arise, and 
consequently, they are the very stuff from which our minds are made. If we are 
to comprehensively understand our minds, and especially, the contents of our 
minds, we need to understand how our minds relate, not only to our 
environments, but also to the particular features of the environment that 
interest and concern us. These points are important when accounting for 
personal identity, for if the external world is crucial to the constitution of minds 
and the contents of thoughts, then it is crucial to the formation of personal 
identity also. The psychological continuity criterion is remiss in this regard, as 
when accounting for personal identity, it fails to take any of these factors into 
account, and thus fails to include reference to many of the most crucial 
features which personal identity involves. 
3.7 Visual Perception 
The specific modalities by which humans perceive the world are also 
significant to mind formation, and correspondingly, to personal identity. 
Perceptual information is received from the immediate environment in the five 
modalities of sound, smell, taste, touch, and vision. While each modality 
provides a different type of information, there are common principles involved. 
Each modality involves an interaction between the perceiver and the world by 
means of the appropriate perceptual apparatus. Cognitive systems are 
involved in the interpretation and understanding of this interaction. Visual 
perception is, in most circumstances, a primary source of perceptual 
information for humans and other creatures. The process of visual perception 
in humans provides further evidence of ways in which our perceptual 
interaction with the world of objects determines and constrains the nature of 
our thoughts, and hence, the contents of our minds. Perceptual input for 
sighted persons is considerably different to perceptual input for non-sighted 
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persons. We thus could not expect the structure or content of thoughts for both 
to be the same, (although this does not mean that there could not on 
occasions be some thoughts which might be very similar, such as 'I am cold' 
and so on). Understanding the visual process and how it relates to thought 
gives insight into the integral connection between perception and thought, and 
correspondingly, between perception and personal identity. 
Studies show that visual perception is not a discrete act, but involves a 
complex array of factors. One key factor is object recognition. To recognise 
objects requires an interaction between the perceiver's visual systems, and 
the perceiver's stored knowledge. This knowledge results from practical 
engagement, either directly or indirectly, with the objects concerned. It is this 
engagement, or connection with engagement, which provides meaning to the 
perceiver. For example, knowing that an object is a chair involves more than 
the technical operation of one's visual apparatus. It also involves knowing the 
purpose of the chair. This, in turn, means 'knowing' about the difference 
between sitting and standing, having legs, having knee joints, and so on. I 
come to know about these things by incremental activity, beginning in infancy. 
If I did not know about these things, I would not know how to identify the object 
as a chair. I could mistake it for a coffin. If I was born deformed and unable to 
use a chair myself, I could learn about the chair from watching others. 
Perceivers do not recognise objects in vacuums, but from accessing stored 
knowledge, either about, or related to, the object concerned. Without this 
knowledge, objects would have no meaning, and thus, would be 
unrecognisable. Interacting with objects is thus crucial to our ability to 
interpret our perceptions and understand our thoughts. This need to interact 
with objects is not acknowledged by the psychological continuity criterion, as it 
takes our ability to understand objects for granted. 
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Another key factor in the visual process is the human visual system's 
developmental nature. Visual systems are underdeveloped at birth, and 
would remain so unless appropriately stimulated. This stimulation occurs 
when an infant first begins to respond visually to the world of objects. The 
infant's interaction provides the necessary conditions for the physical 
structures of the eye and brain to mature, at the same time as providing the 
necessary conditions for the development of semantic networks. Thus, the 
maturing of vision and the development of the knowledge of objects occur in 
tandem. This point is supported by the fact that persons who first acquire 
vision as adults are unable to immediately recognise objects. 62 The 
successful development of vision requires that interaction with the world of 
objects takes place. 
Visual systems comprise retinal and brain structures. The visual process is 
initiated by the reception and regulation of light by the iris. Receptor cells in 
the retina then transform this light into electrical energy. Next, an image is 
focused by the lens onto the retina. Vision is clearest at the central part of the 
retina, the fovea, where the receptive cells are most densely packed. Reflexes 
in the brain control the eye's movement. When the eye surveys a scene, its 
blinking movement means that the brain receives information only 
intermittently. Yet, the brain is able to integrate these incomplete signals into a 
coherent picture. This process occurs due to several complex factors (Furst 
1979), pp 36-39. When we understand these factors, we realise that 
perception and thought occurs in the first instance, only in virtue of our 
interactions with the world of objects. 
Like the brain, of which it is part, the retina is neurologically complex. It has 
several layers of orderly, functioning nerve cells, an important task of which is 
62This claim is more fully explicated shortly. 
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to perceive contrast, thereby detecting visual edges. The visual cortex is 
connected to the back of the eyes by the fibres of the optic track. The central 
section of fibres from each eye cross over en route, so that information from 
the right half of each eye reaches the left hemisphere, and information from 
the left half of each eye reaches the right hemisphere. At least 80 percent of 
the cortex nerve cells respond to stimulations from either eye. Each retina half 
relates to the part of the visual cortex to which it is connected. Thus, when 
points on the retina are activated, so also are the corresponding points on the 
cortex. This can lead to the mistaken conclusion that visual perception 
consists of an 'homunculus' or tiny man watching a film inside the brain (Furst 
1979), pp 37-40. 
Fibres from the optic nerve also connect to the optic tectum, situated at the 
back of the brainstem. For creatures without a visual cortex, such as birds and 
amphibians, the optic tectum forms their total visual brain. For humans and 
other mammals, the optic tectum informs of peripheral objects, while the visual 
cortex provides more detail about centrally placed objects. Vision involves the 
division of a scene into its constituent parts. Recognition take place, allowing 
a scene to be seen. The ability to 'see' an object is not just a matter of the 
operation of a set of visual apparatus. This, alone is insufficient for 
recognition, as becomes apparent when we realise that some scenes can be 
interpreted in more than one way. This would not be possible if visual 
apparatus was all that was involved. The picture below makes this point 
clearer (See Figure 7). We interpret the picture either as a vase, or as two 
symmetrical faces. Neither of these interpretations would be possible unless 
we already had some basic knowledge of similar objects. Such knowledge 
could only come from having interacted with these objects. It could not have 
come 'out of nowhere'. This example shows how factors apart from, and 
external to, the visual process itself are involved in the act of recognition. 
Figure 7 Vase or Two Faces 
Reproduced from Charles First, Origins of the Mind 1979, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, p 41. The picture can be recognised in two ways. This shows that the brain 
segments the picture in accordance with already acquired semantic content. It does 
not interpret the scene ex nihilo (Furst 1979), p 41. 
Recognition is essential, as otherwise no sense could be made of visual 
presentations. It was first discovered in 1932 that former cataract sufferers 
cannot, after cataract removal, immediately understand their visual 
perceptions. They require time to become familiar with the intricacies of sight 
before they can identify even simple objects, such as basic shapes. They can 
only achieve this familiarity by interacting with objects, and learning to match 
the unfamiliar visual input with the already familiar tactile input (Furst 1979), 
pp 39-42. 
It is apparent that the ability to successfully recognise objects is a crucial 
aspect of effective vision. Computer experiments show that this successful 
recognition is more than simple template matching, 63 such as occurs in banks 
when customer numbers are read from cheques or credit cards. Because it 
lacks semantic awareness, a computer could fail to recognise even a simple 
object such as a comb (See Figure 8). 
63A template is an idealised form or pattern guide to which objects are formed or matched. 
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Figure 8 Computer with Comb 
Reproduced from Charles First, Origins of the Mind 1979, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, p 45. The comb is unfamiliar to the computer because it is oriented 
differently to the computer's program, and thus recognition of the comb by the 
computer fails (Furst 1979), p 45. 
Factors such as orientation could cause the comb to be presented to the 
computer differently to the format of the computer's template. Recognition by 
the computer may then fail. Human vision, however, is more complex that this. 
A basic categorisation process occurs prior to the specific recognition of an 
object. This involves matching input with a basic schema, such as 'dog', 'tree', 
or 'person'. Considerable latitude is required, as individual objects in the 
world differ, and are unlikely to match exactly with an idealised form. The 
matching process works only because it draws on stored memories of similar 
objects, and accompanying semantic content. Object recognition is not just a 
matter of perceiving a particular form, but of attributing meaning to that form. 
Tests on animals, in which individual neurones are monitored with tiny 
electrodes, at the same time at which objects are presented visually, 
demonstrate that brain cells respond to specific types of stimuli, and also to 
specific parts of the retina. Due to the experiences which occur during visual 
development, brain parts are 'tuned' to respond in particular ways. For 
example, due to incremental activity coded in the brain, frogs, who possess 
only the visual tectum, respond to moving flies, but are incapable of 
responding to stationary ones. As animals become more evolved, their ability 
to vary their responses increases. For humans, development includes the 
101 
capacity to code visual or other inputs with comparatively abstract schemas. 
The recognition of alphabet letters, even when in heavily ornamented, 
disproportionate, or unfamiliar form, is one example (See Figure 9) (Furst 
1979), pp 43-53. 
4- 14 4 
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Figure 9 Alphabet 
Reproduced from Charles First, Origins of the Mind 1979, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, p 53. Imprecise letters are recognised because the mind refers to what it 
already knows from previous interactions with similar objects (Furst 1979), p 53. 
Object recognition requires the ability to distinguish between shades of light 
and dark, even when the differences involved are minute. Groups of neurones 
respond to light falling in the particular receptive field to which the neurones 
are tuned. Edges and lines are detected at the visual cortex, while receptive 
fields at the secondary or prestriate zone respond to these edges and lines 
also, in addition to the larger region in which these edges and lines are 
situated. The role of recognition and interpretation is illustrated by the initial 
inability to detect figures in camouflage, but following successful detection, the 
subsequent inability to disre ard them (See Fi ure 10). 
Figure 10 Camouflage 
Reproduced from Charles First, Origins of the Mind 1979, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, p 44. This picture demonstrates how recognition of familiar items requires 
demonstrates this aspect of reco nition (See Fi ure 11) 
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an active process of interpretation. Can you recognise the figure in the picture? It 
is usually difficult at first, but once seen, cannot be missed. Try to find the figure 
before reading the footnote (Furst 1979), p 44.64 
The spatial frequency of image components is also important to recognition. 
Relevant here is the spatial - frequency spectrum, by which a pattern's 
decompositional features of brightness and darkness are measured in cycles 
per second. The reproduction, in block form, of well-known painting 
Figure 11 Block Face 
Reproduced from Charles First, Origins of the 
Mind 1979, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p 56. The picture becomes recognisable on 
squinting, but only because we have stored memories from having previously seen 
and understood the image (Furst 1979), p 56. 
Brightness values are averaged in blocks throughout the painting. Although 
this masks the intended image, blurring one's vision by squinting allows the 
unnaturally emphasised edges to be removed, thereby permitting the face to 
be revealed (Furst 1979), pp 55-56. Unless the face was already familiar to us 
we would not recognise it. Other strange shapes, such as the one below, 
reveal the role played by memory in process of visual recognition (See Figure 
12). 
64The hidden figure is a man carrying and pointing a rifle 
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Figure 12 Hidden Face 
Concentrate on the four dots in the middle of the picture for about 30 seconds. 
Then close your eyes and tilt your head back. Keep them closed. You will see a 
circle of light. Continue looking at the circle. What do you see? The disparate 
segments of the image only cohere into a recognisable face because it is one with 
which we are familiar, having seen the image, or something like it, previously.65 
The above observations of the visual process reveal that the achievement of 
vision is not a discrete or simple process. Vision occurs due to the interaction 
between the perceiver's visual apparatus, the perceiver's mind, and the 
perceived object. At least four pertinent features are evident in this interaction. 
First, vision entails object recognition. Second, object recognition draws on 
the perceiver's stored knowledge. Third, this knowledge is attained from direct 
or indirect interaction with objects 'outside' the mind. Fourth, the type of vision 
which occurs is directly tied to the particular kind of visual system that we 
have. For example, certain aspects of vision, such as the ability to detect lines 
and edges, are only possible due to the particular physical constitution and 
construction of our visual apparatus. The combination of all the above 
elements is required for successful vision to occur. And because successful 
vision is dependent on the combination of these various elements, the 
thoughts which arise from vision are dependent on these elements also. 
Thus, neither our perceptions nor our thoughts can be adequately understood 
unless we refer to the world of objects from which those perceptions and 
65 I have been unable to obtain a reference for this picture. It came to me indirectly from my 
daughter's school-teacher, who has been unable to discover its source. 
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thoughts first arise. Correspondingly, neither can personal identity be fully 
understood unless we refer to the world of objects which underpins our 
perceptions and thoughts, and makes them possible. But in maintaining an 
internalist view of the mind, the psychological continuity criterion is unable to 
account for the connection between thought and the objects in the world, and 
thus, its account of personal identity is disconnected from the world of objects 
in which we live. The dynamic nature of the visual process becomes more 
apparent when developing visual systems are considered. 
The progressive nature of pattern recognition is evident from the study of infant 
visual development. 66 Pattern recognition is not immediate, but is the 
outcome of an extended process, which involves an interaction between the 
infant and the world. Infants' responses to visual stimulation situations 
indicate their biological readiness to investigate their surroundings. Their 
perceptual abilities arise from a combination of rudimentary abilities present at 
birth, and subsequent learning, necessary to which is interaction with the 
world (Slater 1989), pp 43-44. Vision achievement is particularly relevant to 
normal cognitive and social development, as it is one of the early key ways in 
which information is extracted from the environment. Investigation of this 
process shows that rather than being a static function, operating uniformly 
between birth and death, vision begins in a primitive form in the newborn, and 
(normally) progresses through various stages to a matured form in the adult. 
The achievement of acuity is one example of this development (Atkinson and 
Braddick 1989), p 7. 
66This discussion of infant visual development is not intended to be comprehensive. The 
process is complex and detailed, and cannot be fully investigated here. The ideas addressed 
are meant to give an example only of some of the principles involved. For an extensive 
coverage of the main issues, see (Slater and Bremner 1989). 
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Developed in the early stages of vision development, acuity is the ability to 
refine spatial detail. Observation of retinal images in newborns reveals that 
infants have the capacity to perceive nearby objects, such as their mother's 
face, but that they have an underdeveloped sense of acuity. While optical 
structures function adequately in newborns, neural structures are 
underdeveloped, generating faulty accommodation responses. 
'Accommodation' refers to the eye's ability to bring objects at different 
distances into sharp focus. Optical structures are responsible for receiving 
information, while neural structures are involved in processing this 
information. Although the information is correctly received, immature neural 
structures inhibit its processing, resulting in blurred vision (Atkinson and 
Braddick 1989), p 9. 
Immaturity in the structure of the eye's cone receptors is also involved in the 
lack of visual refinement. In adults, these receptors are concentrated in the 
central area of the eye (fovea), and are densely packed. They are responsible 
for visual clarity. In infants, they are less concentrated, and therefore less 
centralised, resulting in impaired visual resolution. Visual exposure stimulates 
the receptors, initiating repeated saccadic (rapid flicks) eye movements by one 
month-olds. These movements appear to anticipate the ultimate centralised 
location of the cone receptors, and are seen as failed efforts to fixate visual 
targets in the central position, where they will be located once the cone 
receptors are in their final positions. Practice in target location over several 
months contributes to the continuing development and co-ordinated 
functioning between both optical and neural components, resulting in the 
infant's visual improvement, and the ultimate achievement of acuity 
(Atkinson and Braddick 1989), p 21-22. Although infant visual 
development is considerably more complex than this, the process outlined 
above is one example of how engagement in the visual process itself is 
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integral to vision's ultimate successful development. As can be seen, this 
process is dynamic, and entirely dependent on certain interactions with the 
world of objects for its successful outcome. Without such interaction, vision 
could not occur, and consequently, neither could the thoughts that arise from 
vision. The visual processes which underpin these thoughts are taken for 
granted by the psychological continuity criterion, which pays no attention to 
the preconditions of thought, and to the fact that thoughts do not arise out of 
nowhere, but arise only as the result of the particular interactions of particular 
bodies, in particular surroundings, at particular times. This neglect of the 
external factors which are involved in the preconditions of thought results in an 
internalist view of the mind, and consequently, in an interpretation of personal 
identity which is inadequate and misleading. 
The importance of engaging with objects to successful visual development is 
born out by studies of some eye disorders. Amblyopia, a functional loss of 
visual performance, and strabismus (squint), the permanent misalignment of 
the two eyes, are examples. 67 A common form of human amblyopia, 
deprivation amblyopia, results from cataracts covering one eye and clouding 
vision. Because the damaged eye is less involved in vision, the nerve fibres 
which convey signals from the eye to the neurones in the visual cortex are less 
stimulated than those of the functioning eye. As a result, the damaged eye 
becomes functionally disconnected from the brain. Animal experiments, in 
which one eye is covered or blurred during the early phases of visual 
development, demonstrate this point. These experiments show that most of 
the immobilised eye's connections to the visual cortex become destroyed. 
This indicates that there is a direct link between an eye's stimulation, and the 
eye's successful connection to the brain. Eyes, which through cataracts or 
67Between 2 and 8 % of children develop these eye disorders (Atkinson and Braddick 1989), 
p 24. 
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other impairments, fail to receive this stimulation, are unable to establish and 
support this connection, and thus become functionally inert (Atkinson and 
Braddick 1989), p 24. This example brings home the point that the visual 
process itself should not be taken for granted, as it is dependent on the 
occurrence of certain interactions between a person's visual apparatus and 
the world of objects. If these interactions did not occur, vision would not occur 
either. Vision is not something which is fully developed at birth, but is a 
process which requires interactions with objects for certain components of the 
visual apparatus to mature. We can see from this that our perceptual input, 
and correspondingly our thoughts, are not discrete from our interactions with 
the world in which we live, but are completely dependent on those 
interactions. 
Vision is also affected in cases of strabismus, where the eyes are misaligned. 
In animal studies where eyes become misaligned artificially, it is found that 
eye input to the visual cortex occurs, but that the cortex is abnormal. 
Neurones are missing, which would normally combine the input from both 
eyes. This deficiency is thought to result from the eyes' misalignment. 
Because the eyes are differently situated to each other, the stimulus between 
the eyes is unequal, resulting in the absence of correlated activity between the 
eyes. The regular occurrence of correlated activity between both eyes is 
thought to be required for successful binocular vision to develop. This 
correlated activity may also be linked to other important brain developments 
associated with successful vision (Atkinson and Braddick 1989), p 26. 
However, as this activity is unable to occur, correct visual development cannot 
occur either. Thus, perceptual input and thought are reduced accordingly. 
That thought can be limited in this way is missed by the psychological 
continuity criterion, as it does not recognise the various interactions between 
perceptual apparatus and world which are essential to normal perceptual 
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input, and consequently, that certain thoughts are entirely conditional on such 
input. 
These findings concerning both amblyopia and strabismus, indicate that the 
successful development of visual perception is directly tied to the amount and 
type of stimulus received by the eyes during the developmental process. This 
stimulus only occurs as a result of interaction with objects which exist in the 
world 'outside' the mind, and thus, this stimulus an important component of 
visual perception, and consequently, of the thoughts which result from such 
perception. 
In summary, the investigation of visual perception indicates that vision is not a 
simple or discrete process, but is a complex and interactive one. Parts within 
sets of visual apparatus are complex, and operate by mutual interaction. 
Successful vision results from the interaction between perceptual apparatus, 
stored knowledge, and objects. This combination of factors is required for 
object recognition to occur. Vision is immature at birth, requiring specific 
developmental processes for vision to mature successfully. In tandem with 
these developmental processes, infants learn about their surroundings, and 
become acquainted with the world of objects. For both adults and infants, 
vision is the outcome of specific interaction with objects, without which, vision 
could neither be achieved, nor developed. Because object interaction is 
crucial to successful vision, object interaction is also crucial to the mental 
content which vision provides. This means that the contents of our thoughts 
are directly related to the kinds of interactions we have with the world of 
objects. These interactions are guided and constrained by our perceptual 
apparatus, as it is only in virtue of that perceptual apparatus, and the particular 
way it operates, that we are able to receive information from the world, and 
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thus, are able to think thoughts at al1.68 Although the focus here has been on 
visual perception, similar findings are likely to apply to the remaining 
perceptual modalities, as they too form part of the single system of 
environment, perceptual response, motor capacities, and survival needs 
which form the Umwelten of humans and other creatures. 
3.8 Summary 
I have argued in this chapter, that by holding to 'any cause', the psychological 
continuity criterion maintains an internalist view of the mind. On this view, the 
mind's external factors are not explicitly specified in the account of mental 
content. All that matters is the presence of the right kind of causal 
connectedness between items of mental content, regardless of how that 
mental content came about in the first place. This means that the actions, 
events, items, places, relations, and so on, which furnish the material for 
thought, are not included in the account of thought. The problem with this view 
is that it assumes that mental content is, in some way, just 'given', and is in no 
way tied to factors such as bodies, survival needs, or environments. Even 
were these factors were to be considerably different to what they are, mental 
content, on this view would remain unaltered. But in holding to this view of the 
mind, the psychological continuity criterion does not adequately account for 
the preconditions of thought, and is thus incomplete in its account of the mind, 
and correspondingly, in its account of personal identity. 
I have also argued that in contrast to the internalist view, the externalist view 
acknowledges the objects which first cause thought, and is, therefore, more 
680f course, an objector can always say: 'How do we know that our minds would be different if 
our visual process was different?'. The point I want to make here is that if we take this attitude to 
everything in the mind, we will never learn anything about the process of thought and how it 
relates to the world. In my view, we need to focus more on what actually happens, rather than on 
what might happen, if we are to learn anything constructive about personal identity. 
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comprehensive in its account of the mind, the contents of minds, and the 
conditions under which minds are possible. By including reference to the 
actions, events, items, places, relations, and so on, which exist 'outside' the 
mind, the externalist view is more thorough in its account of the mind, than a 
view which does not explicitly refer to these things. I have argued that if there 
were no objects 'outside' the mind, there would be no material for mental 
content, and minds would not be possible. Due to the intimate link between 
minds and the external world, it is false and misleading to conceive of persons 
apart from the worlds in which they are situated, and apart from their particular 
form of perceptual interactions they have with that world. To support the 
externalist case, philosophical argument and empirical research from a variety 
of sources has been considered. 
The work of Davidson and Malpas shows how the intelligibility of thought 
requires that certain background conditions exist within which thoughts are 
possible. These conditions include a framework within which thoughts cohere 
with other thoughts, and within which relations and communications with other 
persons are conceivable. Because thought relates to action, reference to the 
conditions under which action is possible is also required. Key among these 
is an appreciation of the difference between the subjective states in an agent, 
and the objective causal ordering in the world, as it is these things which 
permit agent-centred action to occur. The requirements specified by Davidson 
and Malpas are met through our engagement and interaction with the objects, 
persons, and places which exist outside the mind, as it is these engagements 
and interactions that provide the basic material for mental content, and thus 
make minds possible. 
The empirical research focused on perception. Studies were considered, 
which indicated that having a mind is related to our status as biological 
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creatures. Our perceptual response to our immediate environment, and to the 
objects we use, is, like that of other creatures, related to our survival and other 
needs. Because our thoughts are intimately connected to our perceptions, our 
thoughts are also linked to the conditions and objects to which these needs 
relate. Similarly, the consideration of visual perception showed that 
interaction with objects is a crucial aspect vision, and that accordingly, object 
interaction and the visual process are crucial to the thoughts initiated by 
vision. 
The above philosophical arguments, along with the examination of 
environmental perception, object perception, and visual perception, supports 
the case that external factors are crucially implicated in mental content. When 
we realise that thoughts initially arise from objects 'outside' the mind, we 
become aware that these objects are a necessary condition of mental content, 
and consequently, a necessary condition of having a mind. Moreover, when 
the connection between perception and thought is studied, it becomes 
apparent that a link exists between humans as psychological beings, and 
humans as biological beings. An account of the mind needs to recognise this 
link, especially when drawing conclusions to which this link is significant. For 
the personal identity theorist, this link is crucial to a correct understanding of 
personal identity. Minds are integrally linked to the world, and thus cannot be 
conceptualised in isolation from that world. Due to the link between personal 
identity and the mind, there is thus an inherent link between personal identity 
and the particular environments in which persons are situated, and between 
their particular modes of interaction with that environment. It thus makes no 
sense to assume that personal identity can in any way be conceived of in 
isolation from the world in which persons live and interact. In addition to 
understanding the link between thought and the world, we also need to 
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understand how thoughts are linked to each other. This topic is addressed in 
the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 Psychological Coherence 
4.1 	Introduction 
The importance to mental coherence of the relations between thoughts and 
the objects of thought has been emphasised. No less important to mental 
coherence are the relations between the thoughts themselves. Indeed, being 
related to other thoughts partly determines what a thought is. The 
psychological continuity criterion pays little attention to the relations between 
thoughts. For example, according to Parfit, personal identity is maintained in 
virtue of 'overlapping chains of strong connectedness', regardless of how the 
mental items within these chains are connected. Without constraints on the 
causal connections involved, mental items could be connected by any means, 
such as by brain or memory transfers, reduplication, copying processes, and 
so on. Mental items which are malleable in this way must have a certain 
degree of autonomy and independence. More specifically, they cannot be 
substantially reliant on other mental items for their coherence and meaning. 
This position is sometimes referred to as psychological atomism. 
'Psychological atomism' is the view that mental contents can stand alone, and 
do not depend for their nature, meaning, or significance on other mental items. 
Because they are independent in this way, complex thoughts, beliefs, and 
other mental items can be 'broken down' into smaller parts, until the most 
basic psychological atoms, or thoughts are reached (Honderich Ted 1995), p 
64. According to Part it, because they are self-sufficient and independent, 
these basic thoughts can be described without reference to the particular 
persons who own them, and thus, can be described impersonally (Parfit 
1984), pp 210-225. In this chapter, I argue that psychological atomism and 
impersonal description are incorrect characterisations of the mind, as they 
represent neither the way that minds function and operate, nor the way that 
thoughts are experienced. 
1 13 
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When psychological atomism and impersonal description are considered in 
more detail, it becomes evident that these two concepts are linked. To 
characterise mental items atomisticly is to hold that a particular mental 
item has meaning in its own right, and thus does not rely for its coherence on 
other mental items. Because mental items do not rely for coherence on links 
with other mental items, it is incidental to which group or mental repertoire 
these mental items belong. This means that the particular ownership of 
mental items is not an important or decisive factor in their description or 
meaning. Whether mental items belong to one person, or to another person, 
makes no different to the characterisation of the items concerned. It follows 
from this that the viewpoint from which an experience, memory, or belief is 
experienced is not a factor in the quality of that experience, memory or belief. 
Importantly, whether a particular experience is viewed from my viewpoint, or 
from your viewpoint, is irrelevant to the characterisation of the experience 
concerned. Such an experience can be described impersonally, that is, 
without specific reference to the particular person who has it. 
Psychological atomism and impersonal description are correlative and 
mutually supportive. For example, given the requisite brain-transfer 
technology, one person could theoretically inherit one or two of another 
person's beliefs or memories, without having to inherit surrounding beliefs or 
memories. You could inherit the memory that you climbed Mount Everest, 
without inheriting the belief that there is such a thing as mountains. Your 
memory could be individuated and described impersonally, that is, without 
referring particularly to you. If your memory was owned by a different person, 
such as the person from whom you inherited it, it would be essentially 
qualitatively unaltered. Hence, according to this view, your memory is 
atomistic, and theoretically 'impersonal'. 
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A problem with this view is that it treats all beliefs and memories 
propositionally, that is, from a third-person perspective, while failing to allow 
for anything in addition to this. The belief that you climbed Mount Everest is 
similar in status to your belief that 2+2=4. There is no personal content in your 
belief that you climbed Mount Everest, no sense in which that belief is 
uniquely your belief, as opposed to someone else's belief. This view that all 
personally recalled beliefs and memories are no different to factual-type 
beliefs is problematic, as it does not accord with how many of these beliefs 
and memories are actually experienced. When I experience a memory of a 
particular incident, the memory is couched within the framework of my other 
memories, beliefs, and so on. It is the particular place of the memory within 
that framework which characterises the memory. There is a 'mineness' about 
it, which cannot be reduplicated if the memory were 'transferred' to someone 
else. In fact, if the memory were part of a different framework, it would, by 
definition, be a different memory. But because psychological atomism does 
not recognise beliefs or memories as parts of frameworks, it cannot account for 
personal ownership. 
Opposing psychological atomism is psychological holism. Psychological 
holism is the view that mental items gain meaning, at least in part, by virtue of 
their connections with other mental items. Thoughts and experiences are 
understood due to their connections with other thoughts and experiences. 
These, and other mental items, such as memories, form more or less coherent 
sets of mental items (or minds). Understanding some elements within these 
sets contributes to our ability to understand other elements in the same sets 
(Malpas 1999), p 79. Because psychological holism recognises the 
significance of a particular person's 'web of beliefs', it supports the position 
that particular identities are relevant to the individuation and coherence of 
116 
particular sets of beliefs and other mental states. Psychological holism and 
personal identification of mental states are thus correlative and mutually 
supportive. 
Relation R involves commitment to psychological atomism and impersonal 
description. On this view, psychological connectedness is incidental to causal 
continuity, and the kind of network connections evident in psychological 
holism are not required to identify or describe mental items. As long as causal 
connections obtain between mental items, it is irrelevant whether these 
connections maintain coherence of content. Because items can be 
individuated in isolation from ownership, they can be 'described in an 
impersonal way' (Parfit 1984), p 210. This applies whether the items 
concerned are merely factual, or whether they are personally experienced 
memories. Psychological atomism and impersonal description are thus not 
only proposed by Relation R, but they are essential requirements of it. If 
psychological coherence was an essential feature of the psychological 
continuity criterion, it would be unable to hold to the Widest Criterion. This is 
because the Widest Criterion permits any cause of psychological continuity, 
regardless of whether that cause maintains psychological coherence. If 
psychological coherence was an explicit requirement of the psychological 
continuity criterion, it would be unable to commit to psychological continuity 
with any cause. 
Consideration of the issues involved, however, indicates that psychological 
atomism is untenable. While rigid, tightly-knit connections are not always 
present in persons' belief systems or sets of memories, a certain degree of 
psychological coherence is necessary for mental states to be possible. A 
minimal degree of contentful connection between mental states is necessary 
for the states to have meaning. Unless there was some coherence between 
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thoughts, no thoughts would be possible. How could one possibly have an 
isolated thought which was totally independent of any other thought? This is 
not plausible. 69 If there was no meaning between thoughts, minds would not 
be possible. These anomalies indicate that the psychological continuity 
criterion's commitment to psychological atomism and impersonal description 
is highly questionable. I argue that an atomistic, 'impersonal' characterisation 
of mental content, misrepresents the mind's structure and mode of operation. I 
further argue that minds are predominantly holistic in structure and 
functioning, and are individuated by ownership. To argue this case, I refer 
predominantly to memory, and begin by discussing quasi-memory. I then 
explicate further the positions of psychological atomism and psychological 
holism, and, due to the importance of memory to this topic, follow this by 
examining several theoretical and empirical accounts of memory. 
4.2 Quasi-Memory 
A major impetus for the psychological continuity criterion's adherence to 
psychological atomism is the attempt to overcome the criterion's inherent 
circularity. First detected in Locke's theory by Butler, 70 the circularity in 
question here consists in the fact that to claim that a person's identity is 
grounded in that person's psychological states, presupposes that the states 
have already been identified as belonging to that person. Due to this 
presupposition, Butler concludes that memory could only provide evidence of 
personal identity, and could not be constitutive of it: 
But though consciousness of the past does thus ascertain our personal identity to 
ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the 
69Even the thought 'I exist' cannot be isolated. What is 'I'? What does 'exist' mean? We must 
answer these questions to understand the thought, and must, therefore, have other thoughts 
also. 
70The circularity objection was first mounted against Locke's account of personal identity in 
1867 by Joseph Butler (Butler 1867), pp 193-198. 
same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done 
one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. 
And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity 
presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than 
knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes (Butler 
1867), p 194. 
In contemporary terms, to say that what makes me the same person at t2 that I 
was at ti is the fact that the psychological states I had at ti are continuously 
connected to the psychological states I have at t2 is uninformative, since the 
claim that the states in question are mine presupposes that the states have 
already been identified belonging to me. 
Part it acknowledges that the psychological continuity criterion and the 
commitment to Relation R are vulnerable to the circularity problem. To 
overcome this problem, Parfit invokes the strategy of quasi-memory. Quasi-
memory is unowned or impersonal memory. An account of a quasi-memory 
would include such details as times, events, places, and so on, but would not 
refer essentially to any particular individual person as the owner of that 
memory. Quasi-memory is a form of memory in which memories are like items 
of property, the ownership of which is independent of the property itself. For 
quasi-memory to work as a successful strategy requires that it 
comprehensively and accurately represents normal memory. If successful, its 
principles could be applied to all psychological states, thus furnishing a non-
circular version of psychological continuity. 
A detailed version of quasi-memory is found in Shoemaker's work 
(Shoemaker 1984). Shoemaker makes two claims concerning personal 
memory. First, he claims that for a person to remember an event requires that 
the person witnessed or experienced the event - this is designated as 'the 
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previous awareness condition'. Second, he claims that a particular type of 
memory about oneself which is 'full and accurate' cannot be mistaken in 
respect of whether the person one remembers is oneself. These types of 
personal memories are not those made on the basis of observation, but rather 
on the basis of self-knowledge at the time the incident occurred. Thus, 
present-tense accuracy of knowledge is 'preserved in memory' (Shoemaker 
1984), pp 20-21. Such memories are said to be 'immune to error through 
misidentification'. 
This second point can be understood more clearly by contrasting one's 
memories about oneself with one's memories about persons other than 
oneself. For example, although I seem to remember Frank telling me he had 
read a certain book, my memory could be mistaken. I may actually be 
remembering Bill, who is sometimes with Frank. The mistake could consist of 
either mis-identifying Frank in the first place, or by misremembering him. But, 
claims Shoemaker, in the case of some types of memories about ourselves, 
we cannot make this type of error. For example, if I correctly recall myself 
visiting my room at the university, checking my email, and returning home to 
begin re-reading Shoemaker's work on quasi-memory, I can be sure that I am 
not mistaking myself for someone else. In this type of memory, to remember is 
just to recall doing these things, and so to recall oneself doing them. 
Whereas to remember an incident concerning another person is to leave open 
the question of misremembering or mis-identifying, to remember correctly 
about oneself is to omit this possibility. Shoemaker claims this is not to say 
that one could not misremember incidents about oneself - clearly this is 
possible. Shoemaker gives the example of mistaking oneself in a mirror: 
If I say "I blushed when Jones made that remark" because I remember seeing in a 
mirror someone, whom I took (or now take) to be myself, blushing, it could turn out 
that my statement is false, not because my memory is in any way incomplete or 
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inaccurate, but because the person I saw in a mirror was my identical twin or double 
(Shoemaker 1984), p 21. 
The difference between the above case and one with immunity from error is 
that the former is a mediated experience (that is, I knew it was myself because 
I saw myself in a mirror), whereas the case of immunity from error is one in 
which the experience is direct and unmediated, (that is, I knew it was myself 
because I had self-awareness at the time, and was specifically recalling 
something about myself). In such a case, the immunity from error is 
maintained in memory: 
We might express this by saying that where the present-tense version of a 
judgement is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person 
pronouns contained in it, this immunity is preserved in memory (Shoemaker 1984), 
p 21. 
That is to say, I might mis-identify John as the person I saw yesterday, but not 
that is was me who remembers seeing him (Shoemaker 1984). 
Shoemaker then claims that interpreting one's apparent memories as 
knowledge of one's own past experiences may seem trivially analytic, but 
need not be so. If one person could have seem to have direct knowledge of 
experiences had by another person, then we could consider these 'memories' 
in isolation from the experiences which gave rise to them. Thus, if we could 
possess the knowledge of another person's experiences, such that the 
apparent recall appears to one in the same way as the memories of one's own 
experiences, then this would constitute quasi-memory knowledge. Having 
quasi-memory knowledge would mean that a cognitive state qualitatively 
identical to the cognitive state generated by the original event existed in 
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someone, but not necessarily in the same person who had the original 
experience. A person with such knowledge could be said to quasi-remember: 
Let us speak of such knowledge, supposing for the moment that it is possible, as 
"quasi-memory knowledge," and let us say that a person who has this sort of 
knowledge of a past event "quasi-remembers" that past event (Shoemaker 1984), 
p 24. 
In the case of a quasi-memory then, a previous awareness condition would be 
present in someone, but not necessarily in the person who remembers the 
event. An example of this might be that I have a quasi-memory of attending a 
lecture by Frank on Plato. This would mean that I have the present cognitive 
state with this content, but that it may not have been me with the cognitive state 
at the time of the lecture. It may have been a person other than myself who 
attended, and who had that earlier state. Without the initial cognitive state, I do 
not satisfy the previous awareness condition, and, in this case, although my 
memories would seem to be of me, there is no certainty that they would be: 
Quasi-memory, unlike memory, does not preserve immunity to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns (Shoemaker 1984), p 28. 
Shoemaker claims that in this universe we do not have quasi-memories, but 
that the notion of quasi-memory prompts the identification of certain features of 
memories which permit the circularity objection of the psychological continuity 
criterion to be surmounted. When considering the possibility of quasi-memory, 
Shoemaker adds the requirement that memories are correctly causally 
connected to the events they represent, which for him means that a present 
cognitive state occurs due to its causal link (by an M-type causal chain) to a 
previous cognitive state. 71 Thus, while in this universe, ordinary memories are 
71 Shoemaker claims that an M-type causal chain is one that entails a quasi-memory which is 
causally linked to the corresponding past cognitive and sensory state of which it is a memory. 
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correctly annexed to the events they represent due to the owner's previous 
awareness condition, in another universe, a correct causal connection could 
be of some other kind, such as by means of an M-type causal chain 
(Shoemaker 1984). 
Shoemaker's earlier thought experiment provides an example of an M-type 
causal chain. 72 If the brain of Brown were to be transplanted into the skull of 
Robinson, and 'Robinson' were to subsequently display the memories, 
character dispositions, and so forth, which were formerly attributed to Brown, 
then, according to the psychological continuity criterion, the former person 
'Robinson' would have become the former person Brown, to then be referred 
to as 'Brownson'. But if we assume this identification merely because 
Brownson has Brown's memories, Shoemaker claims we would be engaging 
in the same sort of circular argument which troubled Butler. That is, we know 
that Brownson is Brown because he has the same memories which Brown 
formerly had, and what identified those memories as Brown's is simply the fact 
that they were his. To overcome this circularity, we could look to the causal 
connection, that is, an M-type causal chain. We could then claim that 
Brownson is the former Brown, not just because he has qualitatively similar 
memories to the former Brown, but because these memories are correctly 
causally connected to Brownson by means of the brain transfer operation. 
According to this hypothesis, the causal connection is correct because the 
previous awareness condition exists in someone, although it is not necessary 
that this someone is the same person as the one who apparently recalls the 
original experiences. Thus, in this case, the causal connection is not 
dependent on the identity of the rememberer, and, therefore, Shoemaker 
claims, the circularity problem is overcome (Shoemaker 1984). 
Causal links do not have to be of the 'normal' sort, and could involve partial or complete brain or 
memory transfers (Shoemaker 1984), p 35. 
72 As referred to in Chapter 2. 
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To appreciate how quasi-memory features in the debate about personal 
identity, we need to consider its impact on first-person memories, by imagining 
that we inhabit a quasi-memory possible universe. Here, I could not take for 
granted that any first-person memories which I appear to have are mine 
merely because I appear to have them. I may appear to remember myself 
sitting at the computer writing this thesis, but whereas in the present universe, 
this first-person knowledge would, due to the previous awareness condition, 
be immune to error through misidentification, in a universe with quasi-memory 
this would not be so. In such a universe, instead of the previous awareness 
condition which guarantees my memories in this universe, I would be relying 
on the presence of a non-branching M-type causal chain, which, of course, 
could never be confirmed. So I could never know if 'my' memories were mine. 
So too, one could never know 'who' one was! In other words, Cartesian 
scepticism is now a possibility, even for self-identity. 
In the case of the imagined Brownson story, Shoemaker claims that although 
Brownson does not inherit his traits in the normal way, the fact that Brown 
formerly had these traits was an important part of the cause of Brownson now 
having them, and that further: 
It is only where we suppose that the traits of things at different times are causally 
related in this way that we are entitled to take the similarity of something at one time 
and something at another time as evidence of identity (Shoemaker 1984), pp 44- 
45. 
This means that if the identity of the rememberer is not part of the description 
of the memory, identity could then be ascribed on the basis of the appropriate 
causal links. In other words, part of what it is for me to know that I am the same 
person at t2 that I was at t1 is for me to have a memory which is correctly 
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causally linked, that is by a non-branching causal chain, to a former event. By 
imagining a universe in which memories can be transferred from one person 
to another, Shoemaker claims that although we are unable to perform the 
required transplant operations, the fact that we can imagine them happening 
entitles us to employ the projected consequences in personal identity 
arguments. By means of quasi-memory, we can consider a person's 
memories in isolation from that person. Rather than accepting that my 
apparent memories are really mine because they have the requisite previous 
awareness conditions, they are mine because they have the correct causal 
links. Shoemaker refers to these different interpretations respectively as 
'strong' (that is, memory which entails a previous awareness condition in the 
rememberer), and 'weak' (that is, memory based on an M-type causal chain) 
remembering, designated as 'remembers' and 'rememberwl. He claims that in 
actual remembering, it is difficult to know which of these senses of remember 
reflects our common understanding. Further, it is only because we do not 
really have branching causal chains that we have no need to make this 
distinction. It would seem that for the memory criteria of personal identity to 
work, an understanding of memory in the 'weak' sense is essential, although 
Shoemaker is a little ambiguous on this point: 
But I do not think that this question is especially important. We can defend the spirit 
of the claim that memory is a criterion of personal identity without settling this 
question, although in order to defend the letter of the claim we must maintain that in 
its ordinary use "remember" means "rememberw' (Shoemaker 1984), p 43. 
It seems, however, that how we understand rememberingis important, and that 
the latter point is crucial. For if the above claim is wrong, and my memories 
are mine in virtue of being causally connected specifically to me by means of 
the previous awareness condition, rather than because they have some other 
non-standard type of causal connection, such as an M-type causal chain, 
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then the original circularity objection remains unanswered. 73 We need to bear 
in mind that the difference between Shoemaker's two kinds of remembering is 
the difference between memories identifiable by means of a previous 
awareness condition in the rememberer, and memories identifiable by means 
of an M-type causal chain. Memories based on a previous awareness 
condition in the rememberer are memories which are standardly causally 
connected to the person who had the original experience, which means the 
experiencer and the rememberer are one and the same person. Memories 
based on an M-type causal chain are not necessarily causally connected to 
the person who had the original experience, they could be causally connected 
to a different person, in which case, experiencer and rememberer are not the 
same person (Shoemaker 1984), p 36. This means that for quasi-memory to 
work as part of a non-circular account of personal identity, an adequate 
characterisation of the pertinent memories cannot include additional 
information, such as reference to other psychological states, or to the body of 
the rememberer, as such information would inevitably entail reference to 
already established ownership. If the ownership of the memory is part of what 
we understand a memory to be, then its place in a psychological continuity 
criterion of personal identity cannot be impersonal, and consequently, the 
circularity present in this criterion cannot be overcome by recourse to quasi-
memory (Shoemaker 1984). The very notion of quasi-memory would involve 
a vindication of what we do indeed take memory to be. 
4.3 Psychological Atomism 
Although Parfit presents a simplified version of quasi-memory, its underlying 
principles are essentially the same as those of Shoemaker's version: 
73While the 'previous awareness condition' has some merit (although, as is shown in Section 
4.6, not total merit), it turns out that reference to this condition is not the prime method of 
justifying the presence of authentic memory in personal identity accounts. As will be shown 
shortly, the holistic structure of memory is more important. 
(1) I seem to remember having an experience, 
(2)someone did have this experience, 
and 
(3) my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on that past 
experience (Par-lit 1984), p 220. 
In other words, my memories are not necessarily mine due to the normal 
causal connections between my experience and my memory, but are mine 
due to the 'right kind of causal connection', which could be any kind whatever. 
Because quasi-memory permits any type of causal connection between 
memories, it involves psychological atomism. That is, memories can be 
understood on an individual basis, rather than as parts of semantic or 
epistemic networks. 
Parfit claims that hypothetical examples provide a basis for the evaluation of 
quasi-memory, as the consideration of 'certain imaginary cases' assists the 
understanding of 'actual people in ordinary lives' (Parfit 1984), p 219. To 
evaluate quasi-memory requires ascertaining whether these 'imaginary cases' 
are analogous to actual life. As an example of quasi-memory, Parfit presents 
a thought-experiment in which part of a brain is transferred from one person to 
another person. In the scenario envisaged in this experiment, brain biology 
has advanced to the stage where individual memories can be located in 
particular brain parts, while neurosurgery has developed to the point where 
these minute parts can be physically transferred from one brain to another. 
Such transfers allow one person to quasi-remember another person's past 
experiences. In Parfit's story, part of Paul's brain is transferred to Jane. Jane 
subsequently 'remembers' events which occurred during Paul's trip to Venice 
(Part it 1984), p 220. Other than the brain connections involved, these 
memories have no particular connections with Jane's other memories. 
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Jane quasi-remembers the events 'contained' in the transferred memories. 
These events include walking on marble paving, hearing the flapping of 
pigeons' wings and the cries of gulls, seeing lightening, and shaving. As 
quasi-memories, Jane experiences these memories in the first-person mode, 
although their content and quality are the same as they would be if these 
memories were experienced by Paul. Jane is unaware that 'her' memories 
are 'Paul's' memories unless he informs her about the memory transfer, or 
unless the memories are obviously anomalous, such as the memory of 
shaving. Apart from these two provisos, Jane's experience of Paul's 
memories is indistinguishable from her experience of her own memories 
(Parfit 1984), p 221. 
From this scenario, Parfit draws conclusions about the operation of genuine 
memory experiences. He claims that the scenario shows that causal 
connections between memories do not need to rely on ownership, but rather 
on overlapping strands of connected experiences. Although connections 
within and between strands are required, the kind of connection is irrelevant. 
These overlapping strands can thus provide the necessary connectedness in 
a person's life, without presupposing the person's identity: 
Overlapping strands of strong connectedness provide continuity of quasi-memory. 
Revising Locke, we claim that the unity of each person's life is in part created by this 
continuity. We are not now appealing to a concept that presupposes personal 
identity. Since the continuity of quasi-memory does not presuppose personal 
identity, it may be part of what constitutes personal identity. It may be part of what 
makes me now and myself at other times one and the same person (I say 'part' 
because our criterion also appeals to the other kinds of psychological continuity) 
(Part it 1984), p 222. 
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The unity of a person's life is explained in terms of 'overlapping chains of 
strong connectedness' of impersonal memories. Because these memories 
are impersonal, they do not presuppose personal identity, and therefore can 
be used as part of the criteria for personal identity. Consequently, claims 
Parfit, the account of personal identity is no longer circular. 
The above scenario, however, is rife with problems concerning the meaning 
and interpretation of memory. A mental item is treated, on this account, as a 
memory, regardless of the type of connection it holds with the original event. 
Memory is traditionally held to be a form of recal1. 74 This recall is normally 
understood to be from the perspective of the original experiencer. It is this 
perspective which characterises the experience, and consequently, the 
memory of the experience. Yet, according to Parfit, although Jane has not 
experienced the original events, she experiences the memories of these 
events in qualitatively the same way as a person who has experienced such 
events. But without the experiential connection to the original events, it is not 
clear to me how Jane's mental events can be memories. As Jane did not 
actually experience the events which the memories are about, there is little, if 
anything, to distinguish her mental events from delusions. A delusion is: 'a 
false belief'. When Jane 'remembers' events experienced by Paul, she is 
either experiencing a mental state which she knows is not her own, or she is 
74Some different types of definitions bring out the intent of memory to refer to some type of 
recall. A typical commonplace definition characterises memory as: 'the faculty by which things 
are recalled to or kept in mind; to recall is: to summon back; bring back to memory, recollect, 
remember' (Turner 1978), p 429. A typical philosophical definition characterises memory as: 
'1. The mental function of retaining information about stimuli, events, images, ideas, etc. after 
the original stimuli are no longer present. 2. The hypothesised "storage system" in the 
mind/brain that holds this information. 3. The information so retained' (Reber 1985), p 429. 
And finally, a typical psychological definition characterises memory as: '1. The recall of past 
experiences that are assumed to be stored in unidentified biological structures, most probably 
neural. 2. Remembering, that is, behavioral sequences in which ongoing, prior, and later 
experiences are synthesized. 3. The treatment of past experiences in a manner analogous to 
electronic information processing' (Popplestone and McPherson 1988), p 234. While these 
definitions could be understood to refer only to a brain state at the time of recall, regardless of 
the connection between the memory and the original event, such an understanding goes 
against the traditional meaning of memory, and thus should be explained and justified. 
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having the false belief that the mental state is her own, in which case she is 
having a delusion. In neither case does her experience accord with what is 
normally understood as memory. 75 
Part it's scenario also misconstrues the very nature of the memory process. 
For him, memories are just 'experienced' without any specified background. 
Jane's memories of incidents experienced by Paul are supposedly 
qualitatively the same memories which Paul would experience. This view 
treats memory as a discrete item, which can be passed around from one 
person to another, without any substantial change being made. It assumes 
that single, unattached memories could be experienced and understood. 
Such memories do not have to belong to epistemic or semantic networks to 
have meaning. In Jane's case, she can remember items regardless of their 
epistemic links, or lack of such links. Her 'memories' of Venice do not depend 
on whether she knows what or where Venice is. We are not told how she 
recognises Venice, or what knowledge she must already posses in order for 
her memory to make sense. She must 'remember' the items and experiences 
contained in the transferred memory, regardless of whether she is familiar with 
them. But without the appropriate supporting framework of experiences and 
ideas, the memories could be totally mysterious. It is difficult to conceive of a 
memory which could stand in isolation from other memories or mental items, 
such as beliefs or plans. Unless it was connected to such items, a memory is 
unlikely to make any sense. In taking an atomistic view of memory, Parfit and 
similar theorists violate the very nature of the memory process. 
75Consider the situation in which you vividly describe an event in your life to me. I may imagine 
it, rehearse it, and accurately recall the details, maybe complete with mental imagery. But I was 
not present at the event, and so cannot be considered to be remembering it. I am merely 
remembering what you have told me. This must not be confused with reconstructed memories 
which will be dealt with shortly. 
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According to Simon Beck, thought experiments which discuss the transfer of 
brains or brain parts simply assume that psychological states have the 
necessary atomistic character for 'transfers' to be possible. But according to 
Beck, this view of mental states is mistaken. Beck claims it is undeniable that 
mental states do not actually operate in this discrete fashion, but can only be 
what they are do to their connections with other mental states: 
The holistic character of our mental states like beliefs and desires seems 
undeniable. Particular beliefs and desires function only against the background of a 
vast network of other beliefs, desires, and so on. And thus we have no reason 
whatsoever to believe that a single mental state, or even a set of mental states, 
could be removed from an individual's psychology, leaving the remainder intact 
(Beck 1991), p4. 
Beck claims that this conception of mental states denies not only mental 
holism, but also physicalist theories, such as type-identity theories. These 
theories are not built on an indiscriminate characterisation of identity, but on 
the identity which holds between particular individuals at particular times. 
Thus, if particular thoughts are taken out of the context in which they are 
situated, there is no reason to assume that these thoughts would, or even 
could be the same if they were 'transplanted' elsewhere. Beck argues that 
there is no way we could never know how particular mental states and 
particular portions of physical matter relate to each other. He claims that it is 
unwarranted to assume that transfer or reduplication of physical matter 
inevitably entails the replication of particular mental states, as there 'is no 
reason to believe that the transplanting of a small amount of brain matter from 
one individual to another will bring with it a particular mental state' (Beck 
1991), pp 1-4. Beck argues that it is simply not enough to say that we are, as 
yet, unable to perform such atomistic type operations on humans, as the 
holistic character of mental states prevails, regardless of the physical matter 
out of which such states are 'constructed'. 
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Another problem with quasi-memory is that it undermines and misconstrues 
the relation between memory ownership and personal identity. If we accept 
that quasi-memories are legitimate memories, the psychological continuity 
criterion itself would be rendered vacuous. Were technology to advance as 
Parfit envisages, and memory transfers between persons become a reality, 
then psychological connectedness could refer to any artificially constructed 
and potentially modifiable series of supposed memories, rather than to the 
memories of incidents experienced by a specific, individual person. This 
means that the life or supposed memories of a single person might never be 
accurately represented in a single memory chain. It could never be assumed 
that an individual's 'memories' referred to his own life. The memories could 
equally apply to incidents experienced by several different individuals. As a 
means of explicating personal identity, the psychological continuity criterion 
would thus be uninformative and completely impotent. 
There are, moreover, a number of points on which Parfit's account is simply 
confused. On the one hand, the transferred memories are referred to as 
belonging to someone - in one sense they are Paul's, though they are also 
Jane's - and yet on the other hand, they are also held to be unowned or 
impersonal. Marya Schechtman argues that memories cannot be treated in 
this arbitrary way: 
simply deleting the "nametag" from a memory is not sufficient to make it 
nondelusional, and that in order to make an apparent memory truly nondelusional 
one will either have to presuppose the identity of the rememberer with the person 
who had the experience, or else remove so much of the content of the memory that 
it is no longer plausible to say that what is relevant to personal identity in genuine 
memory is preserved in quasi memory (Schechtman 1990), p 79. 
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Schechtman contrasts Part it's memory description with that of Edward Casey's 
account of a family visit to the cinema.76 When details of the outing are 
recalled, they occur with a myriad of other little details and anecdotes, such as 
the demeanour of the children, their responses, and also other memories. 
Some memories are clear and definite, while others are indistinct and 
uncertain. The memories are not presented as discrete items of experience, 
but rather as elements in an intricate network, with complex and dynamic 
connections to other mental states. They have a richness and depth which is 
absent from quasi-memory (Schechtman 1990) (Schechtman 1990), p 81-82. 
Schechtman imagines what might happen if Jane were given the memories in 
Casey's account. Without their accompanying background details, these 
memories might be unrecognisable, disconnected, alien, or incoherent, just 'a 
blur of unidentifiable sights and sounds' (Schechtman 1990), pp 82-83. But if 
the memories did include their connections with other mental states, confusion 
would arise. These connections would fail to synchronise with those of Jane's 
own mental states, making integration between these alien memories and 
Jane's own life history problematic. The transfer of the whole of a person's 
memories would not solve the issue, since this would give rise to a question 
as to whether the transfer in question was a transfer merely of memory, or of a 
whole person. The identity of the memories themselves would then be 
problematic, as it would be unclear which had priority, the identity of the 
memories, or the identity of the person who has them. And, unless the 
memories were tagged to a particular person, as Schechtman notes, the 
distinction between the memories and delusions would be unclear: 
What this discussion has shown is that, on either of the two possible pictures of 
what it is to have a quasi-state, quasi-states fail to do the work they are supposed to 
because they include either too little or too much of the state they reproduce. If 
76Schechtman takes her account of memory from (Casey 1987), pp 25-26. 
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they include too little, they do not capture what is relevant to personal identity, and if 
they include too much, then, unless sameness of person is assumed, they are 
delusional (Schechtman 1990), p 86. 
If too much is transferred with the memory, a whole person seems to be 
transferred, but the means of identifying that person is inherently problematic. 
On the other hand, if too little is transferred, the transfer itself is meaningless 
and incoherent. 
In summary, quasi-memory is a thoroughly unsatisfactory strategy. The 
discontinuity between quasi memory and other mental states implies that 
quasi memories would be unintelligible. Quasi-memory is so unlike normal 
memory that it offers no help in unravelling the issues concerning memory and 
personal identity. 
4.4 Psychological Holism 
In contrast to the atomistic view of quasi-memory, psychological holism 
recognises that mental states are necessarily united to other mental states. It 
recognises that while mental states can, in a sense, be considered 
individually, their unity with other mental states is a necessary condition of 
their coherence. For many theorists, this raises the question of what 
underpins mental unity itself. David Hume was particularly perplexed with this 
question, as he could detect no underlying self in which to ground such unity. 
He concluded that mental states were united into bundles, but could detect no 
principle of unity, other than that of the association of the ideas within 
particular bundles. 77 Hume later expressed dissatisfaction with this solution, 
77Hume claimed that, while some philosophers claimed they could perceive a self, he could 
not. He consequently made his claim: 'I may venture to affirm to the rest of mankind, that they 
are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with 
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement (Hume 1888), 1.4.6. 
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but was unable to offer a better one (Hume 1962). Many contemporary 
theorists have questioned the idea that resemblance is, in itself, sufficient to 
explain the connections between mental states. 78 
The idea of mental unity is also a central issue in the Kantian attempt to 
explore the conditions for the possibility of experience. In Kant, this idea of 
unity is primarily expressed through the idea of the unity of apperception. This 
unity can be understood in terms of the ability for the self-ascription of mental 
states that is, the ability, as Kant suggests, for mental states to be understood 
as one's own: 
It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, 
and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at 
least would be nothing to me (Kant 1929), B 132. 
The possibility of synthesis, or the mind's combining activity, is directly tied to 
such apperceptive unity. Synthesis is the combining of representations, as 
delivered by the faculty of sensibility, in relation to concepts, derived from the 
understanding, so as to constitute a single experience or judgement. Such 
78For example, Barry Stroud asks what if there are a group of perceptions which do resemble 
each other, occurring of, for example, the Eiffel Tower - are we to assume that they are all 
necessarily present in a single mind - could they not be occurring in several different minds? 
(Stroud 1977), pp 124-125. Conversely, there could be a multitude of different perceptions 
simultaneously present in a single mind? In this case, there may be no obvious connection 
between the ideas generated. (I might simultaneously be thinking about my thesis, and about 
what I will cook for dinner tonight. There is no similarity in the ideas involved). David Pears also 
criticises Hume's view of psychological unity. He claims that Hume's account gives rise to the 
problem of loose 'psychological integration ... like a group of buildings around a farmyard' (Pears 
1990), p 122. Without a persistent self, the mind of a person 'is a sequence of ever-changing 
impressions and ideas' (Pears 1990), p 124. Pears argues that unless there are principles 
which bind them together psychologically, there seems to be no reason why particular ideas are 
unified in minds the way we normally experience them, or expect them to be. Another problem 
pointed to by Pears is that Hume's account does not adequately explain what distinguishes one 
particular bundle from another. Pears uses the example of an outbuilding, which may be 
identifiable without knowing to what complex or other building it belongs. There is no evident 
principle or rule which determines which buildings belong to one group rather than to another. 
Pears maintains that Hume presents mental items as being like this, but that in reality they are 
not. It makes no sense, according to Pears, to talk of them without attributing ownership (Pears 
1990), p 122. 
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combination is achieved through the referring of representations back to a 
single 'I'. We can say, then, that mental unity is required, since the having of 
mental states itself depends on a certain connectedness obtaining between 
those states, and between the elements of those states. The unity of states 
and the unity of the 'I' involved in self-ascription, that is, the unity of 
apperception, are thus one and the same (Kant 1929), A 84-130; B 117-169. 
There remains an ambiguity, however, as to how we should understand the 
nature of such apperceptive unity, and the nature of the synthesising activity 
with which it is associated. Addressing this issue, Malpas claims that 
synthesis is underpinned by embodied agency, and that it is this that ultimately 
unifies mental content. Malpas argues that only a predominantly holistic 
account of mental states can explain how mental content and action are 
possible. 
According to Malpas, experiencing subjects, minds, and actions are integrally 
related and mutually constitutive. While subjects exist, they are not constituted 
prior to experience, but rather in tandem with experience. An essential part of 
any experience and mental content is that a certain form of self-awareness is 
part of the experience itself. For example, it is a formal requirement of me 
seeing the hedge outside my window that I am aware that it is me seeing the 
hedge, rather than you seeing it. My awareness does not occur by my first 
having the experience, and then appropriating it to myself, as if I could equally 
have appropriated it to someone else. I do not first see the hedge, and then 
decide it is me seeing it. My seeing the hedge is, by definition, my experience. 
Thus, having the experience and knowing it is me who has it are 
simultaneous. This point is not undermined by mistaken experiences. Even 
136 
my mistaken experiences are, by definition, my experiences. 79 Awareness 
that an experience is mine is integral to my awareness of myself. Put another 
way, one does not grasp oneself as a subject separately from grasping 
oneself as an experiencing subject. Thus, knowing oneself as a subject is 
integral to knowing oneself as an experiencing subject (Malpas 1999), pp 72- 
78. 
Malpas also notes that for a person to have experience requires that coherent 
connections obtain between the experiences of the person concerned. Rather 
than being regarded atomisticly, the experiences of a single person must be 
considered as part of a coherent framework of experiences. Only through their 
connections with a variety of mental items, can any mental items have sense 
or meaning. For example, knowing it is a green hedge outside my window 
entails knowing about the existence of plants and colours. To believe that one 
was once in Russia requires believing that the world is divided into countries, 
one of which is currently called Russia. Even mistaken beliefs about being in 
Russia cannot be held in isolation from the requisite background of associated 
beliefs. Recognising the connections between our experiences provides the 
sense of ourselves as subjects persisting through time. It should be noted 
here that the requirement of meaningful connections between mental states 
does not mean that every mental state is connected to every other mental state 
by means of its content, although clearly certain minimal such connections are 
necessary for states to have meaning (Malpas 1999), pp 78-80. 
A key feature of mental holism, for Malpas, is the relation between mental 
content and action. Mental states are organised in relation to action, while the 
ordering of action is seen only in relation to mental states. Hence, an integral 
79For example, I may mistake the hedge for a real one when it is artificial, or I may mistake the 
yellow leaves for flowers. 
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relation exists between the two. This can be understood by considering the 
difference between action, which is (in general) rationally motivated, 80 and 
behaviour, which could be an uninitiated bodily response (such as shivering). 
Actions which are rationally motivated draw on beliefs and other mental states. 
For example, because I believe that water quenches thirst, I drink water when I 
am thirsty. Without the belief, the action would not occur. And without the 
framework of beliefs within which the belief about water sits, I could not have 
such a belief. 81 Beliefs are parts of schemas (or small systems) contained in 
larger networks, forming a person's total belief system. The particular 
concatenation of elements within a given circumstance impels the relevant 
belief or desire to motivate action. These elements are the state and 
circumstances of the world in which an agent is located, combined with the 
agent's particular aggregated network of mental content. According to 
circumstances, certain elements of the network are drawn towards the 
requisite action: 
Like a spider's web in which a fly has been caught, and in which all the threads have 
pressure exerted on them from a single point, so mental states are similarly 
organised in relation to, or are 'pulled towards', the current activity of the agent 
(Malpas 1999), p 96. 
Action brings together the relevant elements of mental content, thus providing 
a focus for their unity. While integration occurs at the point of action, this does 
not necessarily entail all parts of a person's mental framework or belief 
system. This is not required for action to occur, as all parts of the framework 
are not relevant to all actions (Malpas 1999), pp 96-99. 
800f course, not all action is rationally motivated, but those which are not are contingent on a 
world in which most action is, in some way, rationally intended. Unless this were the case, the 
distinction between rational and non-rational actions could not be made. 
81 This should not be confused with an instinct to drink water, such as might be had by an 
animal. I am referring here to full cognitive awareness. Of course, creatures can be motivated to 
drink water without this awareness, but this is not what is being discussed here. 
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For some theorists, such as Jerry Fodor, however, involvement with one 
element in a holistic system necessarily means involvement with them all. He 
claims that this involvement could potentially destabilise the whole system, as 
it means that if one element in the system were changed, then all elements 
would change. The ability of speakers to share meaning would then be 
compromised. An utterance derives its meaning from the constituent parts of a 
person's belief system. Fodor argues that understanding one component of 
the system is dependent on understanding it all. Therefore, unless a speaker 
understands the total system of another, she cannot understand any of it. 
Without this understanding, argues Fodor, the communications and meanings 
of one person may not be comprehended by another person. Similarly, if 
holism operates within different systems of thought, it could seem that no two 
disparate systems of thought, such as two scientific theories, could refer to the 
same objects, such as stars. Because little of the beliefs of these disparate 
systems (such as ancient Greek astronomy and modern astronomy) are held 
in common, then neither are their objects of reference. The problem then 
arises as to whether beliefs between different persons and systems can be 
identical, merely similar, or indeed, if they can have anything in common at all 
(Fodor and Lepore 1992), pp 4-22. 
Other theorists, however, such as Bilgrami and Malpas, believe that these 
objections can be met, without holism being compromised. Bilgrami, for 
instance, claims that holism must be constrained by externalism. This means 
that not all beliefs are called into play at the point of action, but only those 
which are relevant to the particular action being performed. According to 
Bilgrami, beliefs are affected by external causes only to the degree to which 
these beliefs are implicated at any one time. Not all beliefs are always 
implicated, due to the presence of two levels at which they can be conceived. 
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The first is the conceptual level, referred to as a the 'meaning-theoretic level'. 
This level is an aggregation of a particular person's mental repertoire. The 
second level is that of content, referred to as 'local', and concerns beliefs 
selected from the theoretical level, which are relevant to any particular 
experiential situation. Thus, the theoretical level is general, while the local is 
specific, the latter being that at which action occurs. Because beliefs extracted 
at the local level are only those implicated in any given situation, a complete 
change in holistic content does not occur. 
Bilgrami gives the example of two persons drinking water to quench their 
thirst. Both have the belief that the water will perform this task. One of the 
persons, skilled in chemistry, also holds beliefs about the water's chemical 
composition. However, the belief that the chemical composition of water is 
H2O contributes nothing to the action of drinking the water. Hence, when the 
action is performed, the beliefs about the water's thirst quenching ability are 
invoked at the local level, while those concerning its chemical composition are 
not. Thus, while the aggregated level of beliefs is different for each person 
drinking water, those at the local level are the same. Were the beliefs about 
the water's chemical composition to change, it would not automatically follow 
that the beliefs about its water-quenching ability would also change. Because 
the degree to which beliefs are brought into play at the point of action is 
limited, the outcome feared by Fodor is curbed. It therefore does not follow 
that all beliefs are subject to inevitable change. Thus, Fodor's claim that 
persons could neither maintain beliefs, nor share the same beliefs is 
unsustainable. Similarly, the fear that beliefs and theories about beliefs is 
threatened, is insupportable (Bilgrami 1992), pp 142-150. 
In summary, the holistic account of mental states implies that important 
semantic and epistemological relations pertain between different mental 
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states, but that these relations are not inherently destabilised every time a 
belief or mental state is changed. The key point is that contentful relations 
between mental states are essential for those states to have any meaning or 
content at all. 
To see how well these views relate to the way mental states are actually 
experienced, some theoretical accounts of memory are now considered. 
These accounts demonstrate that memory is, in principle, a holistic process, in 
which memories do not occur in isolation from other mental states, but indeed, 
are tied to, and contributed to by those other mental states. Empirical 
accounts of memory also support this claim. 
4.5 Memory Theories 
'Memory' is broadly understood as the recall of earlier events, or as a form of 
stored knowledge. 82 This knowledge is derived from events experienced by a 
particular person, and therefore holds the perspective of that particular person. 
Were the memories of one person to be experienced by a different person, the 
original perspective of the memories could not be duplicated, as it is not 
possible for one person to have the same perspective on the world as another. 
Some further distinctions concerning memory are important. 83 A genuine 
memory is the (more or less) accurate recall of an event which actually 
occurred. Genuine event memories are causally connected to, and in some 
ways like, the original event. Mistaken memories are of events which did 
occur, but which are different in some important or significant way to the 
original event. False memories are mental events which are taken to be 
memories, but which are not causally connected to any event which actually 
82 For example: 'The ability of the mind to store and recall past sensations, thoughts, 
knowledge etc (Wilkes and Krebs 1995), p 830. 
83See also (Schechtman 1990), p 78. 
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occurred. False memories include errors, hallucinations, delusions, and one 
form of imagination.84 Consideration of genuine and faulty memories brings 
out the significances of these distinctions. 85 
Plato and Aristotle were among the first thinkers to seriously consider memory. 
They saw memory as a 'trace' in the mind, although its exact nature could not 
be determined. Augustine took memory to be a reproduction of an original 
event, which had been 'stored away' in the mind. Locke initially held memory 
to be the retention of ideas in the mind, but later considered this problematic 
as the perceptions on which the ideas were based no longer existed. 88 He 
subsequently saw memory as the revival of earlier perceptions (Locke 1971), 
pp 3-6. The Representative and Realist theories of memory arose from these 
early views. 
84 It is important to be aware of possible ambiguity when referring to imagination, especially 
when associating the term with memory. An imagined event can be of two kinds: first, an event 
which I mistakenly claim to remember, but which has not occurred, I only imagined that it did; in 
this case I am not aware (until and unless it is drawn to my attention) that I am imagining it. For 
example, I may strongly intend to return a book to the library, and then imagine that I have done 
so. It this case I make a mistake (I make the distinction between imagination and error here as 
they are not necessarily the same kind of mistake. An error could be of the form of mis-
remembering that you have done something, such as returning the book to the library. 
Imagination could be the misremembering/ imagining of the actual incident itself). The second 
type of event is one in which I deliberately and knowingly imagine something, such as a plot for a 
story, or how I will spend the next holidays. 
85Memory, its operation and its aberrations is a large and complex topic, and can clearly not be 
completely covered here. I have therefore selected material for these sections to give a general 
overview of the field, and to bring focus to areas which impact on psychological continuity and 
quasi-memory. 
88Based on his view that the mind had no innate ideas, Locke saw memory as 'the keeping of 
those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it has received' (Locke 1959), 2.10.2. 
Memory is thus an essentially mental operation. Memory is needed because persons are 
unable to foreground all their ideas at the same time, and thus require somewhere to keep 
them: a kind of 'storehouse' where ideas reside until invoked at some later time. Subsequently, 
Locke modified his view to the claim that because ideas are actually 'perceptions in the mind', 
they could not exist beyond the duration of the original perception. A memory, therefore, is the 
activity of reviving an earlier perception. Locke's 'storehouse' view was modified in a later edition 
of the Essay. The paradox of possible 'unperceived perceptions' prompted his addition: 'But, 
our ideas, being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, will cease to be anything when 
there is no perception of them; this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory 
signifies no more but this,- that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which 
it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. 
And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are 
actually nowhere;- but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as 
it were paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more 
lively, and others more obscurely' (Locke 1959), 1.2.10.2. 
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The Representative theory of memory holds that memory is a mental state 
which represents a past experience. 87 The representation is in the form of an 
image in the mind. In some sense, the image reproduces the past experience, 
causing memory knowledge. However, to view memory as merely an image 
leaves open the question as to the distinction between genuine memory 
images, mistaken memory images, and images which are completely false. 
Attempted solutions to this problem by Hume and Russell actually help little. 
Hume claims that memory can be detected because it is more vivid than 
imagination. This is not necessarily the case, as imagination frequently 
outstrips memory in vivacity and intensity. Russell distinguishes memory from 
imagination by claiming that genuine memory experiences are accompanied 
by feelings of 'familiarity' and 'pastness'. As with Hume's distinction, however, 
these feelings could equally apply to an imagined event, and tend to 
presuppose the memory experience they are trying to justify (Locke 1971), pp 
7-16. Locke claims that the fundamental distinction between memory and 
imagination is that memory refers to an event which actually occurred, 
whereas imagination does not. This means that a genuine memory is one 
which is causally connected in the right kind of way to an event which took 
place at a time prior to the occurrence of the memory. 88 The problem is less 
one of defining what memory is, but rather more of knowing how to make the 
distinction between genuine and non-genuine memories: 
The Representative theorist finds himself imprisoned within his imagery, with no 
way of confirming that the imagery does reveal the past, as it has to if we are to have 
memory-knowledge (Locke 1971), p 17. 
87 The following sections are based on work from (Locke 1971). 
88By this I mean that the causal connection between the prior event and the memory is one of 
recall, as opposed to some other kind of causal connection, such as a hypothetical form of 
'memory transplant'. This means that if I have a thought of an event which actually occurred, but 
which was not causally connected to the original event by means of recall, my thought would be 
one of (coincidental) imagination rather than memory. 
According to Thomas Reid, a more direct theory was needed, and thus the 
Realist theory of memory arose (Locke 1971), p 20. 
The Realist theory of memory holds that a memory experience is a 'direct 
awareness of the past' as opposed to a mere representation of it (Locke 
1971), p 21. Memories are not new items, but rather the re-appearance of old 
ones. For the representativist, the mental occurrence called a 'memory' is 
numerically distinct from the original mental occurrence; for the realist, it is 
numerically the same (Locke 1971), pp 24-26. Nevertheless, the Realist 
theory incurs similar problems to the Representative theory. Distinctions are 
difficult to make between genuine and non-genuine memories, or between 
deteriorated or distorted memories. Verification of memories is still dependent 
on factors internal to the memory experience, rather than on factors outside it 
(Locke 1971), pp 29-31. These difficulties mirror those discussed in the 
previous chapter, and show that a different approach to memory is needed. 
Don Locke notes that both the above theories hold in common the following 
three points: 
1 Remembering is an occurrence, something we do; 
2 The occurrence consists of an experience, such as a image; 
3 Based on the occurrence, we know various facts 
(Locke 1971), p 32. 
These three points, however, do not apply to all memories. Not all memories 
entail remembering particular incidents or having mental images. Locke cites 
remembering facts such as the election results. This seems to be a completely 
different act to remembering, say, where the car is parked. And neither 
necessarily entails remembering any particular act. Remembering where I 
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parked the car may involve remembering the act of parking it, but it may not. I 
may simply remember where the car is. These realisations led to the 
reappraisal of memory, and to the recognition that it can refer to remembering 
incidents, or it can refer to knowing facts. Locke distinguishes Factual 
Memory, Practical Memory, and Personal Memory (Locke 1971), pp 32-77. 
Factual memory" refers to knowing specific facts, or 'retained factual 
knowledge' such as scientific facts, the days of the week, or the date of one's 
birthday (Locke 1971), pp 52-52. Practical Memory refers to abilities and 
skills, such as being able to drive a car or play a musical instrument (Locke 
1971), pp 64-65. Personal Memory refers to memories of one's own 
experiences (Locke 1971), pp 70-71. In the course of research, these basic 
ideas have developed and expanded into more refined taxonomies. As the 
research below demonstrates, these taxonomies show that connections 
between memories and other psychological states are a crucial factor in the 
ability to understand and experience memories, and they therefore support the 
claim that memory is, in principle, a holistic mental process. This argues 
against the atomistic characterisation of mental states, and more specifically, 
against the possibility of quasi-memory. 
4.6 Memory Research 
Beginning in the late 1900s, much memory research focused on 
understanding the memory process, and identifying its main influential 
factors. 89 Early work, such as that of Ebbinghaus, examined the duration of 
memories.90 Recording his own attempts to remember 'nonsense syllables', 
he concluded that much learned material is soon forgotten. More recent 
89 This section is drawn from a variety of sources, including (Goethals and Solomon 1989), pp 
2-11, and also from the works listed in footnotes below. 
90 Ebbinghaus' seminal article on memory research On Memory was published in 1885. 
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studies indicate that a steep 'forgetting curve' results when learned items are 
meaningless (Weiten 1992), p 251. Results are more positive when items 
with meanings and contexts are committed to memory. This indicates that 
meaning and context are relevant to memory. Items isolated from contexts are 
very difficult to remember, thus posing a challenge to the atomistic view of 
memory. 
As research developed, diverse traditions were set up by Galton and Freud. 
Galton's interest was in the kinds of associations which assist memory, such 
as verbal or sensory cues (Robinson 1986), pp 19-23. Freud's focus was on 
the role of memory in neurosis, and thus on subliminal causal links in recall 
(Rubin 1986), p 20. Binet's research on children's memories 91 reveals that 
considerable reconstructive process occurs in memory (Goethals and 
Solomon 1989), pp 2-3. Reconstruction is where memories become conflated 
with other memories and experiences. Exact sequences of events may not be 
remembered, but may be combined with other recollections. Studies 
conducted by Bartlett indicate the importance to reconstruction of a person's 
prior knowledge and expectations. 92 These trends in research reveal the 
significance to memory of other mental items, thus supporting the trend 
towards a more holistic approach. 
Neurological progress prompted some researchers, such as Lashley to try to 
locate memory traces in the brain. 93 His failure to do so led to the conclusion 
that memory was distributed throughout the brain, rather than localised in a 
specific brain part (Goethals and Solomon 1989), p 3. This view was 
modified in 1984, when McCormack and Thomson's experiments on rabbits 
91 Binet's study: Binet & Henri was published in 1894. 
92Bartlett's ideas were presented in Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social 
Psychology was published in 1932. 
93These traces were referred to 'engrams', and were a major focus for Karl Lashley in the 
1950s. 
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revealed a small area of conditioned response. They studied the behaviour of 
rabbits, before and after inserting a small lesion into part of the brain. This 
enabled them to locate the site of the conditioned response, thus proving that 
particular brain parts were involved in particular memories. Although sites like 
this are sometimes located, many memories are still held to be distributed 
throughout the brain. The following taxonomies are the outcome of study in 
recent years. 
4.6.1 	Memory Taxonomies 
Two basic kinds of memory are procedural memory and declarative memory. 
Procedural memory refers to learned abilities and skills, which we may or may 
not remember learning, but which we can execute without undue 
concentration, such as typing. Closely connected to procedural memory is 
implicit memory. This is sub-conscious memory, which can only be accessed 
indirectly, and may be reached when treating amnesia or other disorders 
(Weiten 1992), pp 258-259. Both procedural memory and implicit memory are 
related to contexts, and are thus difficult to conceive of in isolation from these 
contexts. Because contexts are composed of experiences and other mental 
states, the atomistic conception of memory fails to adequately characterise 
these types of memories. 
Declarative, or explicit memory refers to factual information remembered 
explicitly. It includes semantic memory and episodic memory. Semantic 
memory refers to general facts such as mathematical knowledge, or the letters 
of the alphabet. Episodic, event, or personal memory is memory of particular 
events one has experienced (Weiten 1992), p 259. 
Personal memory can be further divided to distinguish between memories 
which pertain specifically to life events which concern oneself, and those 
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which do not. For example, 'rote learning' is a form of personal memory. So is 
witnessing an event in someone else's life, such as a wedding or a birthday, 
or even just seeing an anonymous car drive down the road. But unless these 
events involve one in some meaningful way, they are not significant to one's 
own life events. Memories which do involve oneself in a personal and 
significant way are those which compose a person's own life-story, or 
'autobiography'. These memories are referred to as 'autobiographical 
memories'. Autobiographical memories have special relevance for personal 
identity, as they contribute to a person's self-conception. The sense of a 
continuing self over time is provided by the connecting of a person's life-
events within a continuing history (Brewer 1986), p 33. It is often the more 
significant, or public of these events by which a person is identified by others, 
such as which family one is born into, what job one has, one's address, 
partner, children, achievements, and so on. Because many of these things are 
inherently connected, it is difficult to conceive how memories relating to them 
could be understood in isolation from other memories or mental states, and 
thus, how an atomistic account of memory could be sustained. 
Personal or episodic memory operates in three basic stages, encoding, 
storage, and recall. Encoding is the forming of a memory code as the event is 
'put' into memory. Some kind of connection is made with other items in the 
memory store. Codes can be acoustic or semantic, and affect the 
effectiveness of recall. Poor encoding means poor recall, while failure to 
encode means failure to recall (Weiten 1992), pp 238-246. 
Storage can be sensory, short-term, or long-term. Sensory storage is the 
initial reception of sensory information by one of more of the sensory 
modalities. It is controlled by attention, and lasts three to four seconds. 
Unless encoded, information is lost. If encoded, it passes to short-term 
148 
storage for about ten to twenty seconds. Storage is prolonged by rehearsing 
and combining with other mental contents, during which it is in 'working 
memory'. Long-term storage is the retention of information over extended 
periods, lasting from days to years, or even lifetimes. Information may be 
retained in semantic form, specific propositions, or images. Three models are 
used to explain storage: 
• The connectionist model, in which memories are connected by 
networks of association clustered in the brain. 
• The spreading activation model, in which information entering one 
node spreads to other nodes, connecting up associated thoughts, 
ideas, and memories. This model may also be understood as a 
semantic network, which could be complete, or composed of smaller 
networks, comprising grouped concepts in the form of scripts or 
schemas. 
• The hierarchical organisation model, in which memories are stored in 
relation to their place in a graded structure, such as by being part of a 
concept, which in turn is part of a larger concept, and so on. 
It is likely that all models apply to some degree, depending on the type of 
memory and circumstance (Weiten 1992), pp 238-246. These models 
support the view that memories are not isolated items of experience, but are 
defined in part by their connections with other memories and associated 
mental states. 
Recall of memory (retrieval) is complex, and subject to several factors. Key to 
effective retrieval is adequate encoding, and circumstances conducive to 
recall. Retrieval does not normally occur in abstraction from surrounding 
events, experiences and concerns. These items provide cues which activate 
recall. Failure of recall could be due to either poor encoding, or to inadequate 
and inappropriate recall cues. This means that some memories could be 
permanent, but virtually inaccessible. Retrieval can be enhanced by activities, 
such as citing places and events, posing suggestions under hypnosis, re- 
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enacting situations and moods, and so on. These devices contribute to recall, 
often invoking a reconstructive process, in which missing factors, forgotten 
from the original experience, are supplied. The longer the lapse between 
original event and recall, the more reconstruction occurs (Weiten 1992), pp 
247-251. 
4.6.2 	Reconstruction 
Reconstruction is subject to a variety of influences. Some examples bring out 
ways in which these influences affect what is recalled, and how it is recalled. 
A case of recall involving considerable reconstruction was that studied by Ulric 
Neisser, of the subject John Dean. 94 Testimony was given by Dean 
concerning meetings held over several years, both with Nixon, and with 
members of Nixon's administration. 95 Unbeknown to Dean, the conversations 
held at these meetings were recorded. It was thus possible to compare 
Dean's testimony with these recordings. Dean admits that he used 
newspaper clippings of the events in question to aid his recall. When his 
testimony was later compared with the tapes of the events, it was discovered 
that some facts were conflated, and many details were mixed-up. 
Conversations which took place on one occasion were combined with parts 
which occurred on others. But what was apparent was that the general gist of 
the testimony was correct. Neisser claims that Dean's testimony, while not 
verbatim, was: 
not altogether wrong. On the contrary, there is a sense in which he was altogether 
right; a level at which he was telling the truth about the Nixon White House. And 
sometimes, ... he was more specifically right as well (Neisser 1982), pp 157-158. 
94For the full details of this study, see (Neisser 1982). 
95As counsel to the President of the United States of America in the early 1970s, Dean testified 
in 1973 before the 'Watergate' Committee of the US Senate concerning apparent covert 
government involvement in burglary and deception (Neisser 1982), p 140. 
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While the memory of specific events was unclear, the underlying semantics of 
those events was retained. That is, although the details may have been 
inaccurate, the basic meaning behind them was not. As a result of the close 
• correlation between the gist of Dean's testimony, and the facts of the tapes, 
Nixon had to resign, and many high-ranking staff of the White House were 
sent to gaol. Neisser concludes that many memories operate in this 
reconstructed fashion. Minute details are lost or misremembered, and 
sequences of events merged with other similar sequences. The overall 
coherence of events is, however, maintained. These types of memories are 
active and dynamic, as opposed to being static, photographic-like 
representations of original events (Neisser 1982), pp 139-159. 
4.6.3 	Eye-witness Testimony 
Studies of eye-witness testimony also demonstrate the presence of 
reconstruction during recall. A review of such studies, conducted both inside 
and outside the laboratory, indicates that 'pure recall' of witnessed events is 
unlikely. A variety of factors influence recall, often undetected by witnesses. 
For example, how much a witness can retain is influenced by exposure time at 
the original event. Laboratory tests which showed images for varying amounts 
of time revealed a correlation between the degree of retention, and the 
amount of exposure. Also influential is the amount of time which elapses 
between exposure and recall. Memories can be affected by day-to-day 
activities, which can cause deterioration or forgetfulness. Other factors, 
especially in non-laboratory situations, are distance, poor lighting, crowds, 
colour-blindness, and other distractions such as personal stress. In both real-
life crime situations and laboratory tests, stress is a considerably influential 
factor, due to its effect on such things as adrenalin levels, heart rates, and 
other bodily functions. These factors influence concentration and focus. To 
show how this might happen, researchers give the example of subjects who 
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were denied food for over 24 hours, and their subsequent tendency to 'see' 
food in blurred images on a screen (Buckout 1982), pp 116-119. 
Social factors are also shown to influence recall. This was detected in studies 
of selections made from line-ups in photographs. Tests in which subtle 
suggestions were put from superiors to subordinates showed a high 
percentage of response to these suggestions in the choices made. In other 
studies, the choice of particular words, such as 'smashed' or 'hit' 
demonstrated the influence these words had on the request to estimate 
speeds. 96 Similarly, a test in which six out of seven people (falsely) claimed 
that the longer of two lines was really the shorter, influenced the seventh 
person to agree with them. 97 Other studies indicated that many witnesses 
become more certain about their claims as they progressed from their first 
police interview, through the ranks to the grand-jury, indicating that the witness 
had 'filled in' the former uncertainties (Buckout 1982), pp 120-122. These 
studies revealed, not only the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, but also 
that plausible reasons were often available to explain discrepancies. The 
studies also reveal that factors adjacent to memory experience are influential 
in the construction and experience of the memory concerned. 
4.6.4 	Flashbulb Memories 
A more specific form of recall is that referred to as 'flashbulb' memories. 
These memories are so-called as they are supposedly illuminated by some 
intense event or experience to which they are attached. Research indicates 
that flashbulb memories can be generated by incidents of private concern, 
96A study by Elizabeth Loftus showed that the word 'smashed' drew higher speed estimates 
that the word 'hit' when questioning viewers about an automobile accident film (Buckout 1982), 
p 120. 
97This test was designed to test the relevance of conformity among persons. In the test, six out 
of the seven participants pre-arranged to give the wrong estimate of line length. In spite of the 
obvious mistake, the 'naive' person more often than not agreed with them (Buckout 1982), p 
122. 
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such as personal shocks, or public concern, such as assassinations or 
attempted assignations. A remarkable example of the phenomenon concerns 
the moment when persons heard of the assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy in 1963. 98 According to a study by Brown and Kulik, this incident 
generated more flashbulb memories than any other incident studied at the 
same time.99 Their study showed that many people 'captured' certain details 
of what they were doing at the precise moment they heard the news. These 
details are preserved with the memory of Kennedy's assassination, and are 
consequently subject to the same vivid recall (Brown and Kulik 1982), pp 23- 
25. 
Of interest to the researchers was why the Kennedy incident was so 
generative of flashbulb memories. Brown and Kulik compiled relevant data. 
Their study covered several assassinations, and drew on separate groups of 
black and white Americans. By comparing the relative significance of the 
victims to the well-being of the groups, a correlation was found between the 
needs, concerns, and survival of the groups, and the amount of flashbulb 
memories held in relation to particular victims. For example, a much higher 
proportion of black than white Americans held flashbulb memories for the 
death of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. 100 The number of flashbulb 
memories held for the death of Kennedy was almost equal - 39 out of 40 
whites, and 40 out of 40 blacks. Whereas, the deaths of the black leaders was 
considerably more significant to the black population than to the white, the 
death of Kennedy was perceived as being equally significant to both. 
98For the full details of this study, see (Brown and Kulik 1982). 
99This needs to be kept in context. We can imagine similar phenomena applying at other times 
and places, such as when ancient emperors, or persons like Lenin died, or maybe in more 
recent times, Princess Diana. 
100Both were associated with working for the civil rights of black Americans. 
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Also relevant was the type of detail recalled. It usually included place and 
activity, but not minor or insignificant details. In most instances, the memory 
had been rehearsed, either privately, or by retelling, indicating that an amount 
of reconstruction was involved. Brown and Kulik considered these facts in the 
light of the envisaged evolutionary significance of memory. This significance 
concerns the likely connection between memory selectivity in primitive 
humans, and the imperative to remember the relevant facts about predators 
and other dangers, such as location, type of threat, and so on. A similar 
significance is mirrored in the above study. The stronger the connection 
between the victim and the rememberer's well-being, the stronger and more 
prevalent the memory of factors related to the incident. Brown and Kulik 
conclude that there is a connection between the flashbulb phenomenon and 
survival or well-being of the rememberer (Brown and Kulik 1982), pp 28-40. 
These points make sense, as they represent an extreme example of an aspect 
which often accompanies most memories, namely a correlation between a 
memory's importance and the quality of its recal1. 101 Reflection on the above 
study indicates the possibility that this correlation has evolutionary origins. 
4.6.5 	Summary Of Memory Research 
The above studies and considerations of the memory process indicate that 
memories are not inert and discrete, but rather are dynamic and contextual. 
They do not occur 'out of nowhere', but belong to a framework within which 
they make sense. 102 The various components of the framework, such as 
background conditions, biological, social, and personal concerns, influence 
101 The correlation is clearly influenced by whether the knowledge was present in the initial 
situation. The quality of recall by a witness who knew of the importance of an event at the time 
the event occurred may be considerably better than that of a witness who only learned of the 
importance later. 
1 °20f course we do sometimes have 'flashes' of memory, which come unbidden and may 
surprise us by their unexpectedness. But our lives would make no sense to us if all memories 
were like this. I am here discussing the normal occurrence of memory, as it is this which forms 
the background of coherence which is necessary for such unexpected memories to be 
possible. Unless we had such coherence, we would not recognise the 'out of the blue' 
occurrences. 
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the degree and type of reconstruction which occurs. This supports the view 
that memories could not be arbitrarily removed from their contexts, and placed 
elsewhere, and then be assumed to remain intact, as if they were still in their 
'home' locations. The holistic structure of memory does not fulfil the 
requirements of quasi-memory, but rather indicates that memories can only by 
understood in relation to the context in which they are situated. This 
conclusion is also supported by studies of false memories. 
4.7 False Memories 
False memories are memories which are totally fictitious, and refer to 
supposed events which have never occurred. Although reconstruction occurs 
in the course of normal memory, reconstruction is not synonymous with the 
experience of false memories. Reconstruction and degeneration are a normal 
part of the memory spectrum. This does not mean, however, that anything can 
be construed as a memory. There is a distinction between a memory which is 
more or less genuine, and an apparent memory which is completely false. 
This distinction is important to understand, as it is relevant to Parfit's argument 
regarding transferred memories and ownership of memories. If we were to 
agree that 'transferred' memories or supposedly 'impersonal' memories were 
acceptable as genuine memories, we would be failing to distinguish between 
genuine and false memories, such as has happened in the case of Jane's 
memories of Venice. The distinction between genuine and false memories is 
a real one, and needs to be recognised. If the distinction between genuine 
and false memories was overlooked, one would never know which memories 
applied to oneself, and thus what one had done, or, more importantly, who 
one really was. As examples of false memories, 'memory illusions' and 'false 
recognition' are considered. It will shown from these considerations that these 
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types of false memories do not arise out of nowhere, but, like genuine 
memories, have contentful connections with other mental states. 
4.7.1 	Memory Illusions 
The phenomenon of 'memory illusions' was investigated by Lampinen et al. 103 
Memory illusions are one form of 'false beliefs'. A memory illusion is defined 
as an occurrence in which false memories are experienced 
phenomenologically, or as: 'an incorrect belief about the past that is 
experienced as a memory' (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 183. The 
subject falsely remembers an event with the same perceptual awareness as 
that of genuine memory experiences. 104 By contrast, a false belief is the 
incorrect belief that something happened, regardless of whether the event 
itself is recalled. The researchers' concern was to explore the nature of 
memory illusions, as these challenge our notion of first-person verification of 
memory experiences. When I remember myself doing something, I want to 
claim that the fact that I remember the incident vividly warrants my memory of 
the incident being taken seriously. In most instances, my claim would be 
uncontroversial, but there are cases where it would not be. Mistakes can be 
made in remembering, posing the question of what, in addition to personal 
recall, is required to verify a memory experience as being genuine? 
Lampinen et al. see this as a crucially important question, due to its relevance 
to cases of reported child abuse in the case of purportedly recovered 
memories. To address this issue, Lampinen et al. devised investigatory 
techniques, which recognise that subjective experience is relevant to memory 
illusions, but that subjective experience is, in principle, unobservable, and 
therefore, difficult to study (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 181-183. 
103 For full details of the investigation, see: (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998). For their 
comprehensive list of references, see particularly pp 219-224. As the study is extensive, this 
section is unable to cover all the researchers' points, draws on those aspects most relevant to 
the present work. 
104An example of this would be Jane 'remembering' Paul's experiences. 
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Lampinen et al. investigated memory illusions by examining many studies of 
false memory reports. By examining a range of studies, they produced some 
illuminating general principles about the operation of memory. A key initial 
task was to differentiate between memory illusions and propositional-type 
false beliefs. This is important, as it locates the areas in which the study of 
phenomenological characteristics is required. Studies were usually 
conducted by providing test situations in which subjects were presented with 
events, and then asked to recall them under a variety of manipulated 
conditions. 
One study concerned incorrect 'recognition' of words in word-lists. 
Continuous lists of words were given to subjects, with the instruction to 
nominate words already presented. Errors were made when words were 
similar, or semantically connected. For example, if the word 'sleep' was 
presented, some subjects falsely reported that it had been presented earlier, 
when in fact the earlier word was 'bed'. Similar studies in which word 'lures' 
were presented to subjects, yielded incorrect reporting.w 5 When 'nurse, sick, 
lawyer, medicine' and so on were presented, subjects falsely reported the 
word 'doctor'. Another study, in which non-famous and famous names were 
mixed in particular ways, yielded mis-reporting of non-famous names as being 
famous. Some researchers recognised and extended Bartlett's work on 
memory reconstruction, by conducting similar studies to those by Bartlett. 106 In 
one example, subjects were given varying amounts of information concerning 
certain characters, such as Helen Keller or Adolf Hitler. In instances where 
subjects knew the identity of the characters, more mistakes were made 
105 tures' are specifically referred to by these and other researchers, rather than 'cues' which 
may have been expected. This is probably because the words are deliberate ploys, designed to 
mislead. 
106Bartlett's studies were mentioned earlier in this chapter, in Section 4.6. 
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concerning other information given in the study, than was made by subjects to 
whom the identity was not given. The falsely 'recognised' information was 
information which would cohere with what was generally known about the 
character, but which was not actually supplied in the study. Another range of 
studies concerned simple and complex sentences. By supplying subjects with 
a range of sentence components, false combinations were reported as having 
been given. Lampinen et al. concluded that false recognition ranges from 
simple to complex situations: 'subjects will not only falsely recognize and 
recall simple stimuli such as words and names but also more complex stimuli 
such as stories and sentences' (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 183- 
186. 
These studies led to the production of a specific three-staged formula, found to 
produce a high percentage of false reports. 107 Stage one is where an event or 
film of an event is witnessed. Stage two is where misleading or neutral 
information is given to some subjects. Stage three is where all subjects are 
questioned regarding the original event. In one example, subjects were first 
shown a slide presentation of a vehicle accident. Some subjects were then 
given a questionnaire containing misleading information, in which a yield sign 
was substituted for a stop sign. When all subjects were subsequently 
questioned, it was found that 75% of non-misled subjects gave correct 
answers regarding the signs, whereas only 41% of misled subjects gave 
correct answers. The study demonstrates how post event information can 
mislead and distort memory (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 187. 
Even warnings about inaccurate information does not necessarily prevent 
such information from contaminating a memory. In one investigation, although 
107This methodology was devised by Elizabeth Loftus in the 1970s, and, due to its success, 
has been used by many researchers since then (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 187. 
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subjects were told that their information had been manipulated, test results 
were not significantly affected. The warnings did not prevent the subjects 
concerned from being influenced by the false information. For example, in 
one eyewitness post-event study, subjects were warned that police 
information might be inaccurate. Contrary to expectations, this did not 
produce a higher accuracy-rate of reporting in warned subjects than in 
unwarned subjects. Similar results have been found in many different types of 
tests, such as word-list tests which had both pre and post-event warnings. 
Researchers concluded that warnings specifically prevent neither false 
recognition nor false recall. They infer from this that memories resilient to 
warnings are likely to be illusions rather than inferences, as inferences would 
be more vulnerable to change when warnings were given (Lampinen, 
Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 202-204. The significance of this type of study is 
that in spite of warnings, memories can be unavoidably contaminated by their 
surrounding circumstances. 
Another study showed how repeated suggestions can produce a completely 
false 'memory'. The researchers, along with the subject's brother, conducted 
conversations over several days, with the result that the subject eventually 
'remembered' an event in which he had been lost in a shopping mall as a 
young child. The memory was described as 'vivid'. No such incident had ever 
occurred. Another study showed how related items can be falsely reported. In 
a case where many items of a particular kind are placed in a room, reports of 
the items often include related items which are not present. For example, a 
room containing office items was reported to contain books when none were 
present (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 187-188. These, and many 
similar studies, show that false memories can, and do, occur. To discover 
why, several models of memory were examined. 
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The Perception/Reception model recognises the similarity between perception 
and memory, and draws conclusions about memory by comparing the two. 
Tests which concerned reports of perception and memory found that in neither 
case did subjects treat them as 'discrete' experiences. Responses to events 
were coloured by the subjects' own general knowledge and personal 
concerns, raising doubt in the appropriateness of the 'storehouse' model of 
memory (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 189. 
The Fuzzy Trace theory holds that memories are encoded in both verbatim 
and gist forms. 'Verbatim' refers to specific information, and to its surface 
format. 'Gist' refers to the relevant information in a more generalised form. 
The theory holds that genuine memories can be produced by either, whereas 
false memories are produced by the latter only. In cases of verbatim recall, 
experience is richer than gist recall. But where verbatim traces are not 
rehearsed, they can decompose, and become integrated with other gist 
representations, producing traces which are a mixture of both, thereby 
'creating' false memories (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 190-191. 
The Source Monitoring Framework theory holds that memory illusions result 
from a mistaken conception of the origins of memories. The mistake is to 
assume that the memories have been generated from 'without', rather than 
from 'within'. Certain types of inferences which lack emotional or contextual 
content can 'overlap' with inferences which contain more perceptual and 
emotional content, thus causing confusion to the rememberer regarding the 
origin or 'source' of the memory (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 191. By 
investigating whether the source of a particular memory is a 'recalled' 
experience, or a held belief, source monitoring tests can ascertain whether a 
false memory is phenomenologically experienced, or merely held 
propositionally. The limitations of subjective reports are recognised, resulting 
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in some researchers augmenting these tests with others which yield more 
detail (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), pp 200-201. 
Lampinen et al. concluded that the above results imply that the memory 
process is an interrelated process, rather than a discrete one. Memory 
consists of interconnected components within a framework, each of which, to 
some degree, depends on other components. 108 Lampinen et al. argue that 
while individual memory components cannot be studied directly, they can be 
studied by observation of the framework within which they sit: 
It is perfectly reasonable to draw conclusions based on theoretical frameworks to 
the extent that the framework as a whole is subject to confirmation or 
disconfirmation (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 193. 
Memory as a framework, rather than as a unitary operation, permits the study 
of memory illusions, and of the conditions conducive to their occurrence. This 
supports the view that an atomistic conception of memory is not only false, but, 
given the results of the various studies above, also contrary to the basic 
principles of the memory process itself. 
For Lampinen et al., the value of the above investigation lies in its ability to 
inform and predict the future direction required for further memory illusion 
study. But for the present thesis, the interest lies in the investigation's support 
for the contention that memories, in principle, operate in a predominantly 
holistic fashion. The above studies reveal ways in which memories can be 
influenced and coerced by adjacent mental experiences. The studies show 
that lures can influence persons to mistakenly believe they have already seen 
108 For instance, Lampinen et al. cite short-term memory, attentional capacity, output 
interference, long-term memory, memory strength, and so on. While unobservable, they are 
known to exist due to behaviours which are observable, and due to the explanatory power 
which these components provide (Lampinen, Neuschatz et al. 1998), p 193. 
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previously unpresented words. They also show that the manipulated 
presentation of false material can cause the creation of completely false 
memories. These false memories are not discrete, but are conditioned by 
personal circumstances and concerns. Gist representations can be 
inaccurately remembered, thereby confusing the rememberer regarding the 
source of memories. Gist can also mistakenly be reconstructed and 
experienced phenomenologically as an episodic memory, deceiving the 
rememberer regarding the validity of the memory. Memory illusions appear to 
be an extreme and distorted version of the reconstructive process which 
occurs in normal memory. Illusions appear to be produced by the faulty 
amalgamation of various mental processes, rather than by a single, discrete 
act. These problems show why the verification of a particular memory often 
involves reference to the mental framework to which the memory belongs, 
rather than just to the individual memory itself. The way that false memories 
occur further supports the holistic conception of memory, and adds more 
weight to the case against the possibility of quasi-memory. The view that 
memory is an integrated and interrelated process is further supported by 
investigations of false recognition, across different groups of subjects. 
4.7.2 	False Recognition 
Amnesia researchers investigate the causes of different types of amnesia. 
Factors which assist this research concern rates of false and true recognition. 
Due to damage in medial regions of the temporal lobes and associated 
structures in the diencephalon, amnesics have impaired short-term 
memory. 109 To determine precisely the effect of this damage to memory, 
recognition tests have been carried out. These tests involved comparing 
recognition responses between amnesics and matched control groups. Early 
109The temporal lobes are two of the four lobe divisions of the brain, and are located laterally on 
each side; the diencephalon is the part of the brain located between the two cerebral 
hemispheres and the midbrain (Tortora 1980), pp 407; 615. 
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tests differed in methodology from later tests. Results between earlier and 
later tests concerning the rate of false recognition of the different groups 
differed also. A third test was carried out, to try to isolate the variable factors 
which led to these contrasting results (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), pp 
668-669. 
A general aim of all tests was to detect the rates of true recognition, absence of 
recognition, and false recognition. 110 'False recognition' is the mistaken claim 
that an item has been previously presented, when the former item was merely 
similar. A difference between earlier and later tests was the rate at which this 
occurred. In the first test, amnesics displayed a higher rate of false recognition 
than did controls. In the later tests, the rate of false recognition of amnesics 
was less than that of controls. All tests comprised the presentation of words 
lists, with the instruction to differentiate between words which were presented 
for the first time, and words presented previously. Subjects comprised 
controls and amnesics. The tests included semantically related lures, which, 
in this case, were words not identical with previously presented words, but 
were words semantically related to them (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), 
669-670. 
The first test concerned controls and Korsakoff amnesics. 111 It comprised one 
continuous word list, in which some words were presented once only, and 
other words presented more than once. The subjects' task was to read down 
the list, indicating whether a word was being repeated, or presented for the 
first time. New words were 'signalled' by the presentation of either an 
11 °As it is false recognition which most concerns the present inquiry, reference to the other 
results will not be made. The study is extremely complex, and too lengthy to deal with in full 
here. Referring to one section of the results only in no way distorts that section, or the results as 
a whole. 
111 Korsakoff syndrome is a psychological disorder caused by alcoholism, and involves 'mental 
confusion, hallucinations, and memory losses' (Weiten 1992), p 182. It was thought that 
Korsakoff amnesics might differ from non-Korsakoff amnesics by having damage to frontal lobe 
areas. This extra damage may increase the type of memory deficit experienced, and was thus of 
interest in the third test. 
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associated word, a homophone, or a synonym. 112  If subjects were distracted 
by these lures, they would falsely 'recognise' the new word as having already 
been presented. On the first presentation of a word, subjects designated 
'new', and on subsequent presentations, designated 'old'. The subjects' 
scores thus represented the degree of correct and false recognition which 
occurred. The results of the studies showed that the amnesics had a higher 
level of false recognition than the controls (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), p 
669. 
The second test concerned controls, Korsakoff amnesics, and non-Korsakoff 
amnesics. It consisted of two word lists. The first was studied with the aim of 
memorising as much of it as possible. The second list comprised the 
recognition test. Subjects had to indicate which words on the second list had 
already appeared on the first list. As before, lures were presented. In this test, 
however, amnesics showed less false recognition than did controls. Schacter 
et al. sought to discover the factors behind the variation in results between the 
earlier and the later tests (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), p 669. 
The researchers conjectured that the variation might be attributable to the 
different range of subjects, or to the different details of tests, or possibly both. 
Subjects in the first test comprised controls and Korsakoff amnesics only. 
Subjects in the subsequent tests also included non-Korsakoff amnesics. This 
was relevant, as the extra damage in the frontal lobe suffered by Korsakoff 
amnesics may have been responsible for the poorer retention rate of already 
presented words. If this were the case, it would explain why the results of the 
earlier and later tests were different. The different details between earlier and 
later tests concerned the way in which words were presented for recognition. 
In the first study, new words were signalled by individual lures. Subjects had 
112Associated words might be 'food, eat'; a 'homophone' is a similarly sounding word, such as 
'brake, break'; a 'synonym' is a similarly meaning word, such as 'find, locate'. 
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to remember the individual lures to distinguish between the lures and the 
newly-presented words. For controls, this involved remembering single items, 
which could feasibly be done by means of episodic memory. This would be 
manageable for controls, but due to their incomplete memory mechanism, 
difficult for amnesics. Hence, controls showed a better rate (that is, less) of 
false recognition than amnesics. In the second test, however, the words to be 
repeated were presented on a preliminary list, rather than 'mixed in' with the 
test words. Hence, the ability to detect a repeated word depended, not on a 
lure which had just been presented separately, but on remembering whether a 
lure had been presented on a previous list. For controls, the previous list 
would have been too much to encode as individual episodic memories, and 
would therefore have been predominantly encoded as 'gist'. But gist, being 
less specific than episodic memory, would be more vulnerable to deception 
from lures, and thus more likely to generate false recognition, such as for 
example, mismatching a later word 'food' with the earlier word 'eat'. Due to 
impaired functioning, amnesics encode less gist than healthy controls, and 
therefore have less gist available to mismatch. The task then, for Schacter et 
al., was to find out the cause of the discrepancy between the results of the 
earlier and later tests (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), pp 669-670. 
To investigate this issue, Schacter et al. devised a third test. Locating the 
relevant differences between the two earlier studies required recognising the 
above variation in both subjects and test details. Strategies were devised to 
illuminate the differences in performance between non-Korsakoff and 
Korsakoff amnesics, and the differences caused by test variations. Subjects 
were Korsakoff amnesics, non-Korsakoff amnesics, and matched controls. 
The strategy involved the initial presentation of six study lists. Following the 
study of these lists, subjects were presented with a recognition test, which 
included new words, words from the study list, semantically-related lures, and 
165 
non-semantically related lures. The procedure of studying lists, followed by 
testing was repeated, with a total of five tests being conducted (Schacter, 
Verfaellie et al. 1998), pp 669-670. 
Schacter et al. predicted that repeated exposure to the lists would facilitate the 
operation of episodic memory in controls, producing decreasing rates of false 
recognition in each test. They predicted that the defective memory 
mechanisms of Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesics would inhibit the use of 
episodic memory, thereby preventing the progressive improvement of false 
recognition rates. They reasoned that false recognition in amnesics resulted 
from the degeneration of semantic gist, rather than from unsuccessful attempts 
to use episodic memory. If this was correct, tests which permitted the build-up 
of episodic memory in healthy controls, but which, due to the impairment of 
memory mechanisms, could not cause the same build-up in amnesics, would 
show that the rates of false recognition would decrease (that is, improve) in 
controls, but would fail to decrease in amnesics. Schacter et al. conjectured 
that the extra damage to frontal lobe areas in Korsakoff amnesics, as opposed 
to non-Korsakoff amnesics, might be also relevant. If these differences were 
relevant, they would show up by Korsakoff amnesics having an initially high 
rate of false recognition in comparison to controls, rather than merely one 
which deteriorated across trials (Schacter, Verfaellie et al. 1998), pp 669-670. 
The results from the tests verified much of what had been proposed. Non-
Korsakoff amnesics initially showed less false recognition than Korsakoff 
amnesics, although this difference lessened as the trials progressed. The 
levels of false recognition of non-Korsakoff amnesics steadily increased 
across trials, resulting in a crossover with the rate of Korsakoff amnesics. The 
increasing levels of false recognition in Korsakoff amnesics was attributed to 
the deterioration of cumulative gist representations. Mixed results comprising 
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non-Korsakoff and Korsakoff amnesics showed them to initially have slightly 
less false recognition than healthy controls. Mixed groups of non-Korsakoff 
and Korsakoff amnesics showed less improvement in false recognition across 
trials than healthy controls. The difference in results between non-Korsakoff 
and Korsakoff amnesics was probably caused by several factors and requires 
more testing, although the extra damage to frontal lobe areas in Korsakoff 
amnesics was probably a factor. Healthy controls showed decreasing levels 
of false recognition across trials. This was attributed to cumulative 
improvements in explicit recollection as trials progressed. In general, data 
was consistent with that of previous trials conducted by Schacter et al. 
concerning rates of reduced false recognition in both amnesic subgroups. 
As in the previous studies, the impact of these results for researchers lies in 
the results' predictive power for future research, but for the present discussion, 
the results are relevant to the coherence of memory. They show that the 
coherence of particular memories is tied to, and constrained by factors which, 
while adjacent to particular memory experiences, are yet integral to them. 
Results concerning all three groups brought out the difference in the episodic 
memory operation of each. In each case, factors outside the particular 
memory were found to be influential. For example, healthy control groups 
demonstrated less false recognition across trials due to the increased 
rehearsal of mental items. The improved episodic memory counteracted the 
influence of lures, resulting in improved recognition rates. Non-Korsakoff 
amnesics demonstrated increased rates of false recognition due to the 
retention of gist, which, influenced by impaired recall, misled them - much like 
the case of naive healthy controls during the initial tests. And finally, the 
initially higher level of false recognition in Korsakoff than in non-Korsakoff 
amnesics demonstrated their impaired memory functions, regardless of 
contamination, either by lures, or by faultily recalled gist. In each instance, 
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memory operation was influenced and circumscribed by the conditions in 
which the memory experience occurred. In no instance did the memories 
appear to operate discretely, nor were they unaffected by other memories, or 
other circumstantial influences. 
These test results show that even misremembering is not an atomistic, 
unattached mental occurrence, but is one which is influenced by surrounding 
and influential factors. The results show that even false memories are 
attached to other memories and other mental states. It appears that not only 
are genuine memories unlike quasi-memories, but that false memories are 
unlike them also. Like genuine memories, false memories demonstrate the 
holistic nature of memory, and its ability to be affected, influenced, and in 
some instances, obstructed by the circumstances and concerns within which it 
occurs. Indeed, the above studies indicate that not only is memory influenced 
by the surrounding circumstances and concerns of the rememberer, but that 
these circumstances and concerns are often part of the memory itself. This 
provides further evidence against the atomistic conception of memory entailed 
in quasi-memory, and the possibility that memories could be characterised in 
the way required by the psychological continuity criterion, particularly as it 
relates to Relation R. If the commitment to Relation R is dependent on the 
success of quasi-memory, it is now evident that this commitment cannot be 
sustained. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has assessed Relation R's commitment to an atomistic and 
impersonal characterisation of mental states. This commitment is necessary to 
meet Relation R's causal requirements, namely, psychological continuity with 
any cause. Psychological continuity with any cause is only possible on an 
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atomistic characterisation of mental states, as normal causation requires 
reference to other mental items, and ultimately to ownership. I have argued 
that the characterisation of mental states required by Relation R misrepresents 
the mind's structure and mode of operation, and consequently, is 
unsustainable. I have also argued that minds are predominantly holistic in 
structure and functioning, and correspondingly, are individuated by 
ownership. To defend my claims, I have explored psychological atomism and 
psychological holism from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. This 
has involved a consideration of quasi-memory and an investigation of genuine 
memory. 
The exploration of quasi-memory shows it to be a faulty strategy, as it fails to 
represent the structure and operation of genuine memory experiences. Quasi-
memory fails to cohere, either with other memories, or with the experiences 
from which these 'memories' first arise. Work considered from Davidson and 
Malpas shows how the intelligibility of a particular mental state or memory 
depends, at least in part, on its place in an integrated network of other similar 
mental states. It is only by belonging to that network that the state has 
meaning, and can be identified as the particular state that it is. This fact 
supports the view that mental states are individually owned and are 
identifiable as those of a particular, individual person. 
The consideration of memory theories and memory research further supports 
the claims of this chapter. As memory theories have evolved, they have 
become more aware of memory's holistic structure, and of the fact that 
memories do not occur in isolation from other memories, or other mental items. 
Research into memory has shown that memory operates in a dynamic and 
reconstructive manner, and is informed by the original event, its storage 
conditions, and its recall conditions. This applies whether memory operation 
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is normal or aberrant. These findings do not support the atomistic 
characterisation of memory. They show that merely an appeal to particular 
memories or small sets of memories cannot can assist in the elucidation of 
personal identity, since this merely shifts the problem of the unity of the person 
to the unity of mental states. 
Indeed, the above findings support psychological holism. They support the 
claim that memories are not isolated mental events, but are part of a network 
of similar events. In view of these findings, it difficult to conceive how a 
discrete or impersonal account of memory could be defended. The integrally 
related interplay of factors which characterises memory experiences indicates 
that memories are predominantly holistically constructed, and consequently, 
are unique to their owners, and to the times and occasions at which they 
occur. In addition to its inability to account for the relations between mental 
states, the psychological continuity also has difficulty in accounting for the 
relation between the mind and the body. This topic is dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 5 Indiscrete Bodies 
5.1 	Introduction 
It should already be evident from the discussion in the previous two chapters 
that the psychological continuity criterion is inadequate to account for certain 
aspects of mental content, such as how mental content relates to external 
objects, and how mental content maintains its internal structure. Further 
investigation shows that the psychological continuity criterion is similarly 
inadequate to account for the mind-body relation. According to the 
psychological continuity criterion, although persons typically have bodies, 
particular bodies are incidental to particular sets of mental states. Whether a 
person has one body or a completely different body is irrelevant to a person's 
mental life. It is taken to follow from this that because mental life is tied to 
personal identity, particular bodies have no relevance to personal identity 
either. One consequence of this view is that although mental life and personal 
identity are always accompanied by the body, they are not tied to any 
particular body. This conception of the mind-body relation can be seen from 
the psychological continuity criterion's view that psychological continuity 
arises essentially from brains or brain parts, to the exclusion of other body 
parts. The restriction of personal identity to the brain arises from the view that 
personal identity is grounded in causal connectedness between mental states, 
regardless of the type of cause which holds or the type of mental content 
involved. According to Parfit's thought experiments, the supposed separation 
of brains and bodies is taken to show that psychological continuity is 
maintained in the brain rather than in the body, and consequently, that 
personal identity is also maintained in the brain rather than in the body. In this 
chapter, I will argue that this view misconceives the relation between the body 




Excluding the body as a condition of personal identity is consistent with the 
psychological continuity criterion's reductionist, atomistic conception of 
personal identity. This conception treats the elements that compose personal 
identity as if these elements were discrete and independent of each other. 
Minds and brains are treated as if they were independent the body. It is 
assumed that a person's mind would be substantially unaltered if the person's 
brain was removed from the body of which it is part, and then placed into a 
different body. Thought experiments which discuss brain bisections and brain 
transfers treat these brains and brain parts atomisticly, as if they would operate 
in precisely the same way after the transfers had occurred. According to this 
conception of the mind-body relation, the body itself has no input to personal 
identity, and therefore, when changes in a person's embodiment are 
supposed to occur, personal identity is taken to be unaltered. 
In contrast to this atomistic conception of the body and personal identity, I 
present a holistic view of the body's relation to personal identity, which, while 
acknowledging the connection between the mind and the brain, also 
acknowledges the connection between the mind and the body. The holistic 
views conceives of the brain as an integral part of the body, rather as some 
sort of 'add-on extra' which can be arbitrarily removed or swapped. This view 
recognises the actual relation which exists between the brain and the body, 
rather than postulating one which is artificial and contrary to reality. Brains are 
not objects discrete from the body, but are an important part of the body, such 
that they are affected by the particular body of which they are part. This is an 
important point in this debate, as it is assumed that putting brains in different 
bodies would bring no change to mental life; however, when it is realised that 
mental life is a product of the brain-body unit, rather than just of the brain, it 
becomes evident that this is not the case. Many bodily functions affect mental 
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life, as can be seen when the brain's relation to the rest of the body is better 
appreciated. These points, which will be developed in this chapter, make it 
evident that it is not merely the qualitative identity of one's body that is relevant 
to personal identity, but that it is the numerical identity of one's body which is 
at issue. Because, as will be shown, the development and functioning of the 
mind is intimately tied up with the development and functioning of the body, 
the separation of them, suggested by psychological continuity theorists, 
actually makes no sense. 
Brains are integrally connected to all parts of the body on a number of levels, 
ranging from the minute cellular level, to the level of the body's major systems. 
There are eleven of these systems, and the brain is crucial to the operation of 
each of them. 113 The brain itself is part of the body's nervous system. The 
nervous system is the body's major means of communication and control, and 
is extensive and complex. Its two main subdivisions are the central nervous 
system and the peripheral nervous system. Major components of the central 
nervous system include the brain and spinal cord, while those of the 
peripheral nervous system are the afferent system and the efferent system, 
comprised respectively of afferent and efferent neurones. The efferent system 
conveys impulses to the central nervous system from the body's extremities, 
while the afferent system conveys impulses in the reverse direction (Tortora 
1980), pp 362-433. The main purposes of the nervous system are to maintain 
(with the endocrine system) homeostasis, 114 and to stimulate movement. This 
is effected by sensing and interpreting changes in the body, and initiating the 
appropriate action (Tortora 1980), pp 362-368. 
113The body has eleven major systems, whose operations jointly keep the body alive and 
functioning. While each system operates independently, each system's operation is crucially 
influenced by the operations of the others. These systems are: the Integumentary, Muscular, 
Skeletal, Digestive, Cardiovascular, Lymphatic, Respiratory, Endocrine, Nervous, Urinary, and 
Reproductive systems (Tortora 1980), pp 80-86; 214-242; 92-94. 
114'Homeostasis' refers to the state of stability within an organism. 
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Through its operation within the nervous system, the brain is connected to, 
and influenced by the body's other systems. For example, the circulatory 
system runs throughout the whole body, including the brain. Nutrients, drugs, 
poisons, or any other substances which circulate through the body, also 
circulate through the brain, and affect the brain accordingly. Similarly, the 
body's other systems affect, influence, and contribute to the life and operation 
of the brain, and the brain likewise contributes to the life and operation of 
these other systems, and through them contributes to and maintains life in all 
parts of the body. This means that the operation of the brain, and the extent of 
its capacities, is intimately and directly tied to the body of which the brain is 
part. It follows from this that the mental life which we associate with the brain 
is actually a product of the whole body, rather than just of the brain. 
Understanding this connection between the body and mental life is crucial to 
the personal identity debate, because it makes evident the important point that 
the particular body which one has is a factor in the type of mental life that one 
has. It is not just the case that the body is connected to mental life and that's 
that. It is the more particular point that which body one has makes a difference 
to the mental life that one has. Understanding this integral connection 
between the body and mental life makes it evident that because mental life is 
so intimately tied to personal identity, the body is inevitably tied to personal 
identity also. This conception of personal identity conceives of bodily identity 
as an essential feature of personal identity, rather than one which is merely 
incidental to it. 
Normal recognition procedures support the view that bodily identity is 
commonly taken as a major determinant of personal identity. In the normal 
course of events, it is by means of physical characteristics that we identify 
each other. When we encounter each other in our homes or work-places, we 
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recognise these physical characteristics because they are accessible to us, 
and because we are familiar with them. They are the natural means by which 
we know and recognise each other. In situations where these normal 
recognition procedures may be unavailable, or where they may need 
checking, the body provides the unique identity-determining characteristics of 
DNA and fingerprints. 116 These features are standarly accepted as being 
identity-determining, as being unique to each person, and as not being 
duplicable (Norton and Esposito 1994), p 141; P 781. 116 
Physical characteristics are also important to self-recognition. Knowing who 
we are, recognising ourselves as ourselves, and knowing how we feel about 
ourselves is very much tied to our bodies. 117 We have an instinctive sense of 
our selves as being persons with particular bodies, and not just as having any 
body. Imagine that if you could never be sure that you would wake up with the 
same body, or that you had no sense of what your body was like, what it 
looked like, or what it felt like, or how big or small it was, would your sense of 
yourself be the same as it is now? It seems to me that without the sense of our 
bodies as particular bodies, our sense of ourselves would be very much 
depleted, and somewhat strange. 
The psychological continuity criterion does not recognise this integral 
connection between the body and personal identity. It assumes that the brain 
and body swapping which occurs in thought experiments can tell us 
something about personal identity in real life. But the brain and body 
115 'DNA' is the organic chemical whose complex molecular structure codes genetic information 
for the transmission of inherited traits. 'DNA' refers to Deoxyribonucleic acid. Its 'unique 
structure confers great stability, allowing it to act as a template for the production, or replication, 
of new DNA molecules or of a related molecule, RNA (ribonucleic acid) which mediates the 
synthesis of proteins by the cell' (Norton and Esposito 1994), p 140. A more precise 
description is difficult here as it is complex and lengthy. Sufficient for our purposes here is that it 
is a unique genetic marker. Fingerprints are impressions made by the ridges on the ends of 
fingers. 
116DNA and fingerprints are unique even to identical twins. 
117Bodily self-awareness and self-knowledge is dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. 
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swapping which goes on in thought experiments does not occur in real life. 
There is no reason to assume that the kind of identity changes described in 
these scenarios would occur in the way supposed. But what we can know is 
that the whole idea of personal identity disconnected from bodily identity is 
totally impracticable and unworkable. If we could not, as a general principle, 
rely on physical features to identify each other, personal, family, social, and 
other relations would be totally disrupted and unmanageable. 118 Think about 
it. If you could not rely on physical features as a means of person 
identification, you could never know for sure that the persons with whom you 
interacted in the normal course of events really were the persons you took 
them to be. Without bodily identity, you would be supposed to rely on the 
amount of 'psychological connectedness' in persons' minds to know who 
these persons were. But it is a mystery how you could discover what this 
amount was. How could you measure the amount of psychological 
connectedness present in a person's mind, and how could you know if was 
the right amount? The problem here, then, is not just that we should change 
our recognition procedures, but rather that we could not change these 
procedures. Without bodily recognition as a prime determiner of personal 
identity, we could never be sure who we were with, or who we even were 
ourselves. Physical features are, in most normal circumstances, absolutely 
essential to our interactions with each other, to our identification of each other, 
and to our identification of ourselves. 
The body's role in mental life also supports the view that bodily identity is 
intimately tied to personal identity. As shown in Chapter 3, minds are not 
internally constituted, but are constructed in relation to certain external 
1180f course, mistakes in identification can be, and often are, made. But these mistakes are 
made against a background in which most identifications we make in the course of our lives are 
correct. Making a few mistakes is not the same thing as living in a world in which one could not, 
in general, rely on bodily identification, especially in the case of close relatives and friends. In 
spite of its lack of total certainty in all instances, unless we could rely on bodily identification, 
normal life and relationships would be unworkable. 
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features. Recall that these features relate to our Umwelt, and concern the 
'functional cycle', in which the immediate environment, survival needs, 
perceptual apparatus, and activity are understood as a 'systematic whole', that 
is, as an interrelated and mutually supportive set of factors, in which an 
organism's perceptual response initiates its activity, and in which its activity 
influences and defines its perceptual response. 119 For humans, the functional 
cycle is tied to both the body and the mind. The particular body one has 
determines one's survival needs, perceptual responses, activities and so on, 
such that were one to have a different body, these things would be different 
also. And our particular perceptual responses form the basis of our thoughts, 
such that if our perceptual responses were different, our thoughts would also 
be different. Through our perceptual responses there is thus an integral 
relation between the particular body one has and the particular mind that one 
has. And because personal identity is intimately tied to particular minds, it is at 
the same time intimately tied to particular bodies. The relevance of individual 
bodies to individual sets of mental states will become more apparent as this 
chapter progresses. 
The claim that the body is irrelevant to personal identity is not an accidental 
feature of the psychological continuity criterion. If psychological continuity was 
recognised as a product of the whole body, rather than just of the brain, then 
the characterisation of psychological continuity independently of bodily 
continuity could not be made, and thus, personal identity could not be 
characterised solely in terms of psychological states, to the exclusion of bodily 
states. In other words, the arbitrary separation of mental states and bodily 
states could not be proposed if the holistic structure of the body was 
recognised, and if the integral relation between mental states and the whole 
body, rather than just the brain, was taken into account. Due to this integral 
119See Chapter 3.5. 
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relation between body, mental life, and personal identity, I will argue that the 
neglect of the body in the account of personal identity by the psychological 
continuity criterion produces misleading conclusions about the relation 
between personal identity and the body. I will also argue that due to its 
influence on mental life, the body is decisively involved in psychological 
continuity, and correspondingly, also in personal identity. To further argue this 
case, I will first examine some thought experiments in which brains and bodies 
become separated from each other. I will then consider some examples of 
brain-body interaction, and ways in which this interaction impacts on the 
relation between bodily identity and personal identity. 
5.2 Irrelevant Bodies 
The psychological continuity criterion's neglect of the body begins with the 
criterion's particular formulation. By characterising personal identity as 
holding in 'overlapping chains of psychological connectedness', to the 
exclusion of bodily connectedness, the relevance of embodiment to personal 
identity is overlooked. While this does not mean that persons are taken to be 
disembodied entities, it does mean that the body's role in personal identity is 
not taken into account. This neglect of the body implies that the body is not 
essential to the identification or reidentification of persons, or to the realisation 
of psychological continuity. Parfit's representation of the relation between 
bodies, brains, and minds, is particularly problematic in this regard. Bodies 
are treated as silent partners in the realisation of psychological states. Brains 
are treated as discrete and malleable items, capable of dissection, 
manipulation, and re-embodiment, without any significant disruption to a 
person's continuing psychology. This implies that neither the identity of the 
body, or of its parts, is significant to personal identity. 
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The rift between bodily identity and personal identity mirrors a division within 
the Lockean characterisation of personal identity from which the psychological 
continuity criterion descends. Locke holds that bodily continuity consists in the 
continuity of organic matter, whereas personal continuity consists in the 
continuity of rationality and consciousness. Locke distinguishes between 
substance, body, and person: 
It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will 
determine it in every case; but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider 
what idea the word it is applied to stands for: it being one thing to be the same 
substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and 
substance, are three names standing for three different ideas;- for such as is the 
idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity; which, if it had been a little 
more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that 
confusion which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, 
especially concerning personal identity, which therefore we shall in the next place a 
little consider (Locke 1959), 2.27.8. 
Persons and bodies normally occur together, but according to Locke, may not 
always do so. Locke cites the case of a 'rational parrot' which was able to 
converse as competently as any human person. Locke then proposes that 
persons are essentially rational, psychological beings (Locke 1959), 2.27.9- 
11. Because human psychological characteristics are not held to depend on 
particular bodies, it is assumed that the body is incidental to personal identity. 
Subsequent psychological continuity theories, such as Parfit's, inherit this 
characteristic by disregarding the body in personal identity accounts, and 
consequently, denying that bodily identity is relevant to personal identity. 
5.3 Disembodied Memories 
The psychological continuity criterion's disdain for the body is evident in its 
various thought experiments, in which brains are dissected and transferred to 
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different bodies. In these thought experiments, the quality of a mental 
experience associated with a particular brain part is taken to be unaltered, 
even though the brain part concerned is removed from its original location, 
and placed into the skull of a different person. The earlier thought experiment 
concerning Jane and Paul is an example of this type of scenario. 120 Recall 
that this thought experiment involves the transfer of a small part of Paul's brain 
into the skull of Jane. Subsequent to this transfer, Jane is supposedly able to 
experience Paul's memories. Jane is supposed to remember events such as 
walking across marble paving, hearing bird-cries, and shaving. It is taken that 
a person with one body is able to 'remember' events experienced by a person 
with a different body. According to this scenario, although these memories are 
first-person memories, they are unaffected by their different embodiment. This 
view implies that although the body is involved in experience, it plays no 
specific role in experience. If the body was recognised as a specific factor of a 
person's experiences, it would be acknowledged when considering the 
person's ability to remember such experiences. The relevance of particular 
bodies to experiences and memories becomes clearer when we reconsider 
the Jane-Paul case. 
In this scenario, we are told that Jane has first-person memories of events 
which were experienced by Paul. First-person memories are memories in 
which one remembers one's own self performing an action, rather than 
remembering someone else performing it. These actions are remembered 
from a first-perspective on the world, which means, not only from the 
perspective of one's own mind, but also, from the perspective of one's own 
body. It is difficult, as we saw earlier, to conceive how one person could have 
first-person memories of events experienced by a different person. For 
example, when I remember myself walking, my memory has a first-person 
1201he Jane and Paul thought experiment is referred to in Chapter 4.3. 
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quality, which means that I remember it from the point of view of my body. It is 
specifically from the standpoint of my body that I see, feel, hear, and interact 
with the world. There is thus something very odd in the idea the Jane could 
have first-person memories of events experienced by Paul, when she does not 
have Paul's body. We need to consider more closely what this could mean. 
The transferred memories consist of various physical activities which were 
performed by Paul, but remembered by Jane. As Jane did not perform the 
activities in question, her ability to remember doing so, however, cannot be 
taken for granted. For example, Jane is supposed to remember walking 
across marble paving. But if Jane was physically different to Paul, say much 
shorter, or much heavier, it is difficult to see how her memory could be from 
Paul's perspective, or could have the same quality as Paul's memory. This 
problem becomes more obvious if we consider how Jane might remember 
walking if she was a paraplegic, or born without legs. Having never walked, it 
is difficult to know how she would be capable of 'remembering' walking. Her 
legs and other body parts would never have been engaged in the way 
required. Of course she could imagine what it felt like, but this would hardly 
qualify as a memory, and there is no guarantee that her imagination could 
match the reality. 
Jane is also supposed to remember the cries of gulls in exactly the same way 
as Paul had heard them, and as he would have remembered them. Again, we 
might wonder how Jane could do this if she was born deaf, and had never 
heard sound before. How would she even know what 'sound' was, or be able 
to know that the 'sound' in her memory was the cries of gulls? And finally, the 
shaving episode is intriguing, as it is difficult to see how Jane could remember 
shaving, when she does not have the face that was shaved, or even a face 
which has ever been shaved. The memory is supposed to be a first person 
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memory, but it is difficult to see how a memory of Paul's chin could be a first 
person memory, or how a memory of shaving Jane's own chin could qualify as 
'Paul's memory'. If Jane and Paul's bodies were similar, and if their habits 
and behaviours were very much alike, it is conceivable that their memories 
could have some similarity. But if there were significant differences between 
their bodies or their behaviours, it is difficult to conceive how their memories 
could be alike, or, in some instances, even recognisable. Notice here also 
that the role of the body in memory means that the change in bodily identity 
renders questionable the continuity in identity of memory. 
The problem with this thought experiment is that it fails to recognise the role of 
the body in mental life. In failing to recognise this role, it misses two important 
points concerning experience. The first concerns the first-person perspective 
of experience. The failure to include the body in the account of mental states 
leaves the first-person perspective inadequately defined. A more adequate 
appreciation of the first-person perspective indicates that it makes no sense to 
claim that one person could remember the experiences of a different person. 
The second point concerns bodily differences. The thought experiment leaves 
no place to account for bodily differences, and for the fact that particular 
bodies are tied to particular sets of mental states, such were a person's body 
to be different, that person's mental states would be different also. This 
indicates that bodily identity is indeed a fact in the identity of mental states. 
These two points are explained in more detail. 
The first-person perspective of an experience is the perspective of the person 
who has the experience, or, in other words, the experience from the point of 
view of the experiencing subject. Coinciding with the first-person perspective 
is the sense of ownership. As explained earlier, this sense of ownership does 
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not come separately from the experience itself. 121 Knowing that an 
experience is mine is synonymous with knowing that the experience occurs 
from my point of view. This point of view coincides with the location activities, 
structure, capacities, and so on, of my particular body, as opposed to those of 
a different body. Thus, having a first-person perspective of an experience 
coincides with knowing that I engaged in that experience with my body. 
If experience requires a point of view, it follows that the memories of 
experiences also require a point of view. When I remember an incident, I do 
so from the perspective from which I experienced that incident. It would make 
no sense to say that I remembered it from the point of view of your experience, 
rather than from the point of view of my own experience. Thus, just as 
experiences are in part defined by viewpoints and ownership, so also are the 
memories of experiences. It follows from this that if bodies are implicated in 
the viewpoint of experience, they are also implicated in the viewpoints of 
memories. Just as I experience an incident from the viewpoint of my body, I 
also experience the memory of that incident from the viewpoint of my body. In 
view of this, there is something very odd in the idea that I could remember the 
experiences of a person with a different body, as if these experiences were my 
own. What exactly does this mean? Does it mean that I mistakenly remember 
myself doing something, which in fact I did not do? Or does it mean that I 
remember someone else doing something? If it is the first, it is a mistaken 
memory, a delusion, false belief, hallucination, or similar, but by definition, is 
not a genuine memory. If it is the second, it is not by definition a first-person 
memory of myself performing an action, but of someone else performing that 
action. It simply is not possible to have it both ways. I cannot both know that 
an experience was had by someone other than myself, and simultaneously 
claim to remember myself having the experience. How can I both admit to not 
121This point was discussed earlier, see Chapter 4.4. 
183 
having had an experience, and at the same time as claim to remember having 
had it? This is incoherent, and makes no sense whatsoever. 
The second problem with this thought experiment is that in failing to account 
for the role of any particular body, it fails to recognise that because all bodies 
are different, their contribution to mental life is also different. 122 Each body 
has its own set of experiences. These experiences are defined by various 
elements, such as the composition, structure, activities, location, relationships, 
and so on of the particular body concerned. Correspondingly, the mental life 
of each person is tied to, and indeed, constructed by these same elements. 
Thus, the set of elements which comprise the experiences, and hence the 
mental life, of a particular individual person are not the same as those which 
comprise the experiences and mental life of a different individual person. It 
makes no sense, therefore, to assume that the mental life of one individual 
would be remain unaltered if that individual were to have a different body. In 
summary, the theoretical separation of brain and body, exemplified in this 
thought experiment, incurs metaphysical consequences concerning the 
relation between experience and embodiment which cannot be sustained. 
The incoherence of brain-body separation is supported by Marya 
Schechtman. Schechtman recognises that the interaction that occurs 
between the body and the brain is an important factor in any experience. 
Schechtman claims that understanding any mental functioning includes 
knowing what occurs in the body as well as in the brain. Both physiology and 
psychology, not to mention common sense, demonstrate that: 
122This point is not overturned by the claim that identical twins have qualitatively identical 
bodies. Right from birth, the perspective and interactions with the world of one twin is distinct 
and separate from that of the other. These differences become manifest in the body of each 
twin, such that the composition, structure, and appearance of each twin continues throughout 
life to differ from that of the other. 
it is virtually never the brain alone which is active in mental life. The brain is in 
constant interaction with the rest of the body, and the physiological understanding 
of mental functions almost inevitably involves not only an understanding of what is 
happening in the brain, but in the entire feedback loop between the brain and 
peripheral systems (Schechtman 1997), p 152. 
In cases where injuries supposedly leave the mind unaffected, but the body 
damaged, such as when vision or hearing are impaired, experience is 
drastically affected and mental functioning is also altered accordingly. 
Schechtman argues that rather than regarding mental activity as confined to 
the brain, we should recognise it as a product of the entire body, and of factors 
beyond the body, such as the immediate environment. She refers to this as 
the 'distributed view'. The distributed view recognises that the body and the 
environment are implicated in the mind, as opposed to the 'standard' view, 
which holds that the mind is located entirely in the brain. Schechtman claims 
that in denying recognition of the brain's external factors, the standard view 
presupposes a self 'inherited from Cartesian dualism - a psychological -subject 
living inside of a body' (Schechtman 1997), pp 151-153. Schechtman argues 
that in neglecting the body's relevance to personal identity, much 
contemporary literature on the topic is based on little more than speculation: 
Virtually the whole of the contemporary literature on personal identity turns around 
puzzle cases in which the brain is manipulated in some way or another - if not 
transplanted then bisected, or altered bit by bit. It is absolutely crucial to these 
discussions that the brain be considered the locus of the psychological subject. 
This means that the whole of the modern personal identity literature rests on a 
questionable set of assumptions (Schechtman 1997), p 160. 
That the psychological continuity criterion rests on such a weak foundation is 
often missed by personal identity theorists. But as shown above, in neglecting 
to acknowledge the body's influence on mental states, the psychological 
continuity criterion overlooks an important influential and constraining factor of 
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mental life, and consequently, and important factor in the realisation of 
personal identity. 
5.4 The Unity of Consciousness 
Another kind of thought experiment which involves discontinuity between the 
body and the brain is based on brain bisection surgery. Brain bisection is a 
surgical procedure used to control epilepsy, in which the fibres between the 
right and the left brain hemispheres are severed (commissurotomy). 
Following one cited example of this surgery, a person was claimed to draw a 
pipe with one hand, while writing the word 'pencil' with the other. In another 
example, a person was claimed to have pushed his wife away with the left 
hand, while his right hand embraced her. Parfit claims that these and similar 
responses indicate that two separate streams of consciousness are present in 
a single-bodied individual (Parfit 1984), pp 245-246. If each stream of 
consciousness is taken to represent a separate, individual person, this would 
mean that two persons were present in the one body. If two persons could be 
present in a single body, this would support the case that bodily identity is not 
tied to personal identity. Parfit's extrapolates from these examples to further 
this case. 
Based on the above argument, Parfit imagines that he is fitted with a device 
which prevents the two hemispheres of his brain from communicating with 
each other. The operation of this device supposedly allows him to divide his 
mind into two separate streams of consciousness. With each stream unaware 
of the other, he could work separately on exam problems, reuniting his mind at 
will. Parfit claims that each stream would experience a unified consciousness, 
as this is what happens in actual cases: 
And it is a fact that people with disconnected hemispheres have two separate 
streams of consciousness - two series of thoughts and experiences, in having each 
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of which they are unaware of having the other. Each of these two streams 
separately displays unity of consciousness (Parfit 1984), p 247. 
Expanding his example, Parfit imagines that it is possible to divide a brain 
many times, resulting in many branches of consciousness emanating from a 
single, individual person. Each brain part is placed into a different body, 
allowing one 'person' to become many 'persons'. The survival of these 
'persons' is unaffected by their different embodiments. But because non-
branching psychological continuity is violated, personal identity is overturned, 
and, as a result, becomes meaningless. Par-fit argues that because personal 
identity loses value in this way, having more concern for oneself than one has 
for persons other than oneself is irrational. He also argues that even if he 
were himself to have surgery which would destroy his own psychological 
continuity, and his life would become 'worse than nothing', he could not justify 
egoistically based concern. Because his belief that the resulting person would 
still be him is unjustified, so also is the precedence of self-concern over other-
concern. Parfit argues that whether the future person is him, or whether it is 
someone else makes no difference as to whether he should care about what 
happens. He holds that neither split psychology, nor altered bodily continuity 
has any relevant impact on personal identity. These factors are not significant 
when speculating on 'what happens' when persons 'divide'. If asked why the 
brain was singled out from other body parts, Parfit would reply: 
Because the brain is the carrier of psychological continuity, or Relation R. If this is 
why the brain is singled out, the continuity of the brain would not matter when it was 
not the carrier or Relation R. The continuity of the brain would here be no more 
important than the continuity of any other part of the body. And the continuity of 
these other parts does not matter at all (Parfit 1984), p 284. 
Part it claims that physical continuity is the least important element in a 
person's continued existence, as it is outweighed by features such as 
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relations, achievements, and other psychological factors. He claims that the 
body is irrelevant to personal identity, and is, therefore, also irrelevant to these 
concerns (Parfit 1984), pp 245-284. If, however, personal identity is ultimately 
meaningless, it is unclear how an individual's relations and achievements 
could have any meaning, or indeed, to whom or what they could mean 
anything to. 
A major problem with this thought experiment is that the foundation on which it 
is based is faulty. Parfit bases much of his argument on the view that 
commissurotomies produce two streams of consciousness in a single-bodied 
individual. This claim is not only incorrect, but is also incoherent. While it is 
true that some researchers initially proposed that two fields of consciousness 
may result from brain bisections, this view has since been modified. 123 
Gazzaniga is an example of one researcher whose views have changed in 
this regard. Early researchers in this field became aware that the co-ordinated 
functioning of the right and left hemispheres becomes disrupted following 
brain bisection surgery. Gazzaniga initially considered that this disruption 
means that two distinct conscious mental spheres have been produced: 
With it sectioned, the two halves become two different conscious mental spheres, 
each with its own experienced base and control system for behavioral operations. 
Just as conjoined twins are two different people sharing a common body, the 
callosum-sectioned human has two separate conscious spheres sharing a common 
brain stem, head, and body (Gazzaniga 1970), p 1. 
Subsequent to more considered research, however, Gazzaniga and others 
deny that altered mental functioning means that consciousness is actually 
split. Rather, these researchers recognise that following brain bisection 
surgery, the processing of information between the two hemispheres of the 
123 For a report on this original surgery, see: (Gazzaniga 1970). 
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brain is disrupted, but that this does not imply that two separate streams of 
consciousness are present. In one example in which objects were flashed in 
the left visual field, but in which the presence of objects was verbally denied, 
researchers conclude that the ability to manually retrieve these objects means 
that both hemispheres were aware of the objects' presence, even though the 
subject concerned could not verbalise this awareness: 
clearly, the right half-brain knew the answer, because it reacted appropriately to the 
correct stimulus. That each half-brain could process information outside the realm 
of awareness of the other raised the intriguing possibility that the mechanisms of 
consciousness were doubly represented following brain bisection. The 
implications of this controversial possibility were far-reaching and attracted the 
interest of philosophers and scientists alike. However, while the conscious 
properties of the talking hemisphere were apparent, the view that the mute 
hemisphere was also deserving of conscious status was widely criticized and 
generally rejected. Consequently, subsequent studies focused on elucidating the 
nature of information processing in the right hemisphere (Gazzaniga and Le Doux 
1978), p5. 
Gazzaniga claims that some early responses to brain bisections were 
misunderstood, leading to 'overdramatized accounts of the uniqueness of 
mind left and mind right', and to 'pop versions of hemisphere function[ing]' 
(Gazzaniga and Le Doux 1978), p 6. He also claims that in many cases, 
these errors were made by persons who had no first-hand knowledge of the 
patients involved. 
When considered in more detail, the notion of 'split consciousness' itself is 
inherently problematic. It is difficult to even conceive of what it could mean. 
For example, how could a person ever know that she had two separate 'fields' 
of consciousness'? If the fields were separate, it would not be possible, when 
experiencing one field, to know that the other one existed. If you did know 
such a thing, the 'other field' would not be separate, but would be part of the 
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one you were currently experiencing. While Parfit's argument supposedly 
addresses the issue of the first-person viewpoint, in fact, it does not do so. A 
first-person viewpoint corresponds with, and is defined by, a single stream of 
consciousness, from the perspective of a particular body. It is thus incoherent 
to propose that there could be two streams of consciousness, and thus, two 
different first-person viewpoints, emanating from one, single body. 124 
More recent studies, such as those of Grant Gillett, also question Parfit's 
arguments concerning brain bisections. 125 Gillett argues that research does 
not support that brain bisection surgery occurs in the way that Parfit describes, 
nor that it produces the results that Parfit claims. According to Gillett, the 
epilepsy surgery on which Parfit bases his argument involves the information-
processing parts of the forebrain known as the diencephalon and the cerebral 
cortex. Surgery does not usually mean that all fibres between the two 
hemispheres are severed. Following surgery, diverse responses from each 
hemisphere to stimuli sometimes occur. This, however, is usually in controlled 
or manipulated situations, where each hemisphere is fed with different 
material, perhaps by information being flashed quickly across a screen, such 
as in the case described by Gazzaniga above. While these test situations may 
produce different responses from each hemisphere, normal life is usually little 
affected. Situations described by Parfit (such one hand pushing and one 
hand embracing), are the exception rather than the rule. Gillett claims that the 
disruption of information processing is usually only temporary. The real 
124An objector could reply: 'Well, what about multiple personalities? Are they not evidence 
that more than a single stream of consciousness is possible in a single-bodied individual?' This 
is not necessarily the case. MPD (Multiple Personality Disorder) is by no means a proven case 
that multiple consciousness in a single-bodied individual is possible. Many theorists see MPD 
as a single consciousness which is disordered and dysfunctional. Sufferers of the disorder do 
not have completely separate mental fields, much knowledge, especially bodily knowledge, is 
shared among so- called alter personalities. See (Kennett and Matthews 2001). 
125 Grant Gillett is not only a philosopher, but also a brain surgeon who has first-hand 
knowledge of the issues discussed here. 
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question is whether there is one subject of experience, rather than whether 
there are two streams of consciousness (Gillett 1986), pp 224-226. 
Gillett notes that patients are aware, not only of making mistakes when giving 
diverse responses, but also that it is they who are making them, not someone 
else: 
The fact is that the person realises that he has made a mistake, not that someone, 
perhaps contingently related to him has made a mistake which he has the 
knowledge to correct. As far as he is concerned, the person in error and the person 
who is not are he, himself, one person and one mind, but he is not functioning 
properly (Gillett 1986), p 226. 
Gillett argues that too much is read into the fact that each hemisphere 
responds to the same stimuli in different ways. This, of itself, does not indicate 
that there is not one single experiencing subject. In these cases, what 
happens in the brain is misinterpreted. By their nature brain parts divide 
labour, so it is no mystery that the communication between different brain parts 
is lost when these parts are severed. That one brain half not trained in 
language cannot respond linguistically is exactly what should be expected. 
As new connections form within the two brain halves, many apparent 
anomalies decrease over time. If we are to fully understand thought, we need 
to appreciate what is necessary for thought. Gillett notes that this requires an 
appropriately constituted subject for whom thoughts are possible. Such a 
subject has a set of beliefs, a conceptual framework, an environment, and a 
set of relations within which to situate and identify herself. Having a single 
mind does not mean having a perfectly integrated mind. To struggle with 
integration is not unusual. For these brain-disturbed patients the struggle is 
simply more acute: 
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Because they do try to reintegrate their information, or make best use of their 
disrupted brain function in tackling the tasks they are set, they can properly be said 
to be struggling with certain confusions to which they find themselves subject 
rather than to have become two mutually independent streams of consciousness 
which are in no more than a contingent relation to each other (Gillett 1986), p 227. 
According to Gillett, the evidence strongly supports the idea that a single 
person, with a single sense of identity, remains following the severing of brain 
fibres. Analysing Parfit's imagined proliferation of brain divisions, Gillett 
argues that personal identity involves relationships, reciprocity, a history, a 
biology, all of which are interrelated, and which could not be 'replicated' in 
some arbitrary way. He claims that persons are entities with a certain type of 
interconnected description, and that it is not clear that such a description could 
be given to Parfit's reduplicated entities. These entities would be severely 
impaired, and on current biology and psychology, would be unlikely to have 
any kind of meaningful mental life at all (Gillett 1986), pp 227-229. In 
summary, the above criticisms indicate that the foundation for Parfit's break 
between bodily identity and brain identity is not well-founded, and 
consequently, that bodily identity and personal identity may not be as discrete 
as Parfit implies. 
5.5 Brain-Body Integrity 
The foregoing arguments imply that bodies, brains, and minds may not be as 
autonomous as the psychological continuity criterion leads us to believe. The 
view that these things are fundamentally connected is supported by 
consideration of ways in which the precise functioning of the brain is affected 
by, and indeed tied to the functioning of the body to which that brain is 
connected, or more precisely, of which it is part. When the connection 
between the brain and the body is fully appreciated, it becomes apparent that 
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the mental life of a particular, individual person is, at least in part, the outcome 
of the interactions and experiences of a particular brain-body unit, rather than 
of a particular discrete brain. This does not mean that a person's mental life is 
reducible to the body, but only that it is constrained and influenced by the 
body, and consequently, that bodily identity is an important component of 
personal identity. In other words, even the identity of a full brain is insufficient 
on its own to capture personal identity. 
As mentioned earlier, the integrity of the brain-body unit is demonstrated by 
the way in which the brain is related to the body through the body's various 
systems, key examples of which are the cardiovascular system and the 
nervous system. 126 The cardiovascular system is responsible for the 
circulation of the blood throughout the whole body. This system ensures that 
blood, which circulates through the body tissues, also circulates through the 
brain tissues. Blood contents which nourish or damage the body, also nourish 
or damage the brain. Indeed, the very maintenance of the brain depends on 
the nutrients which it receives from the blood-supply. The blood-supply 
receives these nutrients from ingested food. Where the body's nutrition is 
deficient, brain functioning is impaired accordingly, and mental life is affected. 
Even the amount of water that one drinks affects the brain, as water 
contributes to the brain's correct functioning. 
Brain activity is also affected by substances such as alcohol, coffee, or 
cigarettes. These substances alter the chemical activity which occurs at the 
brain's chemical synapses, causing stimulation to parts of the brain. Moods 
and behaviours are altered accordingly. Substances which are released into 
the bloodstream by the brain, such as hormones (under the control of the 
126The integrity of the brain-body unit was referred to in Section 5.1 of this chapter, and is now 
explained in a little more detail. 
193 
hypothalamus via the endocrine system) also affect the relevant body parts, 
examples being the onset of puberty or menopause. These examples 
demonstrate that what happens in the brain is entirely contingent on what 
happens in the circulatory system. Because brain activity and bodily activity 
are intimately related in this way, it cannot be taken for granted that, were a 
change in embodiment to occur, a person's mental life would not be 
significantly affected (Curtis 1983), p 825; (Tortora 1980), pp 306-330; 471- 
509; (Damasio 1994), p 88. And because mental life is so significantly related 
to personal identity, it cannot be taken for granted that a change in 
embodiment would not affect personal identity also. 
Another system which significantly influences brain activity is the nervous 
system. This system ensures that signals from all body parts are relayed to the 
brain, and that the brain correspondingly is in contact with all body parts. All 
activities, whether they involve joints, muscles, or organs, or whether they 
involve the regulation of homeostasis, are affected by this system (Tortora 
1980), pp 362-433; (Damasio 1994), p 88. The interrelatedness between the 
body and brain cannot be overestimated. The use of separate linguistic terms 
'brain' and 'body' is misleading, as it gives the impression that the items 
themselves to which these terms refer are disassociated from each other. 
While this may be the case in a dismembered corpse, it is not the case in a 
living, human organism. Antonio Damasio claims that even the description of 
the body and brain as an 'indissociable organism' is an oversimplification. As 
an indissociable organism, the interaction between brain and body involves 
constant information relays between each other's parts. It is only due to this 
interaction that any part of the body or brain can operate in the way that it 
does, or indeed, at all (Damasio 1994), p 88. 
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A key element of brain-body interaction is the transmission of signals between 
the brain and the rest of the body, and between the parts within the brain. 
These signals control all brain and body functions. They are passed between 
the end-points of neurones in the brain and other parts of the nervous system 
called synapses. Synapses emit chemical signals to other synapses. The 
synapses do not actually touch, but are connected only by signals. Electrical 
signals pass directly from one synapse to another. Chemical signals are 
released across the synaptic cleft, in the form of neurotransmitters. 
Neurotransmitters are chemical agents released by neurones, which affect 
either other neurones, or glands or muscles, by altering the 'electrical state or 
activity' (Curtis 1983), p 1101. This alteration is in the form of either excitation 
or inhibition. The chemical signals travel across intercellular fluid. On 
reaching their destination, neurotransmitters combine with postsynaptic cells, 
after which the neurotransmitters are destroyed, or diffused. Prominent 
neurotransmitters in the peripheral nervous system are acetylcholine and 
noradrenaline (Curtis 1983), pp 773-775. 
Noradrenaline is also produced in the hypothalamus, and in other parts of the 
limbic system, and is thought to be involved in arousal and attention levels. 
Low levels of noradrenaline at certain synapses has been associated with 
severe depression, a condition which affects mental functioning. Medication 
to increase noradrenaline at these sites is sometimes used as a means of 
correcting this condition. Such cases provide examples of how what occurs in 
a particular body directly influences and constrains what happens in a 
particular brain, and how mental life is correspondingly affected. Were the 
brain of a person who suffered from depression, and who had just taken 
medication, to be transferred to an unmedicated body, it is difficult to see how 
that person's activities or mental life could be the same as it would have been 
had the transfer not occurred (Curtis 1983), p 825; (Tortora 1980), pp 
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416-417. This example of the tie between the activity of the nervous system 
and mental activity further demonstrates the integral connection between 
mental life and bodily life. Moreover, because mental life is intimately 
connected to personal identity, this tie also demonstrates ways in which 
personal identity is integrally connected to the life of a particular body, rather 
than to the life of just any body. 
Further evidence of the interrelatedness of the brain and the various bodily 
systems is apparent from recent studies of Alzheimer's disease. These 
studies demonstrate ways in which the brain, the circulatory system, and the 
nervous system are mutually related, thereby supporting the view that 
particular minds and identities are related to particular bodies. The (currently) 
12-year old Optima project studies Alzheimer's and other aging diseases. 127 
Alzheimer's disease incurs massive degeneration of nerve cells in the brain's 
cortex, resulting in severe cognitive defects, typically including memory loss in 
the elderly. The deficits are far more severe than, and not correlative with, the 
normal decline expected with age. Studies demonstrate that severe brain 
damage occurs over several years, leading eventually to extreme cognitive 
impairment, and ultimately, to death (Perry 1999), p 46. Although the study 
findings are incomplete, there is mounting evidence that environmental 
factors, including body chemistry, are crucially implicated in the disease. 
Research in the 1960s found that the normal aging process involves 
microscopic changes in the brain. 128 Plaques of amyloid protein become 
deposited outside neurones in the brain, while neuronal fibres become 
1271he Optima (Oxford Project to Investigate Memory and Aging) Project was set up in 1988 at 
Oxford University, England. Its aim is to study aging diseases, especially Alzheimer's disease. 
Alzheimer's disease is the most common cause of dementia in the elderly, presently affecting 
about four million persons in the United States. The percentage of persons affected doubles 
every five years above age 65 years. I am fortunate in receiving the information for this section 
from the Projects leader, Dr David Smith (Perry 1999), p 46. 
128The research was carried out by Garyl Blessed, Bernard Tomlinson and Martin Roth (Smith 
1998), p 98. 
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'tangled' inside the neurones. Mental life, particularly memory ability, is 
affected accordingly. While it was initially thought that the neuronal changes 
were early symptoms of Alzheimer's disease, it was later realised that this is 
not always the case. A task for Optima was to provide a biological 'state 
marker' by which to measure the course of the disease throughout a person's 
life. Comparisons could then be made between changes in the marker, and 
the changes of normal aging. A state marker was provided by use of CT 
scanning (X-ray computed tomography) which image-scanned the brain. In 
particular, the medial temporal lobe was the target, as post-mortem studies 
have found this to be the site with the most tangled neurofibres. Although this 
brain-part is only 2% of the brain's total volume, it includes the seat of memory, 
the hippocampus. Because the neurones in the temporal lobe link to other 
parts of the cerebral cortex, damage to the temporal lobe affects these other 
parts also. As evidenced by the CT scans, the medial temporal lobe of 
Alzheimer's sufferers 129 is much smaller than non-Alzheimer's age-matched 
controls. The amount of atrophy present in the medial temporal lobe equated 
with the density of neurofibrillary tangles present in the hippocampus following 
death. A relation is thus perceived between the neuronal tangles and the loss 
of synaptic connections, and hence the loss of tissue density in the brain 
(Smith 1998), pp 98-100. 
Of the possible causes of degeneration considered by researchers, the most 
likely was that degeneration was triggered by a sudden brain event. 
Researchers reached this conclusion after examining the results of continuous 
brain-scans which were taken over several years of suspected Alzheimer's 
suffers. An incredible 15% per year medial temporal lobe shrinkage was 
detected in these scans, as opposed to the normal aging rate of 1.5% per 
year. Evidently, the cause of atrophy was catastrophic, and according to the 
129That is, persons who eventually died of Alzheimer's disease (Smith 1998), p 99. 
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researchers, clearly distinct from the causes associated with normal ageing. 
The direction of Optima's research then turned to considering possible factors 
associated with neuronal decay. Several likely candidates were produced, 
each of which could play a smaller or larger part in the decay process. 
According to researchers, the key factors relate to genes, body, and 
environment. Some of these factors could be: age, head injury with 
concussion, myocardial infarction in women, atherosclerosis, oestrogen 
deficiency in women, low education, and dietary factors. While these factors 
affect mental life through their effect on the brain, most of them are located 
outside the brain itself. They involve the body either directly, such as through 
hormone levels or diet, or indirectly, through environmental factors, such as 
education, age, and so on. These findings provide further examples of how 
factors associated with the body are crucially involved in brain functioning and 
mental life. And because brain functioning and mental life are crucially 
involved in personal identity, the bodily factors which affect brain functioning 
and mental life are crucially involved in personal identity also. Indeed, when 
the involvement of the brain-body unity on mental life is considered in relation 
to diseases such as Alzheimer's disease, the connection between bodily 
identity and personal identity becomes even more apparent. For many crucial 
factors which affect memory loss (such as those mentioned above) are directly 
tied to the state of the body and to the environment in which the body is 
located, such that were these bodily states and environmental factors different, 
the person's mental life would be different also (Smith 1998), pp 101-103. 
The continuing study of Alzheimer's disease further supports these findings. 
Epidemiological studies are still in process and final results are not yet 
available. But environmental and bodily influences are still held high as likely 
causal factors. Hormone and vitamin levels are being investigated. Some 
studies indicate that post-menopausal women who take HRT are at less risk 
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than matched controls not taking HRT. 130 It is thought that oestrogen may be 
involved in protecting otherwise potential sufferers. Vitamin and dietary 
factors are also being examined. The researchers did not pay attention to 
these factors earlier in the study, but have recently realised their relevance. 
Low intake of vitamin C is thought to be a factor, and low blood levels of folic 
acid and B12 are also implicated. This conclusion comes from an interesting 
turn in research, in which the stored blood from deceased Alzheimer's 
sufferers was examined. 
The examination of this blood revealed that the level of homocysteine, (a 
substance connected with stroke and heart disease) was 30% higher in the 
stored blood than in matched controls. Because the moderation of this 
substance is associated with levels of folate and B12, more tests were done. It 
was found that the levels of these vitamins was down by 30%. Researchers 
hypothesised that in some instances, there was a link between the abnormal 
processing of these vitamins, and the onset of Alzheimer's disease. The 
resulting pathology of this abnormal processing is similar to that of transient 
ischaemia. Transient ischaemia is a blocking of the arteries, a condition which 
results in there being reduced oxygen and an irregular glucose supply. 
Animal experiments which imitated the pathology of transient ischaemia 
produced biochemical and cellular changes similar to those of Alzheimer's. 
While there has not yet been the opportunity to fully test the hypothesis, 
researchers have records of four patients, who had memory loss in 
conjunction with folate and B12 deficiencies. Their memory problems 
disappeared following treatment with these vitamins. Researchers thus 
strongly suspect that factors such as diet are crucially implicated in the 
130HRT= hormone replacement therapy. Often taken by before, during, and after menopause, 
with the intention of preventing the side effects associated with the reduced hormone 
production of menopause. 
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degenerative process which characterises this disease. 131 The ability of diet 
and other factors associated with the body to affect the brain and mental life in 
this way provides compelling evidence of the intrinsic interrelatedness 
between the brain, the body, and mental life. We can see from the above 
research that mental life is not just a 'given', but is entirely dependent on the 
functioning of particular brain-body units, rather than just on particular brains. 
This view of mental life does not support Part it's characterisation of mental life 
as in some way discretely captured by the brain alone. Nor, as had been 
stated repeatedly throughout this chapter, does this view of mental life support 
the claim that personal identity can in any way be captured by psychological 
continuity, to the exclusion of the particular, individual body with which that 
psychological continuity is associated. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the question of whether bodily identity is 
implicated in personal identity. The psychological continuity criterion does not 
attach any weight to the body when determining what is crucial to personal 
identity. I have argued that this neglect of the body by the psychological 
continuity criterion produces misleading conclusions about personal identity. 
One of the most important of these is the view that the body is not a crucial 
factor in a person's psychological continuity, and that consequently, bodily 
identity is discrete from personal identity. According to this view, although 
persons are taken to be embodied entities, it makes no difference to a 
131 When asked if he was excited about the dietary implications for Alzheimer's, as opposed to 
possible drug treatment, head of the Optima Project David Smith replied: 'A: Yes, absolutely. 
It gives you a hope at long last of possibly being able to prevent some of this dreadful disease. 
That's why it's so exciting. I think therapy with drugs is a long shot and not too hopeful. But if 
you can come in before it starts and prevent it, you can save many millions of people from 
developing the disease. Q: Especially with dietary intervention. A: Yes, it's a relatively safe 
kind of thing that you can give' (Perry 1999), p 69. The researchers' conviction that diet 
influences brain structure and activity in this way supports the claim that brain and body are 
integrally related at a very fundamental level. 
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person's identity whether a person has one particular body, or an entirely 
, 
different body. Personal identity is thus in no way tied bodily identity. 
In contrast to this view, I have argued that the body plays a decisive role in the 
realisation of psychological continuity, and that consequently, personal 
identity is, in part, defined by bodily identity. To defend these arguments, I 
have examined the psychological continuity criterion's atomistic conception of 
the brain, and its discrete characterisation of the brain-body relation. I have 
argued that thought experiments in which memories are supposedly 
generated through the transfer of brain parts to different bodies make no 
sense, as memories are partly defined by their first-person perspective, and 
are related to a person's bodily capacities. Due to the different embodiment 
involved, so-called 'transferred memories' not only do not have a first-person 
perspective, but cannot do so. This indicates that the claim that one person 
could remember events in the same way as a different bodied person is 
incorrect and misleading. 
I have also argued that the view that bodily differences are inconsequential to 
mental life, or to the quality of one's memories, is false and misleading. Each 
individual body has its own unique structure, capacities, activities, orientation 
on the world and so on, such that it makes no sense to assume that the mental 
life or memories of an individual with one body, could be duplicated by an 
individual with a different body. 
In addition, I have argued that the claim that brain bisections could produce 
multiple streams of consciousness is unsupported, as this proposition is based 
on the mistaken claim that brain bisection surgery produces dual streams of 
consciousness in a single-bodied person, and that the notion of dual 
consciousness is coherent. Using current neurological findings, I have 
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claimed that while commissurotomies highlight the different contributions 
made by the right and left hemispheres to a person's stream of thoughts, 
feelings, and so on, they do not indicate that there is not, in the end, a single, 
conscious stream, attached to a single-bodied individual. I have argued that 
because particular streams of consciousness are defined by particular bodies, 
the results of brain bisection surgery in no way supports the disruption 
between personal identity and bodily identity. I have also argued that the 
notion of split streams of consciousness, each with a first-person perspective, 
emanating from a single body is in itself completely incoherent. 
Finally, I have argued that the brain's connection to the body by means of 
various bodily systems, such as the circulatory system and the nervous 
system, demonstrates ways in which the capacities and activities of particular 
brains are intrinsically connected to the capacitates and activities of particular 
bodies. Consideration of the circulatory system demonstrates ways in which 
the activities of the body, such as the ingestion of food or alcohol, or the 
secretion of hormones, are connected to the activities occurring in the brain, 
and correspondingly, are connected to a person's mental life. Similarly, 
consideration of the nervous system shows that this system is a vital means of 
connection between the brain and other parts of the body. Where the activities 
of the brain are crucially affected by the nervous system, such as in cases of 
depression or Alzheimer's disease, mental life is affected accordingly. This 
demonstrates that what happens in particular bodies affects what happens in 
particular brains, and correspondingly, in particular persons' mental lives. I 
have argued that due to the inherent connection between mental life and 
personal identity, these facts must be acknowledged when accounting for 
personal identity, if the account is to be in any way accurate or 
comprehensive. Due to this inherent connection between bodies, brains, 
minds, and personal identity, it is difficult to see how the disjunction between 
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bodily identity and personal identity, which the psychological continuity 
criterion maintains, can be supported. In addition to these problems 
concerning the body, the psychological continuity criterion also has difficulty in 
accounting for the self. This final topic is addressed in the next chapter. 
Chapter 6 The Self as Dynamic Unity 
6.1 Introduction 
The final area of neglect to be addressed in this thesis concerns the 
psychological continuity criterion's characterisation of the self. According to 
the Reductionist conception of the self, selves are nothing more than sets of 
causally connected mental states, which have no independent role to play in 
personal identity. Parfit claims that personal identity does not require a 
foundational or transcendent self, as personal identity is grounded in 
psychological states alone, and does not depend on underlying entities such 
as selves or souls. These entities would be superfluous, as they are 
unessential to psychological continuity, and consequently, unessential also to 
personal identity. On this view, the self is conceived to be a mere function of 
psychological continuity, and rather than a crucial determining factor of it. 
Consequently, when referring to subjects of experience, these subjects are not 
taken to have any real or tangible existence, other than as linguistic devices or 
tools of reference, used to refer to aggregations or bundles of thoughts and 
experiences. One result of this view of is that without a self in which to ground 
personal identity, progressive and considerable change in a person's 
psychology can mean that a person can, over time, become a different person. 
Parfit claims that this means that personal identity is ultimately inconsequential 
and meaningless (Parfit 1984), pp 219-243. In this chapter, I argue that the 
Reductionist stance on the self is mistaken, and results from a misconception 
of the self, its origin and development, its role in experience, and its 
contribution to a person's own sense of identity. In contrast to the Reductionist 
view, I offer an alternative account of the self, in which the self features not 
only as an essential component of mental life, but also, as an essential 
component of the embodied activity on which that mental life depends. 
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Underpinning Parfit's stance on the self is the assumption that only two kinds 
of selves are possible. The first possibility is understood as a 'Cartesian soul' 
or a similar 'unknown entity', which although unknown, nevertheless grounds 
experience and mental life. Parfit claims that we have no evidence of this type 
of self, and that we cannot, therefore, presume that such selves exist. To 
assume that they do is unsound, and philosophically unacceptable. The 
second possibility is that selves are formal or linguistic devices, used to 
describe experience and mental life, but which do not refer to anything that 
actually exists. This is the view that Parfit accepts. He also holds that without 
a self in which to ground experience, sufficient change in a person's 
psychological states could mean that personal identity has also changed. In 
cases where the amount of change could not be determined, it would thus be 
an empty question whether a person had one identity, or a different identity. It 
is this conception of personal identity which leads to the view that personal 
identity itself is ultimately a meaningless concept, and to the view that 
preference for self-concern over other-concern is irrational. It is unclear, 
however, how these views can be consistent with Parfit's reductionist stance, 
since it is hard to see what self-concern or other-concern might mean here. 
While Parfit might be right in rejecting the idea of the Cartesian self, his 
reasoning, however, does not vindicate the second alternative he offers. 
There are at least two important issues at stake in this regard. The first issue 
concerns whether the idea of a Cartesian self is indeed coherent or viable. 
The second concerns whether the two alternatives he offers do indeed 
exhaust the available possibilities. On the first issue, I largely agree with 
Parfit, but would argue more strongly that even if a Cartesian self were to exist, 
it would be of no help in relation to questions concerning personal identity. A 
self which is involved in personal identity is a self which is involved in the 
experiences and thoughts from which that identity is constructed. Such a self 
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is knowable, and does not lie outside the empirical realm. It is not 
transcendent of experience. The objection to a transcendent self furnished by 
Part it, however, is not that it cannot be the ground of experience, but rather, 
that we have no evidence of such a self. On my view, even were we to have 
such evidence, 132 it would be of no value here, and would, therefore, be 
irrelevant. In other words, whether transcendent souls or similar entities exist 
is not an issue for the personal identity debate. What is at issue is whether an 
empirical self, a self which is conceived and apprehended in the course of 
normal experience, is crucially involved in that experience, and consequently, 
in personal identity. 
Regarding the second issue, the Reductionist view, sometimes referred to as 
the 'no-self' view, is not based on any detailed investigation of what the self 
might be, how the self might develop, or why the self might be essential to 
experience and mental life. More specifically, the no-self view has not arisen 
out of an inquiry into what it means to be an experiencing subject, to know that 
one has experience, or to have a sense of self or 'self-knowledge'. These 
issues are crucial to the self, and ought to be investigated if any definitive 
conclusion about the self is to be reached. As the Reductionist view has not 
confronted these issues, however, its investigation of the self cannot be 
considered to have been thorough, or to be a sound basis for conclusive 
views about the self. This chapter aims to remedy this deficiency, by inquiring 
into the nature of the self, into the reasons why the self might exist, and into 
why the self might be essential to experience and mental life. Based on these 
inquiries, an alternative view of the self to that of Parfit is proposed. According 
to this alternative view, the self is neither a transcendent entity, nor a mere 
aggregate or bundle of thoughts and experiences. I argue that the self is a 
dynamic unity that accompanies all our experiences, that is essential to 
132Such as might be provided by mystics, religious devotees, and similar persons. 
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experience, and that is given in experience. To understand this conception of 
the self, it is necessary to appreciate that the self at issue here is not a 'thing' 
in the way conceived by many theorists, but is rather a sense of unity within 
oneself, which is experienced in different ways at different times. This sense 
of unity is incremental, and begins in a primitive form early in life, and 
develops through various stages to a more mature and richer sense of unity 
later in life. In line with this developmental approach to the self, I argue that 
the self is first experienced bodily in young infants, and later also cognitively in 
adults. As this embodied experience of the self is foundational to the later 
cognitive experience of the self, I also argue that the embodied self is primary 
to the cognitive self, and that it is only due to the embodied self that the 
cognitive self becomes possible. 
In conceiving of the self as a dynamic unity, it must be made clear here that 
reference to 'the self', 'the cognitive self', 'the embodied self', 'the dynamic 
self' or 'the mental self' in the present chapter does not imply that the self is a 
self-sufficient entity in its own right. While the self is considered to be real and 
tangible, it is, as will become apparent, a unity of many things, and thus, 
cannot be considered apart from the things which are contained in that unity. 
In many instances, reference to the 'self' refers to the 'sense of self', that is, the 
sense that one has of oneself as a single, more-or-less united entity, with 
thoughts and desires, and with the bodily capacity to act on these thoughts 
and desires. These points will become clearer as the argument for the self 
proceeds. My case begins by explicating further the 'no-self' view, and then 
proceeds by outlining the case for the self as a dynamic unity. I then present 
arguments in support of the need for cognitive unity, and follow this by 
elucidating the significance of the embodied self. I then draw on empirical 
evidence to demonstrate the significance of the embodied self to young 
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infants. Finally, I inquire into the cognitive self's development, and explore the 
relevance to the self of autobiography and narrative. 
6.2 The 'No-Self' View 
The idea that the self has no evidential basis is not peculiar to Parfit, but is 
already adumbrated in Hume's work. Hume holds that the self cannot be 
substantial, as 'substance' itself is a meaningless concept. He claims that we 
have no 'impression' of substance, and that therefore, we cannot presume that 
substance exists. Hume similarly claims that no impression of a self is 
encountered in introspection, and that we therefore cannot claim to have a 
self. While Hume accepts that most people believe in the existence of a self, 
he claims that this belief is an illusion. Our ordinary conception of the self is 
based on a 'fiction'. All that really exists are bundles of fleeting perceptions. 
These perceptions are related to each other by no more than constancy and 
coherent change (Hume 1888), 1.4.6. Hume, however, subsequently 
admits to confusion, as on the one hand, each perception appears to be 
separate and distinct, and on the other, without a self, there is no principle of 
unity which binds these perceptions together (Hume 1962), pp 324-331. 
Thus, although the self is a fiction, unless we maintain this fiction, our 
experiences could not be coherent. Many theorists since Hume have found 
themselves equally unable to account for the self, and have therefore rejected 
the idea of a substantial self, in favour of a 'nominal' self, that is, a self which 
has no substantial existence outside of particular mental states, or bundles of 
mental states. Parfit's work provides an example of this conception of the self. 
Evidence of the psychological continuity criterion's reductive conception of the 
self is found in Parfit's thought experiments. One example is the scenario 
concerning Parfit's imaginary reduplication and transportation to Mars. 
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Developing this thought experiment, Parfit considers the point at which the 
thoughts of the earthly Parfit are supposedly taken up by the reduplicated 
entity on Mars. Parfit considers whether an underlying self would be required 
for this to happen. Relating the possible situation, Parfit suggests that prior to 
teletransportation, earthly Part it might think: 'Snow is falling'. Parfit then 
claims that the Parfitian duplicate would inherit the memory of this thought at 
the instance of teletransportation. Parfit then suggests that subsequent to 
teletransportation, the Parfitian duplicate might follow-up this thought with 
another thought, such as: 'So it must be cold'. Parfit then claims that because 
the Parfitian duplicate has 'inherited' the thought: 'Snow is falling', that the 
Parfitian duplicate would believe that he, the duplicate, was the person who 
had this thought in the first place. Parfit claims that duplicated Parfit would be 
unable to tell from the 'content of his experiences' the difference between 
whether he had the first thought, or whether someone else had the first 
thought. Parfit draws from this the conclusion that the contents of our 
experiences tell us nothing about ourselves over and above the experiences 
themselves. We thus cannot tell from our experiences whether or not we are 
entities which exist over and above those particular experiences. Any 
supposed self-awareness which we do have is no more than an awareness of 
our continuing psychology. Parfit claims that unless we can point to anything 
in addition to this awareness, we have no warrant to claim that anything else 
exists. And without such warrant, we should accept the Reductionist position 
that there is no such thing as a self (Parfit 1984), pp 223-224. 
The problem with these arguments, however, is that they are merely directed 
at the idea of the self as an underlying Cartesian entity, and do not give any 
real consideration to the question of what the self might actually be. These 
arguments do not address key issues concerning the self, such as other views 
about the nature of the self, how the self relates to experience, or whether the 
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self is relevant to personal identity. In fact, the above scenario steers us away 
from the self before the concept itself is examined in any detail. Moreover, the 
arguments presented depend on the claims they purport to prove. Consider 
that when the duplicate supposedly inherits earthly Parfit's memories, it is 
taken for granted that there is no self among the things inherited. Parfit's claim 
amounts to the proposition that no self goes along with the memories, and 
therefore, no self is involved in the memories. I do not see how this argument 
amounts to an examination of the concept 'self', or how it produces any 
conclusive views about whether selves exist or not. 
As I explained earlier, the impetus for Part it's 'no self' view results largely from 
the rejection of the idea of the Cartesian self, and from the apparent 
unavailability of any viable alternative view. But as also explained, this 
apparent unavailability does not justify the complete rejection of the self, and 
the resort to a bundle theory of experience and mental life. The conclusion 
that selves do not exist is drawn on the basis of very thin and dubious 
evidence. Specifically, this evidence is that: 1) there is no evidence of the 
only viable alternative, namely Cartesian souls, and 2) that selves are not 
encountered directly in experience. This reasoning, used by Hume, Parfit, and 
. others already assumes a certain conception of the self, and thus does not 
amount to a serious examination of what the self might be. The problem here 
is that the apparent failure of viable alternatives to the no-self view, coupled 
with the apparent inability to directly encounter the self, is taken as definitive 
evidence of the self's non-existence. Scrutiny of this reasoning shows, 
however, that this conclusion drawn does not necessarily follow from the 
premises. Another possibility is that the conception of the self which Parfit and 
others hold needs rethinking. The Reductionist conception of the self follows 
from certain preconceptions about the self, and from applying such 
preconceptions to any thoughts about the self, or to any inquiries into the self. 
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But if these preconceptions about the self are mistaken, and if they are taken 
as the starting point of inquiring into the self, any such inquiry is inevitably 
doomed to producing faulty and misleading conclusions. A more productive 
approach would be to rethink the nature of the self, and to discard the 'all or 
nothing' idea that the self is either a Cartesian or similar entity, or it is virtually 
nothing at all. It would be more useful to consider different possible forms of 
the self, and to examine precisely what the self 'does' for an experiencing 
subject, which would not be 'done' if selves did not exist. This means we 
should consider the sense of self from the perspective of an experiencing 
subject, rather than from that of a merely a grammatical one. When the self is 
considered in this way, it becomes apparent that a certain form of the self is 
essential to the possibility of experience and mental life, such that without 
such a self, neither experience nor mental life could occur. 
6.3 Searching for the Self 
As a topic of philosophical inquiry, the self holds a unique place. Because 
selves are the subjects of experience, the item being studied is the same item 
as that which is doing the studying. This means that it may be a mistake to 
hold strong preconceptions about what the self might be, as this may blind us 
to recognising the various forms of self-awareness that are available to us at 
different times. One way that the self might be understood, which is little 
explored by Parfit, is to consider the self as the unity of the bodily and mental 
capacities of a single individual, together with, and modified by, that 
individual's first-person knowledge of these capacities. On my view, this 
integrated unity is essential for either thought or experience to occur, as, 
unless there was some form of meaningful connection between these various 
facets of our experiences and capacities, mental life would not be coherent, 
and action could not be initiated. This view of the self may initially seem 
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puzzling, and somewhat at odds with traditional views of the self. But when 
this view is considered in more detail, it becomes evident that the sense we 
have of ourselves as individual entities is very much tied to the notion of 
ourselves as entities with particular bodies and bodily capacities, and with 
particular sets of thoughts. This idea is supported by the fact that where 
persons' capacities and knowledge are well integrated, these persons have a 
strong or robust sense of self. Conversely, when persons' capacities or 
mental life are adversely affected, such as through bodily injury or mental 
trauma, the sense of self becomes depleted and shrinks. In severe cases, 
such as grave physical damage or illness, or complete mental breakdown, the 
sense of self may almost disappear altogether. Such persons lose their sense 
of identity and are unable to know how to act, or what they should do next. 
Considering the self as a dynamic unity has at least four important aspects. 
The first has already been referred to, but bears repeating. It is the point that 
the self is not a 'thing', but is a unity of knowledge and capacities we have of 
ourselves at any given time, which underpins our thoughts and actions, and 
which is necessary for us to experience the world around us in any form. The 
second aspect is that the self is developmental; it begins primitively early in 
life, and develops incrementally throughout life. Third, is that the self provides 
different forms of self-knowledge from a first-person perspective. And fourth, is 
that the self is first experienced bodily in young infants, and develops its 
cognitive aspects subsequent to, and conditional on this earlier bodily 
experience. Neisser's models of self-knowledge are useful to understanding 
this developmental approach to the self. 
Neisser examines the self in terms of five different types of self-knowledge, 
each of which represents a stage in the self's development. The most basic 
self is the ecological self. This is the self as it relates to the immediate 
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environment. It is directly perceived right from birth, and is circumscribed by 
the body's capacity for activity. The ecological self does not always coincide 
with the body, although it could do so. It might also include things within the 
body's control field, such as clothes, prosthetic limbs, or even a person's car 
(Neisser 1988), pp 37-41. 
Second, is the interpersonal self, which is also directly perceived. This self 
comprises unreflective, intersubjective relations between at least two persons. 
Interpersonal selves engage through words, expressions, signals and cues, 
such as occur between mothers and young infants. In normal cases, the 
interpersonal self is present at birth (Neisser 1988), pp 41-46. 
Third, is the extended self, which is the self that engages in self-reflection. It 
thus extends beyond merely the present context. It includes the self of the 
past, and the expected self of the future. It is known mostly through 
autobiographical memory (Neisser 1988), pp 46-50. 
Fourth, is the private self, which is a self independent of an individual's 
present circumstances. This self is concerned with inner perception, dreams, 
intentions, memories, imagination, and other forms of introspection (Neisser 
1988), pp 50-52. 
Finally, the conceptual self is the view we have of ourselves, based on facts 
we know about ourselves, such as our profession, family relations, cultural 
standing, nationality, and even how others see us. It concerns those aspects 
of ourselves that we see as most important and identity-determining. Neisser 
sees the conceptual self as essentially comprised of at least four of the 
preceding aspects of self. It incorporates our various forms of self-knowledge 
into the view which we have of ourselves, and which we assume others to 
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have of us. Our self-concept is important, as it is the overarching concept 
through which we know ourselves, and through which our diverse aspects are 
united into a single person (Neisser 1988), pp 50-54. 
Neisser conceives the self as a developmental phenomenon, manifest first in 
bodily form, and later in a cognitive form. The ecological and interpersonal 
selves are realised through embodiment, and the later extended, private, and 
conceptual selves are realised through cognitive development. Similarly, the 
dynamic conception of the self is construed in terms of embodied unity and 
cognitive unity. These are not completely discrete unities, but are progressive 
stages in the development of a numerically single compound unity of 
knowledge and ability. 133 To better understand this developmental approach, 
the self is now examined in more detail. Because the cognitive aspects of the 
self are those which most concern the personal identity debate, this aspect of 
the self is addressed first. Consideration of the cognitive self is followed by a 
detailed investigation into the self's earlier manifest bodily aspects. The bodily 
self is considered in some detail, as I believe that understanding the bodily 
self is crucial to appreciating the self's role mental life and personal identity, 
and also, because the connection between the bodily self and mental life is 
little understood in the personal identity debate, particularly as it relates to the 
psychological continuity criterion. 
6.4 Cognitive Unity 
Cognitive unity is the unity of accumulated thoughts and experiences that is 
required for such thoughts and experiences to make sense. Cognitive unity is 
a form of self-unity, as the self just is the unity of thoughts and experiences, 
133 'Knowledge' here is used in its most general sense, and refers not only to conceptualised 
knowledge, but also to unreflective bodily knowledge, such as the innate, unselfconscious 
knowledge of where my mouth is. 
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and of the capacities to act on these experiences. To distinguish the cognitive 
aspects of the self from other aspects, the self is here referred to as the 
cognitive self. 134 One way in which the cognitive self is evident is in the first-
person character of experience. For, unless I have some knowledge of my 
thoughts and capacities, I cannot intentionally act on them. 135 The importance 
of the self to mental life has been addressed by Kant and more recently by 
Malpas. Their work was considered earlier in reference to mental holism. 136 
The role of the self in making possible experience, and the holistic character of 
mental states are integrally related concepts, and need to be understood in 
light of each other. 
Recall that Kant was concerned to set out the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience. More generally, we might say he was concerned 
with establishing the conditions for the very possibility of contentful mental 
states. Such states depend upon the synthesising activity of the 
understanding, since mental states, and the content of those states, is 
essentially dependent on the connections ('synthesis') between those states 
and their elements. Moreover, such connections are themselves worked out 
and expressed, as we saw earlier, through the way in which all such states are 
referred back to a single, unitary consciousness - a single 'I'. Without the 'I 
think', claims Kant, experience would be 'nothing to me' (Kant 1929), B 132. 
134When referring to the 'cognitive self', 'experience' will be understood as conceptualised, 
self-aware experience, such as contributes to, and is informed by mental life. When referring to 
the 'embodied self', 'experience' will refer to non self-conscious embodied experience, such as 
quenching thirst, moving limbs, or crying from hunger. 
135This awareness must be understood in a general sense, and includes awareness of our 
possibilities. I may be unsure whether I can lift a heavy object until I try, but it must be a real 
possibility for me to intend and attempt the action. 
1361he work of Kant and Malpas was addressed in Chapter 4.4. While this work is referred to 
again here, the previous emphasis was on the implications of the predominantly holistic 
character of mental states, whereas here, the emphasis is on the unitary structure of the self, 
particularly as it relates to mental coherence, and to the capacity for action. 
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Apprehending experience from a first-person perspective means that with 
respect to any and every experience, that experience must be apprehended 
by some experiencing subject, and thereby connected up with other such 
experiences, mental states and so forth. This is to say simply that the having 
of experiences, or the having of mental states, depends upon there being a 
system, or network, of such states, and for there to be such a system is for 
there to be a single subject to whom those states 'belong'. The idea of the 
single subject is just the idea of there being states that are appropriately 
connected or 'unified'. Unless thoughts were present to a single 
consciousness in this sense (and note that this does not imply the existence of 
a consciousness or 'self' that is independent of and separable from the states 
that are present to it), it is difficult to conceive what a thought could be, or how 
such a thought could be understood. For Kant, a single consciousness is a 
unified consciousness, that is, one in which thoughts and other mental items 
cohere into a more-or-less integrated unity, since, unless thoughts were 
unified in this way, they would be independent, isolated, solitary, and 
consequently, meaningless to the person whose thoughts they were - they 
would, in fact, be contentless and thus not be mental states at all. 
Since he takes this unified subjectivity as a necessary condition of experience, 
Kant concludes that the mental unity at issue here is transcendental to, or is an 
a priori condition of experience. 137 Designated the 'Transcendental Unity of 
Apperception', this unity is the unity of thought required for the comprehension 
of experience, and for me to know that my experiences are mine (Kant 1929), 
B 132. Kant claims that although this transcendental unity is an apriori 
condition of experience, we can know nothing of it beyond its formal necessity, 
137Transcendentall as referred to here must not be confused with 'transcendent' referred to 
earlier. I take 'transcendental' to refer to a necessary precondition of something, that is, in the 
Kantian sense, and 'transcendent' to refer to something which exists outside of or beyond the 
material universe. 
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and thus cannot attribute characteristics to it, such as those of an immaterial 
soul or similar unknown entity (Kant 1929), First Paralogism, A 348-351. It is, 
as I noted immediately above, not a unity that can be taken to imply some 
substantial and independent self or subject, but rather refers us to what might 
be viewed as an almost purely 'formal' unity - a unity that is identical with the 
connectedness of the states themselves, and that is worked out through the 
interconnection between states. This unity is established in concrete 
experience, and, keeping in mind the arguments from Malpas that we have 
already considered, also in embodied action. 
Kant's view that self-unity is a pre-requisite to the apprehension of experience 
has important implications for the account of the self. It draws attention to the 
point that experience does not occur as a matter of course, but requires the 
presence of an appropriately constituted unifying structure. For Kant, this 
unifying structure depends on an apriori unifying principle, exemplified in 
the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. The fact that this unifying principle 
is a necessary condition of experience, such that without it, experience would 
not be possible, must not be confused with the similar, but quite different claim, 
that experience depends on entities existing transcendent to, or outside of, 
experience. As has been stated, such transcendent entities, were they to 
exist, would not provide the necessary unifying principle within experience. 
So, although Kant points to the need for apperceptive unity, that is, the unity 
required for me to know that my experience is mine, this unity is not to be 
thought of as existing apart from the occurrence of experience itself. 
Apperceptive unity can best be understood as 'hovering', as it were, at the 
outer limits of experience, being both a necessary precondition of experience, 
but as arising only out of experience. The work of Malpas makes this position 
clearer. 
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In his account of the holistic character of the mental, Malpas argues that 
mental unity is tied to the apprehension of experience by a single subjectivity. 
His emphasis on the relation between the first-person apprehension of 
experience and the grasp of oneself as an experiencing subject was referred 
to earlier. Malpas argues that the existence of a unified subjectivity or self 
prior to the occurrence of experience makes no sense, and merely defers the 
question of unity. He claims that if the subject which experiences is a subject 
which exists outside the experiential realm, such a subject would be incapable 
of conferring unity on experience. Unity, after all, is not a mere causal affair, 
such as might be found in the operation of brain mechanisms (or in Parfit's 
thought experiments). These connections are no more than physical 
connections, and do nothing to explain the coherence of content or meaning 
(Malpas 1999), p 88. For example, knowing that certain principles of hygiene 
contribute to the prevention of disease involves more than having certain 
neurones firing in my brain and making certain synaptic connections (although 
having the thought that: 'hygiene is important to preventing disease' might be 
identical and coincident with the firing of certain neurones in my brain). This 
knowing also involves my understanding the hygiene principles involved, how 
these principles relate to the prevention of disease, and how the absence of 
these principles could cause disease to occur. The unity of thought is thus a 
unity of content, and therefore, can only be derived from the realm to which 
that content refers. Contentful connections between beliefs and so on, to be 
intrinsic to those states, cannot simply be conferred by some entity to which 
those states are attributed. The unity at issue is a 'rational' unity. 
For Malpas, the unity of the self is a matter of the contentful unity of mental 
states, and is thus a unity created by experience, rather than being a unity 
which exists prior to the occurrence of experience. He sees that such a unity 
is a direct consequence of the holistic character of mental states, and, as 
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being integral to the identity of those states, and consequently, also integral to 
the identity of the self. Thus, part of what makes my self the self that it is, is the 
fact that I have certain mental states, which, being present to me in a single 
consciousness, I can identify as mine. Similarly, part of what makes those 
mental states the states that they are is the fact that they are present to my 
consciousness, and are interconnected with other states which also belong to 
me (Malpas 1999), p 89. 
While the self at issue here is an essential contributor to cognitive unity, it is 
not merely a 'mental' self. Malpas argues that underpinning the capacity for 
cognitive unity is the capacity for intentional action. This capacity involves an 
understanding of oneself in relation to other objects in the world, the ability to 
affect those objects, and an appreciation of that ability. 138 Implicit in 
understanding one's relation to other things is a grasp of spatiality, that is, the 
recognition that one is a three-dimensional object in a world of other three-
dimensional objects, all of which are located in particular places, and which 
hold particular spatial relations to each other. The occurrence of action 
requires that these various elements are related to each other in the 
appropriate way. More specifically, there is an integral connection between 
the self, spatiality, and agency, or, as Malpas puts it, between the subjective 
and objective elements of experience: 
So in establishing the necessary connection of self and content with spatiality and 
agency, a connection is also indicated between these concepts and the concept of 
objective space, and more generally, with the idea of objectivity. What is thus 
starting to appear is a structure in which subjective and objective elements are 
interconnected and interdependent. It is on the basis of this structure that thought 
and experience are possible (Malpas 1999), pp 99-100. 
138For example, having the ability to act, and having an awareness of that ability is important, as 
unless I could move my fingers in a certain way, and to know that I could so move them, I would 
be unable to lift a cup to my lips to take a drink. 
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The unity of the self is thus a unity that obtains between the subjective and 
objective elements of experience. This means the self can be neither a 
transcendent entity, nor a mere disunited bundle. A transcendent entity does 
not concern experience, and a disunited bundle lacks any principles of unity 
or integration. Neither of these selves are viable options, as the second 
cannot explain how experience has coherence and meaning, and the first 
cannot explain how experience occurs at all. 
Malpas points out that experience requires certain essential components, and 
that these components must stand in relation to each other in the appropriate 
way. It is not just a matter of having, for example, the required neural structure 
of the brain, or a world of external objects (although these are not irrelevant), 
but is a crucial matter of having efficacious connections between these 
components, and of having certain bodily capacities for action. It is also a 
matter of perceiving these components of experience from a first-person 
perspective, or, put another way, of having apperception. The self could thus 
be understood as the apperceptive unity of experience, which is not 
transcendent to, but is immanent in experience, and which is required for an 
agent to have experience, and to be able to act on that experience. 
Consider, for example, whether I could initiate action, or have coherent 
thoughts and experiences, if there was no unity between the elements which 
composed my thoughts and experiences, or if I did not see myself as standing 
in certain relations to these elements. I would not, for example, be able to eat 
unless there was the appropriate coherence between the feeling of hunger, 
the desire for food, the knowledge that food would satisfy my hunger, the 
knowledge of where and how to obtain food, the capacity to move my limbs in 
the appropriate manner to obtain food and to eat it, the first-person knowledge 
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of these capacities, and, most importantly, the sense that it was me who was 
the subject of these thoughts and activities. Were all these elements to exist 
individually, disunited and isolated from each other, they would not be the 
elements that they are, and the activity which would result from their unity 
would not be possible. 
The unity which makes thought and experience possible is the unity of the self, 
as self-unity just is the unity of the elements required for thought and 
experience to occur, and to be present to a single subjectivity. This means 
that the self is essential to all experience, and can, therefore, be taken for 
granted to accompany all experience. Put another way, because the unity of 
the self is part of what it means to have experience, the very fact that 
experience occurs at all means that the self is already present. Experience 
without the self or self-unity does not make any sense. Indeed, once we see 
things this way, then we do see that the self is not some entity over and above 
experience and actions, it is the unity of experience and actions that makes 
experience and action possible. 
The unity of the self is not just a unity of mental elements, but, due to its 
involvement in action, also includes the bodily capacities and abilities of the 
agent concerned. There is thus a close connection between a person's sense 
of self and a person's mental and physical abilities, and the degree to which 
these abilities are developed. Self-experience is thus not static, but is open to 
change and development, in accordance with a person's particular activities 
and engagements with the world, and with objects in the world. This means 
that although, as Neisser suggests, the self has a private, first-person aspect, 
the self also has externalised aspects, which, through engagement with the 
world of objects, contributes to the self's modification and development. 
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The psychological continuity criterion does not recognise these aspects of the 
self. According to this criterion, the self is a kind of non-entity, with no 
significant causal power to affect or contribute to mental life, or to the 
experience from which mental life is derived. This means that the capacity for 
thought and experience is not acknowledged as requiring preconditions, and 
that the possibility of thought and experience, is, therefore, taken for granted. 
But as shown above, this conception of thought and experience is inaccurate. 
Experience and mental life require coherence, and coherence requires unity 
within a single subjectivity. The unity of experience and mental life within a 
single subjectivity is the unity of the self, as it is only this unity which includes 
all the elements of which experience and mental life are composed. Thus, in 
leaving the self out of personal identity, the psychological continuity criterion 
neglects to account for the unity which is essential to experience and mental 
life, and in doing so, leaves crucial aspects of personal identity unexplained. 
To better understand the foundations of cognitive unity, the bodily unity which 
underpins mental life is now explored. 
6.5 Embodied Unity 
Embodied unity refers to the sense of one's body as a more-or-less united 
entity which under one's control. The experience of one's body as a unity is 
an important aspect of self-experience, and is thus a crucial aspect the 
embodied self. The embodied self broadly refers to the non-conceptualised 
self-experience which is encountered through the body, directly and 
unmediated. This is a more 'primitive' aspect of the self, as it is unreflected 
and unself-conscious. 
Experiencing the self through the body is an important condition of action, as 
unless one has a sense of oneself as a more-or-less unified body, one does 
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not have the control of one's body or body parts required to initiate or perform 
action. Because performing action is essential to mental life, the embodied 
self is a necessary condition of the cognitive self. For it is only in virtue of the 
bodily activity which the embodied self makes possible, that the mental life of 
the cognitive self can occur. The embodied self is thus a precursor to the 
cognitive self, and is the first form of self-experience. 
The integral link between conceptualised experience and embodied activity 
was referred to earlier. Only creatures with the capacity for action are 
creatures who are capable of thought and experience. As Malpas has pointed 
out, activity is integral to the unity and coherence of mental life. A crucial 
feature of activity is the ability to orient and direct one's body in space. This 
requires the ability to distinguish between oneself and the rest of the world. 
Malpas notes that this distinction marks the difference between the subjective 
and the objective realms of experience, sometimes understood as what a 
creature can do (and knows it can do), and what it actually does. 
Important to knowing the difference between oneself and other objects, and of 
appreciating one's capacities, is the 'body-schema'. According to Malpas and 
others, 139 the body-schema is the innate, subconscious knowledge which we 
have of our bodies. This includes such things as knowing that our bodies are 
separate from other objects, where our limbs are, and the sense of our 
orientation in space. I seem to know without thinking, for example, whether or 
not my legs are crossed, or where my hands are, or whether I am sitting or 
standing. The body-schema permits us to be aware of, and to monitor 
changes in our bodies and in the orientation of our bodies (Malpas 1999), pp 
109-111. 
139 For example, see John Campbell and Shaun Gallagher. See 'The Body Image and Self-
Consciousness' and 'Body-Schema and Intentionality' in (Bermalez, Marcel et al. 1995), pp 
29-42; pp 225-244. 
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The body-schema is an important aspect of the embodied self, as it provides 
first-person knowledge of myself as an object in space, and enables me to 
differentiate myself as a real, tangible existent from the objects around me. 
The body-schema is not synonymous with the embodied self, but is an 
essential component of it. For unless I had a sense of myself as an object 
separate from other objects, and of having limbs, and of being oriented in 
space, it is difficult to perceive how I could recognise myself as myself, or as 
an entity with the potential for movement, or with the ability to effect change in 
the world. 
Also involved in the embodied self is the body-image. This refers to the 
reflective, self-conscious awareness or beliefs about one's body, and is the 
sense of one's body which is involved in the actions which one may commit at 
a particular time, rather than those of whose potential we are more generally 
aware. As the potential and importance of the body-schema and the body-
image are relatively new in the study of the self, the difference between their 
roles is only incompletely understood. But what is apparent from studies of the 
relation between embodiment and the self, 140 is that a direct relation pertains 
between the sense of one's bodily capacities and one's orientation in space, 
and the sense of one's self as an efficacious object, capable of effecting 
changes in objects separate from oneself. 
Not all theorists, however, recognise the primacy of the embodied self. Galen 
Strawson, for example, argues that the self is primarily mental : 
the self ... is ... a mental presence; a mental someone; a single mental thing that is a 
conscious subject of experience, that has a certain character or personality, and that 
140Such as the studies mentioned earlier (see previous footnote), and those which will be 
referred to in the remainder of this chapter. 
is in some sense distinct from all its particular experiences, thoughts, and so on, and 
indeed from all other things. It is crucial that it is thought of as a distinctively mental 
phenomenon (Strawson 1997), p 407. 
Strawson argues that bodies are inconsequential to the self, as they are little 
more than 'vessels' which contain the most essential mental part of ourselves 
(Strawson 1997), pp 405-414. 
George Butterworth is one theorist who takes issue with Strawson, arguing 
that the mental or conceptual self is underpinned by a more basic self, which 
is experienced through the body, and which first arises as a perceptual 
response to the immediate environment: 
Perceiving is a spatio-temporal process which provides a continuous flow of 
information about the embodied self in its encounters with the physical and social 
world (Butterworth 1998), p 132. 
Butterworth claims that the embodied self is the self's most fundamental 
aspect, and is foundational and intrinsic to the more developed, cognitive 
aspects of the self. Referring to Strawson's mental self, Butterworth states that 
an 'overly cognitive' view of the self divides the self from the environment, and 
from the body. But, argues Butterworth, this is a mistake, as it is only in virtue 
of the embodied self that the cognitive self can develop. The distinction which 
Butterworth makes is between the immediate perceptual experience of the 
self, and the formation of a self-concept. In opposition to Strawson, 
Butterworth argues that immediate awareness of the self occurs before the 




Butterworth refers to Neisser's five kinds of self-knowledge, in which the 
ecological self, that is, the self as experienced through the body's interaction 
with the immediate environment, is understood to be the primary form of self-
experience, and which, with the interpersonal self, is the natural precursor to 
concept-formation. For it is only in virtue of the body's interaction with its 
immediate environment that the information on which concepts are based is 
received (Butterworth 1998), p 133. 
Butterworth's view highlights the inadequacy of a purely mental self by 
pointing out the significance of the embodied self to the possibility of the later 
conceptual self, and to the consequent maturation of mental life. For unless 
we have a sense of ourselves as bodies located in space, co-existing with 
other objects, receiving perceptual information from those objects, it is difficult 
to see how our thoughts and concepts about those objects could be formed, or 
how such thoughts and concepts could have any coherent meaning. It can 
thus be seen that the embodied sense of self is a crucial aspect of mental life, 
which needs to be recognised by the psychological continuity criterion, if its 
account of personal identity is to accurately reflect the essential features of 
mental life and activity of which personal identity is composed. 
As well as holding metaphysical primacy to the cognitive self, the embodied 
self also holds temporal primacy. For the embodied self is the first way in 
which young infants experience the self. This is apparent from the study of 
infant behaviour, in which the co-ordinated bodily activities of infants are 
observed. These studies are comparatively new in the study of the self, and 
thus add new and important information to the traditional philosophical 
considerations of the self. Important among the findings of these studies is the 
view that the sense of self as a unity is present in infants from the earliest 
experiences of life, and that as an infant's capacities and experiences 
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progress and develop, the infant's sense of self-unity progresses and 
develops also. This view of the self is in contrast to Parfit's view, which sees 
the self as a peripheral concept to experience, and as, therefore, irrelevant to 
personal identity. The view of the self presented here, however, takes the self 
seriously, and conceives it to be essentially the first-person perspective of self-
unity which is necessary for experience of any kind to occur, whether such 
experiences are those of young infants, or whether they are those of fully-
functioning cognitively developed adults. As will become more evident as the 
arguments for the dynamic sense of self proceed, because this sense of self is 
integral to all forms of experience and mental life, it is inevitably also integral 
to personal identity. To develop the arguments for the embodied self, and to 
show how this self is primary and fundamentally necessary to the cognitive 
self, the embodied self is now considered in more detail, first by considering 
the relevance of bodily movement, and second, by considering the relevance 
of perceptual integration. 
6.6 The Importance of Movement 
Recent studies of young infants support the view that the embodied self is 
primary to, and preconditional to the later developing cognitive self. These 
studies indicate that the self is experienced right from birth, and that it 
develops throughout infancy, along with the maturation of the brain's neural 
structures. Because they experience this bodily sense of self, infant's are able 
to differentiate themselves from the rest of the world, to learn about their own 
bodily capacities, and consequently, to develop the skill required to orient and 
direct their movements. 
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Maxine Sheets-Johnstone supports the view that infants first experience their 
sense of self through movement. 141 She argues that through their bodily 
movements, infants learn things about themselves, such as that they are not 
rooted to the ground, that they have limbs, and that the world is made up of 
ground and space. Activities such as bending, stretching, and lifting give 
infants a sense of themselves and their surroundings, and of things such as 
closeness, distance, and direction. Sheets-Johnstone argues that movement 
is the most fundamental source of knowledge: 
Coming to know the world in a quite literal sense means coming to grips with it - 
exploring it, searching it, discovering it in and through movement. There is no 
human culture in which movement is not epistemologically central in this way. There 
is, indeed, no culture in which movement is not our mother tongue (Sheets-
Johnstone 1999), p 226. 
Movement is thus likely to be the earliest source of self-knowledge. Sheets-
Johnstone argues that for infants, movement is foundational to other types of 
learning about themselves, and about objects outside themselves. 
Adults are also sensitive to movement, as we often respond to things such as 
facial expressions, eye and lip movements, and other gestures. Sheets-
Johnstone claims we are 'kinetically attuned to each other', and that the 
capacity for such attunement is probably innate. Movement teaches both 
infants and adults about the difference between objects, and the perception of 
objects. Movement allows us to directly engage with the world, rather than to 
be passive observers (Sheets-Johnstone 1999), pp 228-229. 
141 An objector could claim that quadriplegics have a sense of self, yet cannot move in the 
normal way. In most cases however, these persons would have developed in the normal way 
prior to their disability. I know of no cases in which persons have been totally paralysed from 
birth. Were such a thing to be possible (which I doubt), such persons might develop a minimal 
sense of self through their ability to blink, breath, move their tongue, swallow, and so on. Were 
none of these movements possible, it is difficult to see how such an individual would qualify as a 
human being in the normally understood way. 
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In these comments, Sheets-Johnstone points to something very important 
about ourselves, something which we take for granted. This is the fact that 
there is a fundamental difference between the preconditions of directed 
movement, and the preconditions of the passive reception of movement. 
Consider, for example, the difference between, on the one hand, being carried 
from one room to another and someone taking hold of your hand and guiding 
it towards an object, and, on the other hand, you walking into the room and 
you moving your hand yourself. In the first instance, you did not initiate or 
direct the movements, whereas in the second instance, you did. In other 
words, in the first example, you were passive, and in the second, you were 
active. To be passive requires no effort on your part, but to be active does. 
The effort required for activity is dependent on certain elements, and on there 
being a certain unity among those elements. The elements concerned include 
your sense that your body is your body, that your body is a united entity (that 
is, that the parts within it are connected to and integrated with each other), and 
that your body is under your control. It is the unity between these elements 
which compose and provide the a sense of yourself as an embodied entity, 
and which give you the capacity for directed action. 
It is important to realise, however, that the bodily sense of self referred to here 
is not a self-conscious awareness, or in any way a cognitive awareness. It is 
much more direct and unmediated than that. Cognitive awareness, in fact, 
would be of no use to the capacity for embodied activity in the sense being 
discussed here. Cognitive awareness of the ability to act is secondary to 
embodied awareness, and develops out of embodied awareness. As infants 
develop, their motility increases, along with the development of the 
appropriate neural structures in the brain. As conceptual frameworks develop, 
so also does the ability for self-awareness, and ultimately, for cognitive 
awareness of their innate, already developed physical abilities. 
The innate bodily sense of self, experienced by young infants, is evident from 
observation of their movements. Infants have a natural ability to move their 
hands and kick their legs. Studies of these activities show that the infants' 
movements are not aimless and random, but display a considerable degree of 
purposeful activity. Video-taped studies of young infants bear this out. A 
common early practice of young infants is to attempt to put their fists in their 
mouths. This activity, far from being uncoordinated, involves the correlation of 
limbs and body parts, all at the same time as much writhing and kicking is 
going on. In one study of these activities, many infants made contact with the 
mouth easily, but some struggled at first. But these infants persisted, gradually 
improving their aim, until they made the desired contact. Such persistence do 
not sound like the activities of a random, aimless, disunited, amorphous blob 
of flesh and bone, but rather like those of an intensely determined and 
directed being. Studies like these lead some theorists to believe that much 
self-directed activity occurs before birth, while the infant is still in the womb. 
George Butterworth, for example, claims that studies like the one above 
demonstrate that infants have a 'well organized system, which may have 
benefited from practice in utero' (Butterworth 1995), p 91. 
As infants develop and experience more of the world, their sense of self 
develops also. Information received by infants from their various sensory 
modalities contributes to this development. Visual perception is one prime 
example of this process. When combined with movement, visual perception 
provides self-specifying information for normally-sighted infants. 142 This refers 
1 42 Congenitally non-sighted infants do not have the advantage of visually-provided 
information. Deprived of this aid to the development of the self, their sense of self matures 
more slowly than that of sighted infants. 
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to information which permits the infant to distinguish between things which are 
part of himself, and things which are not. As vision develops, infants learn 
about objects in their visual field, and about how their own movements make 
these objects appear to change location in relation to their own position. One 
way of understanding this process is to consider that the act of perception 
involves receiving two types of perceptual information, that which relates to the 
perceiver, and that which relates to the object being perceived. Drawing on 
the work of Sherrington and Gibson, Butterworth refers to the first of these 
types as propriospecific information and the second as exterospecific 
information. Propriospecific information specifies the subject to himself, and is 
thus 'self-sensitive'. Exterospecific information specifies objects in the 
subject's environment. These two types of information are not received 
separately, but are two simultaneous aspects of a single perceptual response 
(Butterworth 1995), p 89. 
Self-specifying information is received by infants as they perform various 
activities, such as crawling, walking, and running. During this process, infants 
become increasingly aware of themselves as single, coordinated, individuals. 
Their movements contribute to their awareness of the boundaries between 
themselves and other things, and hence of the difference between themselves 
and other things. Infants' instinctive awareness of themselves against their 
surroundings has been demonstrated in room-moving experiments. The 
infants' responses to these experiments indicate an innate sense of 
themselves, and of their own bodily unity. In one such experiment, a three-
sided 'room' was constructed and suspended above the ground. Infants, 
sitting down, were placed inside, and the room was then moved back and 
forth, making it appear to the infants that the end wall was moving backwards 
and forwards in front of them. Because walls do not normally move in this 
way, it appeared to the infants that it was they who were swaying backwards 
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and forwards, rather than the wall in front of them. This incongruity made the 
infants try to correct their posture (which was not, in fact, faulty), and they, 
therefore, fell over. (Butterworth and Harris 1994), p 82. Butterworth sees 
these attempts at posture correction as indicating that the infants had an 
implicit, unself-conscious bodily self-awareness. For, argues Butterworth, it is 
only if an infant senses that it is he himself who is falling over that he would be 
able take the compensatory action required to try to prevent this from 
happening (Butterworth 1998), pp 133-134. 
The above studies are examples of ways in which infants respond bodily to 
their surroundings. More specifically, the infants' attempts to orient their body 
parts in response to their surroundings demonstrates that the infants innately 
sense their separateness from their surroundings, and that they have the 
capacity to act in response to that separateness. The capacity to respond to 
one's surroundings with movement coincides with Neisser's concept of the 
ecological self. It is this early aspect of the self which first receives information 
about the world, and about one's place within that world. This information is 
foundational, as it is only by having the sense of oneself as an embodied 
creature, capable of moving in one's surroundings, that other more advanced 
forms of information can make any sense. For, without the sense of myself as 
a body in space, capable of moving in space, how could I understand what it 
means for objects other than myself to exist, or what it means for me to 
perceive them? Without this sense of self, we could make no sense of 
experience, or of objects, or indeed, of anything at all. This view of the 
embodied sense of self contrasts with the view that the self has no force or 
efficaciousness. It points to the fact that the ability to have experience is not a 
given, but requires certain preconditions of self-awareness, even though for 
young infants this self-awareness is unconscious, it is nevertheless present in 
the achievement (and often struggle for) the self-unity which is necessary for 
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directed activities and movements to occur. As this embodied self is an 
essential precursor to, and an important part of the more developed cognitive 
self, it is also an essential precursor to mental life, and thus should be 
recognised when accounting mental life and for personal identity. The primary 
role of the body in self-awareness is further elucidated by considering the 
propensity to integrate various facets of perceptual information. 
6.7 The Importance of Integration 
In addition to motility, the ability of infants to integrate various facets of their 
experiences is taken as evidence of a bodily sense of self, and in many 
instances, as evidence that this sense of self is innate. Recall that the self is 
understood primarily as a unity, in which various aspects of experience and 
ability are co-ordinated into a single, coherent whole, which is apprehended 
and perceived by the subject as belonging to and referring to him. The ability 
of infants to integrate experiences includes the ability to connect past 
experiences with present ones, and the ability to connect various facets of a 
single experience, so that experience is apprehended as a single, coherent 
event. This integration process is possible due to the fact that all our 
experiences are self-referencial. This means that I do not experience my 
movements, my perceptual intake, or my thoughts naively or neutrally, as if 
they were in a vacuum, and did not apply to any particular person, or any 
particular thing. I experience them very much as mine, as belonging to me. 
This sense that what I experience is mine, is only possible due to the 
unification of the different aspects of a perceptual event into a coherent whole, 
or, in other words, due to the unity of the self. Experiencing my perceptual 
responses as mine, and experiencing them as coherent, are thus interrelated 
and mutually supportive - while each is dependent on the other, neither is 
primary to the other. 
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The natural inclination to integrate perceptual input was demonstrated above 
when referring to room-moving experiments. When confronted with 
perceptually incongruent situations, compensatory action is taken so that a 
coherent response is reached, which in this case was falling over. When older 
infants or adults are involved in room-moving experiments, their compensatory 
response consists of altering their body posture in order to avoid falling over. 
Many different types of perceptually incongruent situations are possible. In 
cases where these situations are difficult to resolve, we have the sense that 
something is wrong, which needs to remedied if perception is to be coherent. 
The drawings of Max Escher is an example of this type of phenomena. 
Figure 13 Relativity 
Reproduced from 
http://www.artistsuk.net/acatalog/ARTISTS_UK  PRINTS_133.html 
In these drawings, situations are represented which are impossible in the real 
world, such as perspectives which are distorted and impossible (See figure 
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14), three-dimensional objects emerging from two-dimensional surfaces, 
staircases which appear to ascend, but which reach a level seemingly lower 
than the one from which they started, or objects with incongruous structural 
features, such that apparently external boundaries also appear to be present 
inside objects. The reason we find these drawings so confounding is because 
we instinctively try to integrate the conflicting elements into a coherent whole, 
and find we are unable to do so. Our instinctive drive to integrate seemingly 
incompatible elements into a single perceptual response stems from the from 
the need to unify diverse elements of our experiences into a single 
subjectivity, so that these elements make sense to that subjectivity. This 
means that one way of locating the sense of self is by ascertaining whether the 
elements of an individual's experience are more-or-less integrated into a 
single, coherent whole. When considering young infants, this strategy is 
particularly useful, as it is a reliable indicator that a sense of self is present. 
Researchers have recently examined the perceptual and bodily responses of 
young infants in a variety of ways. Their findings indicate that a bodily sense 
of self is unequivocally present in young infants, and, according to some 
researchers, is innately present. The innateness of this sense of self 
contradicts the work of some earlier researchers, such as Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty agrees that the primary mode of self-experience is through the 
body (Merleau-Ponty 1964), pp 13-125. He notes that before they are able to 
engage in language, infants exhibit bodily responses, such as smiles and 
gestures, to those around them He sees these forms of communication as 
ways in which we become aware of ourselves, at the same time as we 
become aware of others. According to Merleau-Ponty, this awareness first 
begins in infants at three to six months of age. Prior to this time, infants live in 
a primitive and undifferentiated world, in which there is no self-awareness. 
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Not until about six months of age, claims Merleau-Ponty, can an infant 'look 
another child in the face', and know that he is perceiving another person. 
Merleau-Ponty holds that it is at this age that the myelinzation of the required 
neural connections is sufficiently advanced for these connections to operate, 
and for the child to have a sense of its own body schema (Merleau-Ponty 
1964), pp 13-125. 143 
More recent research, however, and the devising of new study techniques, 
causes several theorists to disagree with Merleau-Ponty, and to claim that a 
sense of self is experienced much earlier that Merleau-Ponty thought. This 
claim is based on studies of very young infants, including newborns. An 
important aspect of these studies is the testing of infants' ability to co-ordinate 
various perceptual elements into a single, coherent perceptual response, and 
thus to determine the presence of rudimentary self-awareness. Habituation, 
olfactory discrimination, phantom limbs, and imitation are some of the topics 
studied. 144 These studies bear out that the sense of self is present very early 
in life, and is integral to even the most primitive experiences. This adds further 
weight to the argument for the necessity of the self to all forms of experience, 
and to the priority of the embodied self over the more mature cognitive self. 
6.7.1 	Habituation 
'Habituation' is the familiarisation process in which infants are presented with 
objects which elicit a perceptual response, visual response being an example 
frequently tested. In such tests, infants are found to initially respond to new 
143. Myelinization is the developmental process by which neurones in the peripheral nervous 
system become covered with a layer of fatty membrane (Curtis 1983), p 1101. 
144The ability for 'cross-modal translation', that is, to translate one mode of perception to 
another, such that one instinctively knows whether what one sees is the same as what one 
feels, is another infant response which has been tested. See (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), pp 
223-227, and (Stern 1985), pp 47-51. This ability (for sighted infants) is seen as indicating the 
presence of an innate body schema, and of the ability to connect different modes of perception 
in a single, subjective space, and thus as indicating the presence and development of the 
embodied self. Space precludes a detailed examination of this topic. There are indeed, too 
many studies which strongly indicate the presence of early infant self-experience to include 
here. 
236 
objects with great interest, and to spend considerable time looking at them. As 
the objects become familiar, the infants gradually lose interest, and look at the 
objects less. Then, when new objects are presented, the infants again look 
longer the new stimuli. This variation in response is taken to indicate the 
infants' ability to discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar objects. When 
presented with a smiling face, for example, an infant will first look with steady 
interest, but will eventually lose interest and look away. But when the smiling 
face is replaced by a 'surprised' face, the infant resumes interest and 
continues to look at the new stimuli. This is taken to indicate that the infant can 
tell the difference between the two presentations (Stern 1985), pp 39-41. 
The ability to discriminate between earlier and later presentations is only 
possible if the infant has the capacity to connect (albeit unconsciously) its 
various perceptual responses, such that those which were repeated can 
become familiar, and those which are presented later can be detected as 
different. This ability would not be possible unless the various presentations 
appeared to a single, more-or-less united subjectivity, in which there was the 
sense that it was the one and same self to which these diverse experiences 
were presented. It is thus taken by researchers and theorists that infants who 
are capable of habituation must have the capacity to make the required 
connections between past and present perceptual responses, and that such 
infants, therefore, have the sense of self required for such connections to be 
possible. The frequent use of habituation in infant studies indicates that 
infants do not experience the world and themselves as an undifferentiated 
mass, but rather that, through their bodies, they experience themselves 
strongly and distinctly at a much younger age than Merleau-Ponty's stipulated 
six months. The testing of infants' early olfactory discriminative abilities bears 
this out. 
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6.7.2 	Olfactory Discrimination 
Using the principles of habituation, the abilities of infants to discriminate 
between diverse olfactory stimuli have been tested. Olfactory discrimination is 
only possible if an infant can connect stimuli experienced earlier with stimuli 
experienced later. In one study, the abilities of three-day old infants to 
discriminate between the smell of their own mothers' milk, and the smell of 
milk from other mothers were tested. This test comprised of infants being 
placed on their backs with breast pads on either side of the head. One of 
these pads was taken from their own mothers, and one was taken from a 
different mother. The results of the test showed that irrespective of on which 
side the pads were placed, the infants 'reliably' turned towards the pads taken 
from their own mothers. This is taken as evidence of infants' ability to 'know' 
the difference between the odour of their own mothers, and the odour taken 
from elsewhere. In other words, to have the ability to distinguish between the 
familiar and the unfamiliar. The ability to make this distinction is entirely 
dependent on the infants' being able to co-ordinate their bodily experiences in 
some way, so that connections and comparisons between earlier and later 
stimuli are possible. The ability to may these connections and comparisons is 
taken by researchers to indicate that the infants have rudimentary self-
awareness, described by Daniel Stern as the 'emergent' self. 
In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, Stern argues that the first two months of life are 
rich with the structure and organisation of a self that 'will remain active for the 
rest of life'. Stern argues that infants cannot be held to experience a lack of 
organisation. We can only imagine such a lack of organisation because we 
understand what organisation is like. Stern claims that the infant's first 
experiences are implicitly differentiated experiences, which become 'yoked' 
together into a single reference point, causing the infant to experience an 
initial sense of organisation. As the reference point builds up, the sense of self 
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emerges. Stern claims the self is both the product and process of 
organisation. He claims that infants' abilities to cohere and amalgamate their 
experiences, and to develop and expand the body of knowledge we call the 
self, indicates that the principle of unity is operative right from the beginnings 
of life (Stern 1985), pp 39- 46. Stern's concept of the emergent self coheres 
with the idea of the embodied self as the dynamic unity of experience and 
ability which develops in tandem with the activities of young infants, and which 
continues to develop and expand throughout life. This view of the self 
contrasts with that of the psychological continuity criterion, which takes for 
granted the ability of humans to have conceptualised experiences, and sees 
no connection between this ability and the earlier developed bodily 
organisation which marks the development of young infants. This produces 
an account of personal identity which alienates the body from experience and 
mental life, and results in an inadequate appreciation of the body's crucial role 
in mental life and correspondingly, in personal identity. 
6.7.3 	Phantom Limbs 
Studies of aplasic phantom limbs also supports the case that self-awareness 
is first experienced through the body. 145 There are strong indications that 
phantom limbs are associated with the body image or the body schema, or 
even with both. The body schema and the body image are key components of 
the embodied self, as they relate to instinctive knowledge about our body and 
body parts. Recall that the body schema is the most basic form of body-
knowledge. It comprises a set of 'motor functions' which operate without self-
conscious or intentional self-reference, and involves the body's unreflected 
posture and movements. By contrast, the body-image is intentional body-
knowledge, and involves perceptual, conceptual, and emotional responses. 
145.Aplasia' is the congenital absence of a limb, that is, a limb which is absent from birth. 
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Normally, these two forms of body-knowledge are free to operate separately or 
together as required. 
We have, for example, basic non-reflective knowledge of where body parts are 
when conducting activities such as walking. In normal walking, only the body 
schema is used. But when steps are consciously directed, such as when 
avoiding puddles, the body image is also used. Cases in which the body 
schema or the body image are damaged are instructive in detecting the 
presence or absence of bodily self-awareness. Neural disorders such as 
hemi-neglect and deafferention are examples of damaged body schemas and 
body images. 
Hemi-neglect occurs when the body schema is present, but the body image is 
absent. In one reported case of hemi-neglect, a patient has a persistent 
perceptual defect, relating to the left side of her body. She neglects that side, 
forgets to dress it, or to comb her hair on that side, and so on. Yet, this patient 
walks and moves the neglected side normally, using hands and fingers in the 
usual way. Her instinctive actions are unaffected, but her reflective ones are. 
Deafferention occurs when the body image is damaged, but the body schema 
is still present. In one case of deafferention, a patient lacks proprioceptive and 
tactile input from the neck down. Control of limbs below this level thus does 
not occur in the normal non-reflective way. The patient must therefore exert 
conscious cognitive and visual control, much as we would with objects 
external to ourselves. In both of the above cases, the body schema and the 
body image are disconnected (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), pp 214-216. 
Similarly, a disconnection between the body schema and the body image is 
thought to occur when phantom limbs are experienced. The development of 
phantom limbs in cases other than aplasia or early amputations, is understood 
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to indicate a conflict between the body schema, in which the limb is still 
'present', and the body image, in which the limb is absent. Gallagher cites that 
prior to 1961, the fact that aplasia and amputations prior to age six did not 
produce phantoms was taken to indicate that the body schema had developed 
since birth, and thus did not include the absent limb. It was assumed that, 
because there was no conflict between schema and image, a phantom was 
not produced. But the development of more accurate study techniques has 
caused these earlier findings to be questioned (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), 
pp 217-218. 
In one post 1961 study of thirty aplasics, 17% were found to experience 
phantom limbs. These phantoms usually appear between the age of five and 
eight years, but can appear later when under stress, or when undergoing life-
changes such as puberty. According to Gallagher, these findings indicate that 
earlier views that aplasic phantoms are not part of the body schema, and that 
the body schema is not present at birth, require reconsideration. For, unless 
the body schema, in which all limbs were present, existed at or prior to birth, 
the appearance of a phantom limb in the place where a limb had never 
existed required explanation. Gallagher suggests that the fact aplasics had 
not experienced phantoms from birth did not automatically mean that the body 
schema was absent at birth, but could mean that the early experiences of 
phantoms had been forgotten, or that the phantoms were present, but, 
because of immaturity, were inadequately apprehended. While these findings 
does not prove that the body schema is innate, they strongly to support that 
view, and are certainly not inconsistent with it. Gallagher cites other studies 146 
which indicate that the body schema is innate, but is open to modification 'by 
146For example: Melzack, 1989; Poeck, 1963; Scatena, 1990; Vetter & Weinstein, 1967; 
and Weinstein etal., 1964 (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), p 214. 
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multimodal sensory experiences' throughout life (Gallagher and Meltzoff 
1996), pp 214-219. 
In addition, Gallagher suggests that revised testing techniques indicate that 
the body image might also be innate. Earlier theorists had presented 
confused findings regarding whether phantoms belonged to the body schema 
or the body image. One example was Simmel, who appropriated the phantom 
to the schema, but described it in terms of the image, that is, as a conscious 
representation, in which particular feelings were experienced in the phantom, 
such as a pain or an itch. Such experiences would indicate that the phantom 
was experienced explicitly, and was therefore part of the body image, rather 
than the body schema. Gallagher holds that these findings indicate that the 
body image could be present in some rudimentary form at birth, but, due to the 
difficulty in distinguishing between the body schema and the body image, this 
should not be taken to indicate that the body schema is not. In fact ( as 
outlined below), Gallagher claims that studies of infant imitative abilities add 
weight to the view that the body schema is innate also (Gallagher and Meltzoff 
1996), pp 217-220. While aplasic phantom limb studies do not yet answer all 
the questions concerning the body schema and the body image, they do 
indicate that aplasic phantom limbs are connected in some way to an early 
form bodily self-awareness which appears to be innate. And while the body 
schema and the body image are still not perfectly understood, what we can 
know of them adds considerable weight to the case that a primitive bodily self-
awareness is present early in life. This bodily self-awareness is integral to 
early infant activity, and is thus the natural pre-cursor to the later developed 
cognitive awareness. The connection between bodily self-awareness and 
cognitive self-awareness is not taken into account by Parfit and other 
psychological continuity theorists, as their focus is on mental life itself, rather 
than on the preconditions which permit mental life to exist. This results in a 
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misunderstanding of what mental life involves, and correspondingly, in what 
personal identity involves also. 
6.7.4 	Imitation 
The ability of young infants to imitate simple bodily gestures is taken by many 
researchers to indicate that a bodily sense of self is present. Such gestures 
could be facial expressions or tongue protrusions, and are thought to be 
possible only due to an instinctive 'recognition' between one's own body 
parts, and the body parts of others. This would not be possible without a 
sense of one's body, and without a rudimentary sense of unity between one's 
body parts. Also important to imitation is the ability to distinguish between 
oneself and the object or person imitated. Acts of imitation indicate the 
presence of Neisser's interpersonal self. Through these acts, selves respond 
to other selves or persons. I relate to you, I want to be like you, so I copy you. 
Clearly, one cannot respond to others in this way (or indeed, in any other way) 
if one does not have a sense of oneself as a self which is separate from 
others. The apparently instinctive imitation abilities of young infants thus 
indicates their sense of bodily integration, and their sense of being a self 
distinct from other selves. 
Gallagher's studies of infant imitative abilities is part of his exploration of the 
body schema and the body image. Piaget's view had been that a child under 
eight months lacked the relevant intellectual mechanism for imitation. It was 
also understood that imitation would be impossible without a body schema. 
Thus, the (presumed) inability of infants to imitate was taken as evidence of a 
lack of body schema. Gallagher agrees that imitative abilities require a body 
schema, but claims that as there is ample evidence of infant's imitative 
abilities, there is also evidence of an innate body schema. Gallagher cites 
experiments to support this view. In a series of four experiments, in which 
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newborns and slightly older infants were exposed to a variety of imitative 
situations, the infants demonstrated an immediate ability to imitate. Each 
experiment consisted of babies being confronted by an adult engaging in one 
or more facial gestures, including tongue-protrusion, mouth opening, and 
head turning (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), pp 220-221. 
In the first experiment, forty normal newborns, aged between one and seventy-
one hours, were each confronted for set intervals, first with mouth-opening, 
and second, with tongue protrusion gestures. The results of this experiment 
showed that the infants had a strong tendency to imitate, including the 
youngest, at only forty-two minutes old! Subsequent experiments involved 
progressively more complex variations in the gestures, and included older 
infants. The data from these studies further supports the arguments for infant 
imitative abilities, and in the case of the 'older' infants (16-21 days and 6 
weeks), an ability to both remember and improve their earlier gestures, and to 
distinguish between familiar and novel gestures. Commenting on Merleau-
Ponty's view that imitation requires a developed body schema, Gallagher 
argues that the positive response of newborns to imitation clearly indicates 
that a primitive body schema is present from the earliest moments of life, and 
thus rejects Merleau-Ponty's view of initial infant indifferentiation (Gallagher 
and Meltzoff 1996), pp 221-223. Gallagher's and similar findings concerning 
the imitative abilities of newborns and infants add weight to the case for an 
innate body schema, and to the view that even the earliest activities of young 
infants involve a bodily sense of self. 
The above studies of infant activities, such as movement, habituation, 
perceptual discrimination, imitation, and so on, are examples of activities in 
which the unity of the embodied self is a crucial component. For, as has been 
explicated, it is only by experiencing my body as my body, and as a more-or- 
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less integrated unity under my control, that I can initiate and perform the 
activities concerned. In demonstrating the role of this early form of self-unity, 
these studies furnish explanations concerning the bodily unity that is essential 
to experience and embodied action, which is missing from Parfit's and similar 
psychological continuity theorists' conceptions of the self. These conceptions 
do not take seriously the self's role in activity, and consequently, fail to 
appreciate the self's role in mental life. The relation between embodied 
experience and cognitive ability becomes more apparent as the development 
from the immediate experience of bodily self-awareness to the more reflective, 
mediated self-awareness is explored, in this instance, by considering the 
formation of autobiographical memories. 
6.8 Remembering Oneself 
The difference between elementary bodily self-experience and later 
developed cognitive self-awareness is the difference between direct and 
reflective experience. Developed cognitive self-awareness involves a self-
conscious self-awareness, as opposed to an instinctive or unmediated self-
awareness. The transition from one to the other is still inadequately 
understood, although much has been learnt. The ability to form and access 
certain types of memories is taken as one of the hallmarks of cognitive 
development. In particular, the formation of autobiographical memories is 
important to the development of the cognitive self. Discovering when such 
memories begin indicates when children first gain a sense of diachronic 
identity, that is, the sense of being the same person in the present that they 
were in the past, and that they will be in the future. Understanding the 
transition from unmediated self-experience to mediated self-experience is 
helpful to appreciating the role of the body in self-awareness in both 
instances. 
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6.8.1 	The Beginnings of Self-Identity 
Experiments with children have been conducted to discover at what age 
cognitive self-awareness begins. An important element in these experiments 
is the discovery of when children are able to identify themselves as being the 
same persons at a later time that they were at an earlier time. Bodily identity is 
a crucial factor in this regard, as children's sense of themselves is very much 
tied to their bodily experiences. In one such experiment, children were 
videoed, and their ability to recognise themselves was subsequently tested. 
This experiment comprised an initial session in which a group of three to five 
year olds were video-recorded playing a game, and a follow-up session which 
was conducted a week later. On the first occasion, a sticker was, unbeknown 
to the child, placed on each child's head during the playing of an 'unusual 
game'. A week later, the procedure was repeated when the children were 
playing a different game, in a different location. Three minutes after being 
videoed, half the children were shown the recent video-recording, while the 
other half were shown the one taken a week earlier (Butterworth 1998), pp 
136-137. 
The results from the study showed the that responses to the recordings were 
different between the older children and the younger children. Whereas the 
older children shown the recent video responded differently to the older 
children shown the earlier one, the response between the two younger age-
groups was much the same for both videos. More precisely, four to five year 
olds who viewed the recent recording demonstrated a continuing sense of self 
with the self of a few minutes earlier. This was evident from reference to their 
video image as 'me', and from their attempts to remove the sticker from their 
own heads. This same age-group who were shown the week-old video-
recording responded differently. Apparently aware of the time discrepancy 
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between then and now, even though they identified themselves with the 
earlier images, no attempt was made by the children to remove the sticker. In 
the case of the three year olds, however, there was no apparent difference in 
response to the earlier and later videos. In both groups, children attempted to 
remove stickers, indicating their identification with the video image, but an 
apparent unawareness of the difference between the self then, and the self 
now. Researchers infer from this that the child's sense of self over time, that is, 
the autobiographical sense of self, emerges at around four years old. This 
development requires the child's awareness of 'perspective duplication', 
otherwise understood as knowing the difference between an earlier and a 
later self (Butterworth 1998), pp 137-138. 
Researchers concluded that children's ability from about four years old to 
identify with the earlier self implies that their self-awareness is less reliant on 
visual and proprioceptive feed-back of present perceptual input, than is that of 
younger children. Butterworth points out that development of the 
autobiographical self is not simply a cognitive achievement, but is also the 
ability to 'duplicate perspectives' - to relate the self then to the self now. While 
researchers could not completely determine the mechanisms involved, the 
ability could be related to the capacity to represent symbolically, such as 
through language. Also believed to occur around the same time is the child's 
ability to attribute mental life to others, sometimes described as the 
development of a 'theory of mind'. Together, these achievements indicate that 
the mental self is a symbolic self, while the ecological and interpersonal 
selves are non-symbolic (Butterworth 1998), pp 138-139. 
These experiments indicate that the self is the outcome of a complex 
developmental process, whose earliest phases involve proprioceptive 
responses. These responses are initiated by bodily and social engagement 
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between subject and environment, resulting in a 'core' sense of self. The 
mental self is secondary to, and develops out the 'core' self, and is thus just 
one aspect of a 'many-faceted' self. While this self ultimately entails a 
cognitive, remembering, introspective self, it only does so in virtue of its initial 
proprioceptive, bodily engagement with the environment, and with other 
selves (Butterworth 1998), p 139. These findings concerning the transition 
from the earlier, bodily self-experience to the later, cognitive self-experience 
demonstrate that the embodied self is an important precursor to mental life, 
and thus furnish explanations as to how that mental life becomes possible, 
which are missing from the psychological continuity criterion's conception of 
the self. 
6.8.2 	The Emergence of the Cognitive Self 
The relation between the cognitive self and the development of 
autobiographical memory has been further explored by some researchers. An 
issue of concern to these researchers is the occurrence of apparent 'infant 
amnesia', that is, the inability of adults to remember anything prior to the age 
of two years. It seems incongruous that infants display considerable early 
memory ability, yet none of this earlier period can be recalled later. The 
period from which adult memories are first recalled coincides with the onset of 
the cognitive self. It had been held that the cognitive self requires certain 
neural structures for memory experience, yet infants appear to experience 
memories much earlier than when these structures develop. 
Research by Howe and Courage indicates that the emergence of the cognitive 
self coincides with the emergence of ability to verbalise, and consequently, to 
integrate the contents of autobiographical memory, rather than with the ability 
to experience the memories themselves. Howe and Courage maintain that 
the mechanisms required for memory are operative much earlier than when 
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memory is first evident. Memory requires 'hardware' and 'software'. 
Hardware refers to the necessary neurological structures, software the skills, 
knowledge, and language needed for memories to form. Howe and Courage 
argue that both 'structures' are operative early in life, even for neonates. 147 
They contribute to of all types of memory formation, including autobiographical 
memory. Apparent changes which occur when memory ability is first evident 
is not due to sudden onset of previously unavailable skills, but to the 
continuing development of 'software', specifically of the cognitive self. 
Memory does not emerge later as a separate system, discontinuous with 
previously operating neural processes, but is rather part of a single, dynamic, 
ongoing process (Howe and Courage 1997), pp 499-500. 
An important aspect of Howe and Courage's research is their distinction 
between the development and the emergence of the cognitive self. The 
cognitive self is the culmination of a developmental process which begins very 
early in the life of human infants. Habituation and early recognition responses 
indicate the presence of much neural processing during the earliest stages of 
infant development. Although this early activity is taken as to indicate an 
emerging sense of self, the immaturity of infants' neural processing 
mechanisms prevents the emergence of the cognitive self until some time 
later. Initially, the human infant undergoes a steady process of maturation, 
until about two years of age, when an important developmental shift occurs. 
The shift involves infants reaching a certain stage of neural development. 
Howe and Courage argue that the level of neural change involved does not 
match the change in memory ability manifest at the same time. Increased 
memory ability is not, as was previously held, due to the sudden maturation of 
the hippocampus, but rather, to the development of certain neocortical 
147 'Neonates' are infants during the first four weeks of life (Tortora 1980), p 625. 
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connections. They argue that the hippocampus in fact, develops much earlier 
than previously thought. Rather than a sudden change, development occurs 
steadily throughout. As the relevant brain structures mature and develop, so 
also does the capacity for learning and categorising information. This 
increased capacity leads to a change in the framework through which infants 
experience the world, permitting the emergence of what has already been 
developing for some time, namely, the cognitive self. A major result is the end 
of infantile amnesia, and the commencement of autobiographical and other 
forms of event memory. Howe and Courage argue that contrary to earlier 
views that language and social factors govern the shift in the type of memory 
experienced, language is merely 'ancillary' rather than 'deterministic' of 
memory development. They argue that if language was the decisive factor, 
memories would not appear until much later than they do, such as in the 
immediate pre-school years. The researchers conclude that the development 
of language skills is not the primary impetus for development of the cognitive 
self, but rather, the result of it (Howe and Courage 1997), pp 500-504. 
The emergence of the cognitive self heralds the commencement of the infant's 
ability to verbalise memories. While memory ability does improve, it is out of 
proportion to the accompanying language development. The apparent jump 
in memory skills is more likely to be due to improved verbal and narrative 
skills. This is indicated by studies in which children were questioned 
concerning past events in their lives. Questions were wide ranging, covering 
events from the previous day to a year earlier. Some questions concerned 
periods in the child's life before verbal skills were acquired. In many 
instances, the children's recall of earlier events was 'highly accurate', 
indicating that these children were accessing memories previously retained in 
a non-verbal form. These results support the presence of early infant memory 
capacity, and correspondingly, of early infant self-awareness. The onset of 
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autobiographical memory thus cannot be seen as an isolated developmental 
phenomenon, but rather, as the outcome of an already occurring intricate and 
fertile process, which, in the first instance, involves bodily engagement and 
bodily self-experience (Howe and Courage 1997), p 505. The importance of 
this early bodily self-experience to the development of cognitive awareness is 
not recognised by the psychological continuity criterion, and it is thus unable 
to account for some of the most important factors involved in the possibility of 
mental life and experience. This results in the account of personal identity, 
furnished by the psychological continuity criterion, being inadequate in some 
of its most crucial aspects. 
6.8.3 	Autobiographical Memories 
Autobiographical memories were described earlier as having special 
relevance to the self. 148 This relevance persists throughout life, as well as 
when autobiographical memories first appear. Brewer defines 
autobiographical memory as memory which contains information relating to 
the self. The self is characterised as complex, comprising (at least) the ego 
and the self-schema. The ego is the subject of experience. It is conscious, 
has first-person awareness, is phenomenologically aware, and is subject to 
space and time. The self-schema is a 'cognitive structure', and consist of self-
knowledge. It is formed from repeated instances of ego-self memories. These 
accumulate to form generic self-memories. The self-schema changes only 
gradually, thus providing a stable background to the self. Together with 
relevant aspects of autobiographical memory, the ego and self-schema form 
the unity of the self. Brewer characterises the individual as a more 
comprehensive construct, comprising self, mind and body, and various skills, 
such as cognitive or motor skills. The individual includes non-personal 
aspects of the self, such as general knowledge or other non-personal 
148Autobiographical memories were referred to in Chapter 4.6. 
251 
knowledge (Brewer 1986), pp 26-27. As I conceive the self to be a dynamic 
unity of all the elements of experience, I find Brewer's self overly mental, and 
would, therefore, include Brewer's 'individual' as part of the dynamic self. 
Autobiographical memories are those memories that comprise life the events 
which are significant to the sense of ourselves and our lives They are 
memories through which we apprehend the past, and gain insight into the 
future. Autobiographical memories concern persons' lives, persons' views of 
themselves, and of their actions. These memories concern first-person and 
third-person memory knowledge, and have intra-subjective and inter-
subjective aspects. Autobiographical memories are more than chains of 
events. They are part of the framework of the self, and are ways in which 
selves become known. 
Neisser suggests that autobiographical memory can be understood in spatial 
terms. Drawing on Gibson's work in ecological psychology, Neisser suggests 
a nested structure, in which smaller units are encased in larger units. For 
example, sitting in my ergonomic chair means also being in my study, in my 
house, in a certain street, in a certain town, and so on. To refer to me at this 
particular place means locating me within this spatial structure. Similarly, a 
particular memory, say, my attending my daughter's debating finals last week, 
is situated inside other memories, such as what else I did that week, what 
happened that day, earlier debates I had attended, and so on. Each item of 
experience can be seen in this way, as part of a sequence which is in turn part 
of a larger sequence. Like a set of Russian dolls, each life-event is situated 
within another event, which, due to its proximity, gives the event shape, 
dimension, context, and meaning. This approach avoids characterising 
autobiographical memory atomistically, or merely serially, respecting instead 
its essentially holistic nature (Neisser 1986), pp 72-77. 
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Understood holistically, autobiographical memories contribute to our self-
formation. We define ourselves in relation to a present which is coherently 
connected to a past. Our known past is part of what defines us to ourselves. 
The things we know about ourselves, such as our name, our family, our job, 
our friends, and so on, all contribute to how we see and know ourselves. In 
one way or another, all our actions contribute to our autobiography, and hence 
to our unity, and correspondingly, to our self-formation. Even forgotten 
activities make their mark. Events unremembered have still contributed to our 
self-making, and are thus still 'part' of us. There may be subconscious 
memories that we cannot access. They may not be part of our explicitly self-
conscious 'memory-chain', but are nevertheless, part of what makes us the 
selves that we are, and hence, the persons that we are. But as with other 
aspects of self-development, the psychological continuity criterion fails to take 
account of these aspects of the self, and thus fails to appreciate self's 
cumulative aspects. It misses the point that our memories contribute to the 
development and richness of the self, and that each self thus has its own 
unique history. This contrasts with the view of the self and memories as being 
somewhat fleeting, rather superficial phenomena, subject to transfer and 
manipulation, without any real significance to mental life or personal identity. 
In taking this view of the self, the psychological continuity criterion fails to 
account for the sense we have of ourselves over time, as not just persons here 
and now, but as persons with a particular history, and with a particular sense 
of ourselves in relation to that history. This sense of ourselves through time is 
sometimes understood through the concept of 'narrative identity'. 
6.8.4 	Narrative Identity 
Understood in the context of a whole life, autobiographical memories form our 
life narratives. Persons are mortal creatures. We were born one day, and will 
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die one day. Our lives span the period in between. There are thus 
boundaries to our life-activities. Realising our mortality, we can gain meaning 
by looking at our lives as a whole. Life is more than one event merely 
following another. Lives have shapes, dimensions, and structures. We can 
reflect on our lives, our reasons, emotions, choices, decisions, and actions. 
We can remember many of our actions, and sometimes only the event itself. 
But we do not remember everything. If we did, we would be overloaded with 
memory, and could probably make little sense of it. A person who remembers 
everything may as well remember nothing. Memory is essentially 
discriminating, constrained by many factors. In remembering we typically 
know who we are, where we have been, where we are heading, and what 
options lie before us. By visualising the future, we can decide between the 
available alternatives as to how we should act. To choose, we must be able, 
in principle at least, to predict the outcome. This requires that we identify the 
self of today with the self of the past, and the self of the future. If I suffered from 
amnesia, and thus lost sense of myself existing in time, such that I had sense 
of neither my past, nor my future, I would be unable to act. Not knowing what I 
am doing now, what plans I had in the past, I would not know what choices I 
should make, or indeed, what choices I could make. If I did not remember 
what my projects were, I could have no intentions to carry out those projects, 
nor could I see how my present life or my future life connects to my actions. 
Seeing my life as a narrative grounds my projects, and thus informs me of how 
I should act now. The things that constitute my narrative are the things that 
make me the self that I am. 
Narratives in stories and films often portray events whose significance is not 
apparent at the time, but which becomes apparent later. The significance of 
earlier events is often only revealed when married to later events. More often 
than not, the significance is derivable from the way the event in question fits 
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into a whole pattern of events. Similarly, real lives gain significance from the 
way their parts relate to each other, especially the most crucial events. Events 
which endow one's life with significance may not always be known or 
recognised at the time they occur, sometimes not until after one's death. In 
this case, only others would know the significance, and not oneself. We can 
gain some idea of our lives' significance from looking back from periodic 
vantage-points. We can never look back on our life as a complete whole. We 
cannot see our lives as a complete narrative, but only as an ongoing one. 
Seeing our lives as narratives enables us to perceive meaning in our lives as 
a whole, rather than just in parts. Our narrative at any given time is the unity 
we have of our self at that time. 
There may or may not be meaning in parts of persons' lives, but the meaning 
of a whole life may not apparent from looking at only the parts. Malpas notes 
that recounting our life as narratives allows us to look beyond individual 
events to the way in which these events are unified into a single life (Malpas 
1999), p 80. Having a master narrative gives one's life even more meaning, 
as it provides a wider setting within which one's life can be shaped and 
interpreted. Considering life in terms of a narrative structure facilitates the act 
of self-interpretation. We can step back from our lives to take meaning beyond 
the present moment, thus expanding the unity of the self. Freeman notes that 
the impetus to integrate memories can sometimes cause us to confer meaning 
not intended at the time. Taken too far, this could result in fictions rather than 
narratives (Freeman 1993), pp 5-11. Integrating false information into the self 
could lead to our self-concept becoming inaccurate and, therefore, self-
deceptive. This appreciation of how our memories, activities, goals, and so 
on, weave into our life-narratives is missing from the psychological continuity 
criterion. By conceiving of the self in superficial terms, it fails to appreciate the 
self's role in our developing self-concepts, and in the sense we have of 
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ourselves as persons with whole lives, rather than as persons with just this 
experience here and now. 
Narrative and time are especially involved in self-formation. Involuntary 
memories play a special role here, as they refer to things which have 
occurred, but which have 'congealed' into the self, and are recalled in 
response to certain triggers which are applied accidentally, rather than 
intentionally. Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, gives many examples of 
such memories, and demonstrates how these memories are direct and non-
interpretive. Often triggered by non-visual senses such as taste, touch or 
smell, involuntary memories are often ineffable, mysterious, unfinished and 
lingering. This is because they are directly experienced through the body, and 
we therefore struggle to find the right cognitive connections and 
interpretations. For example, Genevieve Lloyd refers to the incident in which 
Proust's taste of madeleine evokes strong memories of past places and times: 
The essence yielded by involuntary memory is already grasped as a truth which lies 
not outside but within himself. His seeking mind feels 'overtaken by itself' (Lloyd 
1993), p 130. 149 
149Proust 'recalls' an incident in which, when having afternoon tea with his mother, memories 
are generated by the taste of the madeleine (small cake), dipped in tea: 'Many years had 
elapsed during which nothing of Combray, save what was comprised in the theatre and the 
drama of my going to bed there, had any existence for me, when one day in winter, on my return 
home, my mother, seeing that I was cold, offered me some tea, a thing I did not ordinarily take. I 
declined at first, and then, for no particular reason, changed my mind. She sent for one of those 
squat, plump little cakes called "petites madeleines", which look as though they had been 
moulded in the fluted valve of a scallop shell. And soon, mechanically, dispirited after a dreary 
day with the prospect of a depressing morrow, I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I 
had soaked a morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched 
my palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that 
was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure invaded my senses, something isolated, 
detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And once the vicissitudes of life had become 
indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory - this new sensation having had on 
me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not 
in me, it was me' (Proust 1981), p 48. Because Proust's memory was predominantly sensual, 
that is, bodily experienced, it was not immediately or easily captured cognitively. 
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Involuntary memories like this allow us to revisit and recapture our past selves. 
Malpas holds that place is important to involuntary memories. Activities are 
tied to places. As embodied, spatial creatures, place is thus integral to our 
selves and our memories. Revisiting places can draw threads of the past 
together, invoking our memories, causing us to reincorporate these memories 
into our present selves (Malpas 1999), pp 182-184. Our self-knowledge is 
widened, and the integration between past and present aspects of the self is 
strengthened. This aspect of our selves is missed by the psychological 
continuity criterion, which, while failing to recognise the self's importance to 
memory, also fails to recognise the importance of memory to the self. 
Voluntary memory can be used deliberately in the act of self-formation. 
Autobiographies are often written with this aim. The earliest known 
autobiography, Augustine's Confessions, employs voluntary memory to 
incorporate the past prior to his conversion, with the awareness gained since 
conversion. In doing so, Augustine transforms the past, and sees it, rather 
than just a segment of life, but as part of a single narrative. In the act of 
narrative, he steps back from himself, viewing past and present self-concepts 
in light of his whole life, and in light of his understanding of his life as related to 
God (Lloyd 1993), pp 14-42; (Augustine 1996). In widening his self concept 
in this way, Augustine demonstrates that the self is not a static thing, but is a 
dynamic unity, which is subject to constant change and 'updating'. 
Narratives can unify the self by means of underlying principles or goals. 
These principles can be the primary motivation for actions, unifying a person's 
self, and a person's life simultaneously. For example, a person whose primary 
aim is to pursue a particular sport may judge all his activities in relation to that 
sport. The choice of whether to perform one activity or an alternative activity is 
made on the basis of its contribution to the enhancement of the sport 
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concerned. Individual activities are formed into groups, which, United with 
other groups, form the person's life-history. Similarly, argues Maclntyre, life 
narratives can be understood as divisible into episodes. Episodes comprise 
segments, and segments comprise individual actions. According to Maclntyre, 
a life underpinned by virtue is united by the value-judgments which guide that 
life's actions. Even when judgments are hidden, they are the fundamental 
principles which draw that life into a single history. Understanding a single 
action on its own may make no sense. Only by conceiving it as part of a whole 
history can its meaning be understood. Maclntyre argues that a fragmented, 
temporary self, such as that of Parfit, cannot incorporate values into a single 
life in this way. Fragmented selves do not last a whole life-time, and thus 
cannot be underpinned by sets of values which require a life-time to mature 
(Maclntyre 1981), pp 190-209. Thus, selves which incorporate long-term 
values into their unity are likely to be more enduring selves that those which 
do not. 
The concept of narrative draws on the self's essentially dynamic nature. 
Defined by its actions and memories, the self is necessarily vital and active. 
Paul Ricoeur holds that narrative more fruitfully accounts for the self's 
durability amidst change, than Parfit's 'science fiction'. Ricoeur argues that 
'literary fiction' more aptly represents the real lives from which it is taken, than 
'unrealizable' thought experiments. Literary characters are not static, yet 
when changed by the events and plots of their stories, they are not assumed to 
have changed identity: 
According to my thesis, the narrative constructs the durable character of an 
individual, which one can call his or her narrative identity, in constructing the sort of 
dynamic identity proper to the plot (l'intrigue ) which creates the identity of the 
protagonist in the story. It is primarily in the plot therefore that we must search for 
the mediation between permanence and change, before being able to transfer it to 
the character. The advantage of this detour through the plot is that it furnishes the 
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model of discordant concordance upon which it is possible to construct the 
narrative identity of a character. The narrative identity of this character will only be 
known correlative to the discordant concordance of the story itself (Ricoeur 1991), 
pp 77-78. 
A character's identity is maintained against impermanent and changed 
surroundings. Retention of identity is compatible with change, not contrary to 
it. Unless a character could change and grow, it is difficult to imagine how 
there could be a story at all. Replicas, claims Ricoeur, do not interact with 
other selves, and so are not changed by them. 'Narrative situations' inform of 
real lives, and can act as models by which to interpret lives. This interpretation 
sustains our selves, permitting growth and stability amidst change (Ricoeur 
1991), pp 77-79. In narrating our lives to our selves, we develop and 
progress, while at the same time, drawing together the diverse parts of our 
lives into the unity of our selves. These dimensions of the self are overlooked 
by the psychological continuity criterion. For Part it and similar theorists, the 
self is superficial and insubstantial. But as has been argued, this view of the 
self is mistaken, and results from incorrect preconceptions about what the self 
is, and why the self is integral to experience and mental life. When the various 
forms of self-unity are more closely examined, it becomes evident that self-
unity is crucial to all forms of experience and mental life, such that it is only in 
view of the self's unity that experience and mental life are possible. 
6.9 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the psychological continuity criterion's 
Reductionist conception of the self. This conception holds that selves do not 
ground identity, and cannot be presumed to exist. On this view, a person's 
identity is theoretically transferable, indeterminate, and ultimately insignificant. 
I have argued that the Reductionist conception of the self has little basis, and 
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leaves subjectivity inadequately explained. In contrast to the Reductionist 
view, I have argued that the self is essential to experience, and that the self is 
given in experience. I have also argued that the self is a dynamic unity, which 
is first experienced bodily, and is later experienced cognitively. In support of 
my claims, I have presented philosophical arguments from Kant and Malpas, 
and considerable evidence from empirical studies. I have also explored the 
relevance to the self of autobiography and narrative. 
To facilitate understanding the self, I have discussed the self in terms of the 
cognitive self and the embodied self, as these distinctions permit exploration 
of different aspects of the self. Drawing on Kant and Malpas, the cognitive self 
was shown to be an essential component of mental life and experience, as 
this aspect of the self is understood to be the apperceptive unity of mental life 
and experience. I have argued that it is only by the integration of the various 
aspects of mental life and experience into a single subjectivity, that experience 
and mental life are possible. In support of the embodied self, I have referred to 
studies of early infant development, which showed various ways in which the 
self is bodily experienced early in life, and how this bodily self-experience is 
essential to, and an essential part of, infants' early abilities and activities, such 
as motility, habituation, imitation, and so on. 
To explore ways in which the embodied self develops into, and, in some 
sense, gives way to, the cognitive self, aspects of concept-formation were 
examined. Studies addressed included those concerning infants' ability for 
self-identification, and for the formation of autobiographical memories. These 
abilities mark the onset of concept-formation, and the subsequently, the 
capacity for self-awareness and self-reflexivity. Having self-awareness and 
self-reflexivity permits the unity of self to include our past 'selves' and our 
anticipated future 'selves'. The concept of narrative was also examined, to 
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elucidate various ways in which self-knowledge can expand and develop, and 
in which whole lives can gain coherence and meaning. Narrative permits us 
to imbue our lives with value, and to view our lives as coherent wholes, and 
thus provides a richer conception of the self than a conception which 
conceives of experience as disconnected and atomistic. In summary, these 
arguments in support of the self demonstrate several important ways in which 
the self is a unity, which is both a part of experience, and a necessary 
condition of experience. These arguments also show that the self which is 
conceived as a dynamic unity is not a fleeting, ephemeral entity, but is a self 
which is structured, coherent, organised, inherently complex, and, importantly, 
enduring. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Central Claims 
The foregoing chapters have attempted to defend this thesis' two central 
claims. These claims concern the psychological continuity's atomistic 
approach to personal identity, and the proposal of an alternative, more holistic 
approach to this issue. Specifically, the central claims of this thesis are: 
• That due to its reductionist, criterial approach, the psychological continuity 
criterion is inadequate to account for personal identity. 
• That a sound approach to personal identity must respect the complex, 
dynamic, holistic, non-reductive nature of persons. 
In respect of the first claim, I have argued that by selectively categorising 
personal identity in terms of linear mental chains, the psychological continuity 
criterion produces a misleading account of persons, and consequently, of 
personal identity. Because it neglects many other identity-determining 
features, the psychological continuity criterion produces an untenably thin 
account of the conditions under which personal identity is maintained. The 
continuance of event memories, certain beliefs and intentions, and so on, 
without the specification of what this continuance involves, results in 'persons' 
who are unfamiliar to us. Their minds are theoretically isolated from the world 
in which they live, their mental contents disordered, their body's irrelevant, and 
their self-knowledge superficial. Both their individuality and their long-term 
survival are distorted. As a result, their personal autonomy and their capacity 
for responsibility are distorted also. My concern is that these altered 
conceptions of persons are detrimental, both to individuals and to societies. 
Such persons are anomalous, and do not represent persons as they are, or as 
we know them to be. 
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As the foregoing chapters show, these aberrant outcomes result from an 
analysis which is inappropriate due to several deficiencies: undue focus on 
thought experiments which concern 'uncommon' persons, to the detriment of 
real persons (Chapter 2); inadequate appreciation of the extent to which the 
external world, and our perception of the external world influences and 
constrains our mental lives (Chapter 3); inaccurate characterisation of the 
mind's structure and the failure to appreciate the relevance of the mind's 
particular ownership (Chapter 4); neglect of the body's role in mental life 
(Chapter 5), and finally, confusion with the role and nature of the self and its 
essential place in mental life and bodily activity. Together, these 
misapprehensions of personal identity factors yield an account of personal 
identity which is metaphysically and ethically unsatisfactory, thus supporting 
the first claim: that due to its reductionist, criterial approach, the psychological 
continuity criterion is inadequate to account for personal identity. 
In respect of the second claim, I have throughout the foregoing chapters 
advanced two major points. First, personal identity involves essential features 
not specified by the psychological continuity criterion. Second, due to their 
inherent interrelatedness, many of these features, although concealed, are 
nevertheless implicated by the psychological continuity criterion, but are 
entirely ignored by it. Because they are related at a fundamental level, these 
features are misrepresented when conceptualised in isolation from each 
other. They are missed by the superficial analysis of thought experiments 
(Chapter 2), and include at least the external world (Chapter 3), the individual 
and unique ownership of mental states (Chapter 4), the body (Chapter 5), and 
the dynamic unity of the self (Chapter 6). I have argued that being a person, 
and having a mind necessarily involves living in, and experiencing a world, 
having a coherently structured mind, having a body, and experiencing oneself 
as a more-or-less united self. As I have also argued, the mind's holism is 
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related to our status as acting as well as thinking beings. From the earliest 
moments of life, to the last moments of self-reflection, persons are (in principle) 
interrelated, active beings. Their mental lives and activities depend on many 
parts, and on the relations between these parts. Removing parts, such as 
bodies and environments, from persons makes no sense, as these things are 
part of what persons are, such that if these parts were changed, persons' 
identities would be changed also. These arguments, which have been 
elucidated and defended throughout the thesis, support my second claim: that 
a sound approach to personal identity must respect the dynamic, holistic, non-
reductive nature of persons. 
In light of these and the above arguments, it is clear that an account of 
personal identity which does not address the wealth of empirical evidence, 
available from real persons in real situations, is an account which has no 
authentic foundation, and which, therefore, cannot be sustained. The very fact 
that personal identity is about real persons vindicates the merits of the 
empirical evidence used throughout this thesis. As has been shown, pure 
speculation is simply inadequate to answer the issues which personal identity 
involves. Empirical evidence is particularly important to the psychological 
continuity criterial conception of personal identity because, as mentioned 
earlier, its disregard for bodily identity is based on speculation alone, and 
does not take into account the issues raised throughout this thesis (see the 
last paragraph in Section 1.3, including footnote 11). 
The above conception of persons now needs to be considered in the light of 
concerns expressed earlier in this thesis. 150 Recall that 'Parfitian Persons' are 
'series persons', whose endurance over extended periods of time is dubious. 
The fragmentary nature of series persons means that they have reduced 
150See Chapter 1.5. 
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responsibility for the actions of earlier series persons. My concern is that this 
reduced conception of personhood, and the diminished conception of 
responsibility which goes with it will lead to less respect for others, and to less 
appreciation of the implications of one's actions. On my account of personal 
identity, however, persons are construed to be enduring entities, which are not 
destroyed or threatened by change, but which, on the contrary, thrive and 
develop through change. Thus, change per se would not prevent persons 
from bearing responsibility for their actions. This is not to say that change 
would not be a factor in, for example, bearing responsibility for crimes. 
Clearly, there are many instances where change would be important, such as 
in the case of remorse, old age, illness, and so on. But the difference between 
my account Parfit's is that the type of change would be relevant, rather than 
the amount of change. Because persons consider themselves as whole 
entities, change could mean reform, reparation, self-improvement, the 
development of wisdom, and so on, rather than fragmentation, separation, and 
ultimately the death of one's former self. Contra Parfit, I consider that this 
conception of persons is more personally liberating, and more advantageous 
to society as a whole. 
7.2 Future Directions 
While the two major claims of this thesis, and the accompanying subordinate 
claims, are not intended to provide a definitive account of personal identity, 
they are intended to indicate some of the features which such an account 
should incoroporate. A more developed account of personal identity could be 
produced by undertaking further research into additional areas, such as the 
cultural, economic, and social forces which influence our lives. These forces 
are part of the world in which we live, and thus, on the basis of this thesis, are 
contributors to our identities. As has been argued throughout this thesis, our 
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identities are made of many things. Knowing more about what these things 
are, and how these things affect us increases our scope for self-knowledge 
and self-improvement. Taking the factors which compose personal identity 
seriously is thus more personally and socially useful than is taking those 
factors for granted. But while there is much more to be learnt about personal 
identity than can be covered in this thesis, it is my view that because persons 
are such complex, dynamic entities, the most extensive research will never 
reveal all there is to know about persons or personal identity. All the same, an 
account of personal identity which recognises our inherently dynamic nature, 
and which acknowledges that the world in which we live is intimately related to 
our thoughts and actions, gives more insight into personal identity, than an 
account which fails to acknowledge the sources and influences from which 
those thoughts and actions first arise. 
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